Who watches the justice system, and how far they reach

Constitution of the Argentine Nation (1853, reformed 1994)

Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University) — official constitutional text · Legislation · 1853 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Constitution of the Argentine Nation (1853, comprehensively reformed 1994), confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports Art. 5 (each province shall enact its own constitution and guarantee its own administration of justice); Art. 75 inc. 12 (Congress enacts the national codes — Civil, Commercial, Criminal, etc. — "without such codes altering the local jurisdictions", their application corresponding to the federal or provincial courts by subject-matter); Art. 108 (the judicial power of the Nation is exercised by a Supreme Court of Justice and inferior tribunals); Art. 110 (life tenure during good behaviour and irreducible compensation — judicial independence); Art. 114 (the Council of the Magistracy selects judges and administers the judiciary); Art. 120 (the Public Ministry is an independent organ with functional autonomy and financial self-governance — a fourth, extra-branch body); Art. 121 (the provinces keep all power not delegated to the federal Government — the reserved-powers clause); and Art. 86 (the Ombudsman, Defensor del Pueblo). Establishes the federation, the national codes applied by provincial courts, the autonomous Public Ministry, and the reserved-powers rule.

Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), sections 4 and 5 — establishment of the offices, and functions of the Ombudsman

Office of Parliamentary Counsel — Federal Register of Legislation (Australia) · Legislation · 1976 · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the Commonwealth Ombudsman only — a Commonwealth office with a Commonwealth remit, and nothing about any State or Territory ombudsman. The authorised compilation in force on 4 June 2026, read directly from the Register; the operative text was read from the compilation document the citation page links to, because the citation page itself serves a table of contents. Supports s. 4(1), that for the purposes of the Act there shall be "(a) a Commonwealth Ombudsman; and (b) at least one, and not more than 3, Deputy Commonwealth Ombudsmen". Supports s. 5(1), that the Ombudsman "shall investigate action, being action that relates to a matter of administration, taken either before or after the commencement of this Act by a Department, or by a prescribed authority, and in respect of which a complaint has been made to the Ombudsman", and "may, of his or her own motion, investigate any action" of the same kind. Two things follow and are stated on the page from this record: the office must act on a complaint and may act without one, and its reach is defined by "a Department, or by a prescribed authority" — Commonwealth terms of art, which is what confines the office to the Commonwealth. It establishes nothing about the Ombudsman’s powers during an investigation, which are in later sections not read here.

National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022 (Cth), sections 8, 10 and 20 — corrupt conduct, public official, and establishment of the Commission

Office of Parliamentary Counsel — Federal Register of Legislation (Australia) · Legislation · 2022 · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the Commonwealth anti-corruption commission and the conduct it may examine. Compilation No. 13, in force 1 July 2026, read directly from the Register. Supports s. 20, that "The National Anti-Corruption Commission (the NACC) is established by this section". Supports s. 10, that "Each of the following is a public official: (a) a parliamentarian; (b) a staff member of a Commonwealth agency; (c) a staff member of the NACC", together with persons acting as their deputies or delegates. Supports s. 8(1), that corrupt conduct includes "any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly: (i) the honest or impartial exercise of any public official’s powers as a public official; or (ii) the honest or impartial performance of any public official’s functions or duties as a public official", and further covers breach of public trust, abuse of office and misuse of information acquired in an official capacity. The definitional structure is the fact worth carrying: the conduct of ANY person is within reach, and it is the public official at the other end of that conduct who anchors the jurisdiction. This record establishes nothing about the Commission’s powers, its procedures, or whether it may hold public hearings.

Federal Constitutional Law of Austria (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, B-VG), consolidated

Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes (RIS), Bundeskanzleramt (Austria) · Legislation · 1930 · link verified 2026-07-26

The consolidated Austrian Federal Constitutional Law in the official legal-information system of the Federation (RIS). Individual articles were fetched at their ELI addresses and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports Art. 10(1) Z 6 and Z 7 (civil and criminal law, the administration of justice, protective institutions, and the security police — except the local security police — are FEDERAL matters of both legislation and execution); Art. 78a(1) and 78b(1) (the Federal Minister of the Interior is the supreme security authority; one Landespolizeidirektion per Land, subordinate to that Minister — federal authorities, not Land police forces); Art. 82(1) ("Die ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit geht vom Bund aus" — ordinary jurisdiction emanates from the Federation), reworded to "ordentliche" with effect from 1 January 2014 by the 2012 administrative-jurisdiction reform; Art. 87(1) (judges independent); Art. 90a (public prosecutors as organs of the ordinary judiciary, bound by instructions as provided by federal law); Art. 92(1) (the Oberster Gerichtshof is the highest instance in civil and criminal matters); Art. 129/133 (the administrative courts and the Verwaltungsgerichtshof); Art. 144 (the Verfassungsgerichtshof); and Art. 148a (the Volksanwaltschaft handles complaints of maladministration in federal administration).

Volksanwaltschaft (Austrian Ombudsman Board) — official site (English)

Volksanwaltschaft (Austria) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Austrian Ombudsman Board's own English site, read directly. Supports that the Volksanwaltschaft is the constitutional body (Art. 148a B-VG) to which anyone may complain of alleged maladministration in federal administration, comprising three Ombudspersons, and that it also serves as Austria's National Preventive Mechanism under OPCAT with human-rights commissions. Cited for the existence and mandate of the ombudsman; the annual complaint volume and the exact amendment history are not relied on.

The Belgian Constitution (official English translation, coordinated text)

Belgian House of Representatives (de Kamer / la Chambre) · Legislation · 1994 · link verified 2026-07-26

The official English translation of the coordinated Constitution, fetched as the House of Representatives PDF and text-extracted. Verbatim: Art. 1 "Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions"; Art. 40 "Judiciary power is exercised by the courts. Court decisions are executed in the name of the King"; Art. 142 "There is for all Belgium a Constitutional Court, the composition, competences and functioning of which are established by the law"; Art. 147 "There is a Supreme Court for all Belgium. This Court has no competence over the substance of the case" (the institution named is the Court of Cassation — see be-cassation); Art. 151 §1 "Judges are independent in the exercise of their jurisdictional competences. The public prosecutor is independent in conducting individual investigations and prosecutions, without prejudice to the right of the competent minister to order prosecutions and to enact binding directives of criminal policy". The "for all Belgium" single-body wording of Arts. 142/147/151 establishes that the judiciary, the constitutional court, and prosecution are federal (national) institutions, not Community/Region ones. Authoritative texts are Dutch/French/German; this is the official English reference translation.

Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988

Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25

The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.

Sobre o CNMP — Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público

Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público (Brasil) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the council’s own account of itself. The CNMP’s own page, read directly. Supports that it was “Criado em 30 de dezembro de 2004 pela Emenda Constitucional nº 45”; that it “É responsável pela fiscalização administrativa, financeira e disciplinar do Ministério Público brasileiro e de seus membros”; and that it “é composto por 14 membros, os Conselheiros Nacionais, provenientes de representantes do Ministério Público, da magistratura, da advocacia e da sociedade”. Three of the four benches named are drawn from outside the Ministério Público, which is the composition fact worth stating. The page does not break down which segments of the Ministério Público fall inside the council’s reach beyond that general wording, and nothing more precise is claimed from it. No serving councillor is named here, because a name is the fastest thing on such a page to go out of date.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. R-10), Part VI — Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, sections 45.29 to 45.37

Department of Justice Canada — Justice Laws Website · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: one commission, for one police force — the RCMP — and no other force in Canada. The official consolidated federal text on the Justice Laws Website, read directly. Supports s. 45.29(1), that “The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is established, consisting of a Chairperson and not more than four other members”; s. 45.29(2), that a person is not eligible to be a member if that person “is a member or former member” or is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident; s. 45.33, that “The Commission shall exercise or perform the powers, duties and functions that are assigned to it by this Act”; s. 45.34(1), that for the purpose of ensuring that the activities of the Force are carried out in accordance with the Act, the Witness Protection Program Act, regulations, ministerial directions or any policy, procedure or guideline relating to the operation of the Force, the Commission may, on the request of the Minister or on its own initiative, conduct a review of specified activities of the Force; and s. 45.37, that the Commission must establish and make public service standards for the time limits within which it deals with complaints. The eligibility bar is the provision to hold onto: Parliament wrote the exclusion of FORMER members into the statute, so civilian composition is a legislated requirement rather than an appointment practice. This record establishes nothing about any provincial police oversight body.

General Inspection of Security Forces (Generální inspekce bezpečnostních sborů, GIBS)

Generální inspekce bezpečnostních sborů (Czech Republic) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The GIBS official site, read directly. Supports that the General Inspection of Security Forces is an independent body that searches for, detects and investigates suspected crimes by officers of the Police of the Czech Republic, the Prison Service and the Customs Administration, and opens their criminal prosecutions. Its statutory basis is Act No. 341/2011 Coll. on the General Inspection of Security Forces (the act number independently corroborated in the verification pass).

Public Defender of Rights (Veřejný ochránce práv / Ombudsman)

Kancelář veřejného ochránce práv (Czech Republic) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Public Defender of Rights' own English site, read directly. Supports that the Ombudsman (Veřejný ochránce práv, based in Brno) handles complaints against the conduct or inaction of public authorities, conducts inspections of places where persons are deprived of liberty (prisons, detention, psychiatric hospitals, social-care homes), and acts as the national equality/anti-discrimination body under the Anti-Discrimination Act.

National justice systems — Czechia (European e-Justice Portal)

European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on Czechia, read directly. Supports the court hierarchy (district, regional and high courts under the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court), the statement that "the central state administrative body for the courts is the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic", that "the special court system consists only of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic", and that the only judicial councils are advisory "Councils for the Judiciary" established within individual courts (there is no national self-governing judicial council).

About the Police Complaints Authority

Den Uafhængige Politiklagemyndighed (Danish Independent Police Complaints Authority) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Independent Police Complaints Authority's own English page, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports that the Authority was enacted in 2010 (Act no. 404 of 21 April 2010) and became operational on 1 January 2012; that it investigates criminal cases against police (and prosecution) personnel, handles conduct complaints, and investigates deaths and serious injuries during police interventions or in custody; and that it "is independent of both the police and the prosecution service", with its council chaired by a High Court judge.

The Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman

Folketingets Ombudsmand (Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Parliamentary Ombudsman's own English site, read directly. Supports that the Ombudsman is "elected by the Danish Parliament, the Folketing, to investigate complaints about the public administration", on the statutory basis of the Ombudsman Act. The constitutional section number authorising the office was not asserted (the accessible rendering and the widely-cited official number differ); the statutory basis is used instead.

National justice systems — Denmark (European e-Justice Portal)

European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on Denmark, read directly and re-confirmed in the verification pass. Supports the court hierarchy — the Supreme Court (Højesteret) at the apex, two high courts (Østre and Vestre Landsret), the Maritime and Commercial Court, the Land Registration Court, and 24 district courts (byretterne), plus the courts of the Faroe Islands and Greenland — and that there is no constitutional court and no separate administrative courts (constitutional and administrative questions are decided within the ordinary courts). Also establishes the independent Danish Court Administration (Domstolsstyrelsen), created 1 July 1999, over which the Minister "has no powers of instruction".

About us — Independent Office for Police Conduct

Independent Office for Police Conduct (England and Wales) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the IOPC's own account of its remit. The office's about page, read directly. Supports that it oversees the police complaints system in England and Wales, investigates the most serious matters relating to police conduct including deaths following police contact, and sets the standards by which the police should handle complaints. It establishes nothing about the arrangements in Scotland or Northern Ireland, which are separate and were not researched.

Constitutional Reform Act 2005, section 3 (Guarantee of continued judicial independence) — legislation.gov.uk

The National Archives (United Kingdom) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the statutory guarantee of judicial independence. The official consolidated text, read directly. Supports that the Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary, and that subsection (2) disapplies the duty where imposing it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The section is shown as extending to the whole United Kingdom (U.K.), and the Scottish carve-out inside it is the reason a U.K. extent does not mean a uniform rule.

The Constitution of Finland (731/1999) — Ministry of Justice English translation

Ministry of Justice, Finland (via FAOLEX; original at finlex.fi) · Legislation · 1999 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Ministry of Justice official English translation of the 1999 Constitution, fetched as a PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by me and in the verification pass). Supports: Section 1 ("Finland is a sovereign republic"; "Finland is a Member State of the European Union"); Section 3 ("the judicial powers are exercised by independent courts of law, with the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court as the highest instances"); Section 17 ("the national languages of Finland are Finnish and Swedish"); Section 98 (the general courts and the general administrative courts); Section 99 (the Supreme Court is final in civil, commercial and criminal matters; the Supreme Administrative Court is final in administrative matters); Section 104 (the Prosecutor-General, appointed by the President of the Republic); Section 106 (a court gives primacy to the Constitution where an Act's application would be in "evident conflict" with it — diffuse review, no constitutional court); and Sections 108–109 (the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman). The authoritative texts are Finnish and Swedish.

Décret n° 2013-784 du 28 août 2013 relatif aux missions et à l'organisation de l'inspection générale de la police nationale

République française (Légifrance) · Legislation · 2013-08-28 · link verified 2026-08-10

The founding instrument of the IGPN. Supports the exact wording of article 1, 'L'inspection générale de la police nationale est un service actif de la direction générale de la police nationale' (version in force from 1 July 2023, as modified by décret n° 2023-530 of 29 June 2023); that its scope covers the services of the DGPN, the préfecture de police and, under conditions, the DGSI; article 3, 'une mission générale d'inspection, d'étude, d'audit et de conseil' together with internal control and risk management by delegation; article 4, 'L'inspection générale de la police nationale diligente des enquêtes judiciaires, d'initiative ou sur instruction de l'autorité judiciaire' and 'Elle reçoit les plaintes et dénonciations'; and article 5 (in force from 17 July 2025, as modified by décret n° 2025-651 of 16 July 2025), under which administrative investigations are conducted on the instruction of the Minister of the Interior, the DGPN, the DGSI or the préfet de police, with an urgency exception. It does NOT support any claim about how many investigations are conducted, about their outcomes, about the effectiveness or independence of the IGPN, or about any deontology mandate, which this text does not confer in terms.

LOI organique n° 2011-333 du 29 mars 2011 relative au Défenseur des droits

République française (Légifrance) · Legislation · 2011-03-29 · link verified 2026-08-10

Supports, from the consolidated text: article 2, 'Le Défenseur des droits, autorité administrative indépendante, ne reçoit et ne sollicite, dans l'exercice de ses attributions, aucune instruction', and that he and his deputies 'ne peuvent être poursuivis, recherchés, arrêtés, détenus ou jugés à l'occasion des opinions qu'ils émettent ou des actes qu'ils accomplissent dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions'; article 4, the five mandates, of which the fourth is 'De veiller au respect de la déontologie par les personnes exerçant des activités de sécurité sur le territoire de la République'; article 5, who may refer a matter, including a witness of a breach of security deontology; article 11, the collèges, including the one for security deontology; article 18, that he may 'demander des explications à toute personne'; article 20, communication of useful information and documents; article 22, 'Des vérifications sur place dans les locaux administratifs ou privés des personnes mises en cause'; article 24, that he assesses whether the facts call for his intervention; article 25, recommendations, the power to 'enjoindre à la personne mise en cause de prendre, dans un délai déterminé, les mesures nécessaires', and the rapport spécial made public where an injunction is not followed; article 29, that he 'peut saisir l'autorité investie du pouvoir d'engager les poursuites disciplinaires'; and article 36, the annual reports to the President of the Republic and the presidents of both chambers. The law also provides that where the facts appear to constitute a crime or délit he informs the procureur de la République, and that courts may invite him to present written or oral observations; the article numbers for those two powers could not be pinned across two independent reads and are therefore cited without a number. This source does NOT establish that the Défenseur des droits holds any power to impose a disciplinary sanction — article 29 places that power in another authority — nor anything about caseload, outcomes or effectiveness.

Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 (texte intégral en vigueur)

Conseil constitutionnel · Legislation · 1958-10-04 · link verified 2026-08-10

Authentic consolidated text published by the Conseil constitutionnel. Supports: Article 1 (indivisible Republic; decentralised organisation); Article 64 (President as guarantor of the independence of the judicial authority, assisted by the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature); Article 66 (judicial authority as guardian of individual liberty); Article 72 (categories of territorial collectivity); Article 72-3 (the ten named overseas territories); Articles 73 and 74 (the two overseas regimes); the title of Title VIII ('De l'autorité judiciaire') and of Title XIII (transitional provisions on New Caledonia). Re-verified on 10 August 2026 for Wave 6, which additionally establishes from the same text: Article 65, that the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature comprises a formation for magistrats du siège and one for magistrats du parquet, that the siège formation 'statue comme conseil de discipline des magistrats du siège' and that the parquet formation 'donne son avis sur les sanctions disciplinaires qui les concernent'; and Article 71-1, that 'Le Défenseur des droits veille au respect des droits et libertés par les administrations de l'Etat, les collectivités territoriales, les établissements publics, ainsi que par tout organisme investi d'une mission de service public', that he may be seized by any person believing themselves harmed and may act d'office, that he is appointed by the President of the Republic for a non-renewable mandate of six years incompatible with membership of the Government or Parliament, and that he reports on his activity to the President of the Republic and to Parliament. Does NOT support any claim about how these provisions are applied in practice, nor about the internal organisation of any institution. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authentic consolidated text (version to the constitutional revision of 8 March 2024). Supports Article 61, review BEFORE promulgation: organic laws before promulgation, the propositions de loi mentioned in Article 11 before being submitted to referendum, and the rules of the parliamentary assemblies before their entry into application "doivent être soumis au Conseil constitutionnel qui se prononce sur leur conformité à la Constitution"; that for the same purposes ordinary laws "peuvent être déférées au Conseil constitutionnel, avant leur promulgation" by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, or sixty deputies or sixty senators; that the Council must rule within one month, reduced to eight days at the Government's request in urgency; and that referral suspends the time limit for promulgation. Supports Article 61-1, review AFTER promulgation on referral: "Lorsque, à l'occasion d'une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu'une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d'État ou de la Cour de cassation qui se prononce dans un délai déterminé" — the question reaches the Council only through one of the two apex courts, which acts as a filter. Supports Article 62, the differing EFFECTS: a provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61 "ne peut être promulguée ni mise en application"; a provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61-1 "est abrogée à compter de la publication de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel ou d'une date ultérieure fixée par cette décision", with the Council determining the conditions and limits within which effects the provision has already produced may be called into question; and that the decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel "ne sont susceptibles d'aucun recours" and bind the public powers and all administrative and judicial authorities. Supports no claim about how often either route is used or about outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authentic consolidated text on the Conseil constitutionnel's site. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 36: “ARTICLE 36. L'état de siège est décrété en Conseil des ministres. Sa prorogation au-delà de douze jours ne peut être autorisée que par le Parlement.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 16, first two paragraphs: “Lorsque les institutions de la République, l'indépendance de la nation, l'intégrité de son territoire ou l'exécution de ses engagements internationaux sont menacées d'une manière grave et immédiate et que le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels est interrompu, le Président de la République prend les mesures exigées par ces circonstances, après consultation officielle du Premier ministre, des présidents des assemblées ainsi que du Conseil constitutionnel. Il en informe la nation par un message.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 16, final paragraph: “Après trente jours d'exercice des pouvoirs exceptionnels, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi par le Président de l'Assemblée nationale, le Président du Sénat, soixante députés ou soixante sénateurs, aux fins d'examiner si les conditions énoncées au premier alinéa demeurent réunies. Il se prononce dans les délais les plus brefs par un avis public. Il procède de plein droit à cet examen et se prononce dans les mêmes conditions au terme de soixante jours d'exercice des pouvoirs exceptionnels et à tout moment au-delà de cette durée.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 66: “ARTICLE 66. Nul ne peut être arbitrairement détenu. L'autorité judiciaire, gardienne de la liberté individuelle, assure le respect de ce principe dans les conditions prévues par la loi.”. Cited for the constitutional architecture of French exceptional powers and for the thirty-day review clock the 2008 revision built into Article 16. It records no use of Article 16, states nothing about the état d'urgence, which is statutory and cited separately, and supports no claim about any other country.

Plateforme administrative de signalement de l'inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN)

Ministère de l'Intérieur (France) — Ma Sécurité · Government publication · link verified 2026-08-10

The state's own description of the IGPN reporting platform. Supports that it is open to 'Toute personne, victime ou témoin - direct ou indirect -, quel que soit son lieu de résidence'; the express statement 'Il ne s'agit ni d'un service d'urgence, ni d'un service d'enquête, ni d'un service de plainte'; and that the role of platform staff is to route the report 'vers la hiérarchie compétente, pour y donner suite, ou vers une délégation de l'IGPN'. This source is cited specifically for the boundary between a signalement and a plainte. It does NOT support any claim about how reports are handled after routing, about volumes, or about outcomes. Undated on the page, so it supports the arrangement as at the verification date only.

Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Artikel 17 (Petitionsrecht)

Bundesministerium der Justiz — Gesetze im Internet · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the constitutional right of petition, and nothing about who acts on a petition. The official consolidated German text, read directly. Supports Art. 17 in full: “Jedermann hat das Recht, sich einzeln oder in Gemeinschaft mit anderen schriftlich mit Bitten oder Beschwerden an die zuständigen Stellen und an die Volksvertretung zu wenden.” Two features are worth holding separately from anything else on the German page. The right is held by “Jedermann” — every person, not every citizen. And it runs both to the competent authorities and to the representative assembly, which is why parliamentary petition is a route against an administration rather than merely a political gesture. This record establishes a right. It establishes no body, no power of investigation, and nothing about any Land.

Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Artikel 45c (Petitionsausschuss)

Bundesministerium der Justiz — Gesetze im Internet · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the Bundestag committee that handles Article 17 petitions. The official consolidated German text, read directly. Supports Art. 45c in full: “(1) Der Bundestag bestellt einen Petitionsausschuß, dem die Behandlung der nach Artikel 17 an den Bundestag gerichteten Bitten und Beschwerden obliegt. (2) Die Befugnisse des Ausschusses zur Überprüfung von Beschwerden regelt ein Bundesgesetz.” The second sentence is the one that matters and the one an oversight page is tempted to skip: the Basic Law creates the committee but leaves its investigative POWERS to ordinary federal legislation, which this record does not contain. So this record supports that the committee exists and must handle what Article 17 sends it. It does not support any statement about what the committee may compel, and no such statement is made from it.

Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), § 9 — Zuständigkeit

Bundesministerium der Justiz — Gesetze im Internet · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: which bodies the federal data-protection supervisor supervises, and which it does not. The official consolidated German text, read directly. Supports that the Bundesbeauftragte “ist zuständig für die Aufsicht über die öffentlichen Stellen des Bundes, auch soweit sie als öffentlich-rechtliche Unternehmen am Wettbewerb teilnehmen”, and — the reason this record exists rather than a summary of the office — that the Bundesbeauftragte “ist nicht zuständig für die Aufsicht über die von den Bundesgerichten im Rahmen ihrer justiziellen Tätigkeit vorgenommenen Verarbeitungen.” A supervisory competence that stops at the courtroom door is a different institution from one that does not, and a page listing this office among the bodies that watch the justice system without the second sentence would describe the wrong institution. Federal bodies only: the supervisory authorities of the Länder are established elsewhere and are not in this record.

Constitution of Greece (1975, as amended through 2008) — English translation

Comparative Constitutions Project (Constitute) · Legislation · 1975-06-11 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Comparative Constitutions Project (Constitute) English translation of the Greek Constitution (in force 11 June 1975, as amended through 2008), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted; load-bearing articles confirmed verbatim (Art. 93§4 and Art. 105 re-confirmed by hand at authoring time). This is an UNOFFICIAL translation — the Hellenic Parliament's own official English PDF returned HTTP 403 — so it is cross-checked against the current EU e-Justice portal, and the Greek text is authoritative. Supports Art. 26 (separation of powers); Art. 87–88 (judicial and prosecutorial independence, life appointment of magistrates by presidential decree); Art. 93§4 ("The courts shall be bound not to apply a statute whose content is contrary to the Constitution" — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 94–95 (the administrative courts and the Council of State as Supreme Administrative Court); Art. 96–97 (criminal, jury and military courts); Art. 98 (the Court of Audit, whose judgments are not subject to the Supreme Administrative Court — a co-equal apex); Art. 100 (the Special Highest Court — a conflict-resolving court, not a standing constitutional court); Art. 101–102 (unitary decentralisation); Art. 103§9 (the Ombudsman as an independent authority); and Art. 105 (Mount Athos as a self-governed part of the Greek State, with the State exclusively responsible for public order and security).

The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024)

Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department) · Legislation · 1950-01-26 · link verified 2026-07-27

The official Constitution of India PDF (Ministry of Law and Justice, "As on 1st May, 2024"), fetched and text-extracted; the Seventh Schedule entries and the cited articles were re-confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports the federal division of legislative power under the Seventh Schedule (Article 246): List II (State List) Entry 1 "Public order", Entry 2 "Police (including railway and village police)", Entry 4 "Prisons, reformatories, Borstal institutions… and persons detained therein" — so police, public order and prisons are exclusive STATE subjects; List III (Concurrent List) Entry 1 "Criminal law…", Entry 2 "Criminal procedure…", Entry 11A "Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts" — so the criminal codes and subordinate-court organisation are concurrent (national); and List I (Union List) Entry 8 "Central Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation". Also supports Article 50 (separation of the judiciary from the executive), Article 124 (the Supreme Court of India), Article 141 (Supreme Court law binding on all courts), Article 214 ("There shall be a High Court for each State"), and Article 235 (High Court control over district and subordinate courts).

Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 (UUD 1945, as amended 1999–2002)

Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (Constitutional Court of Indonesia) · Legislation · 1945 · link verified 2026-07-27

The 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945, as amended in four rounds 1999–2002), confirmed against the Constitutional Court and other official hosts in two independent passes. Supports Pasal 1(1) ("The State of Indonesia is a unitary state in the form of a Republic"); Pasal 18 (the unitary state is divided into provinces, regencies and cities with regional governments); Pasal 24(1) ("The judicial power is an independent power to administer justice"); Pasal 24(2) (judicial power is exercised by a Mahkamah Agung over the general, religious, military and administrative court environments, and by a Mahkamah Konstitusi); Pasal 24B (the Judicial Commission, Komisi Yudisial); and Pasal 24C (the Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of statutes at first and final instance). Establishes the unitary state, the national judiciary, and the dual-apex court structure.

Introducing Fiosrú, the Office of the Police Ombudsman

Fiosrú — Office of the Police Ombudsman (Ireland) · Government publication · 2025-04-02 · link verified 2026-07-25

Read directly. Supports: that following commencement of the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 on 2 April 2025, Fiosrú, the Office of the Police Ombudsman, opened as the new policing-oversight body replacing the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC); and that Fiosrú receives and investigates complaints from the public about Garda personnel. Supports the CURRENT identity of the police complaints body and the date of transition. It does not describe the Policing and Community Safety Authority beyond what other sources establish.

Minister for Justice commences the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024

Government of Ireland (gov.ie) · Government publication · 2025-04-02 · link verified 2026-07-25

Official content obtained by search retrieval of gov.ie (WAF-blocked to direct fetch); corroborated by fiosru.ie. Supports: that the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 was commenced on 2 April 2025; that it reconstituted GSOC as Fiosrú (Office of the Police Ombudsman); and that it established the Policing and Community Safety Authority (PCSA), dissolving the Policing Authority and the Garda Síochána Inspectorate and merging their oversight and inspection functions into the PCSA. Supports the current/historical status of the oversight bodies and the transition date. Stated as sourced facts.

Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948) — official English translation

Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Constitutional Court's own official English translation (October 2023 edition), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by the research and verification passes; the Senate's English PDF was bot-walled, so this Court edition was substituted). Supports Art. 101 (justice administered in the name of the people; the judiciary subject only to the law), Art. 104 (the judiciary an independent branch; the High Council of the Judiciary/CSM), Art. 107 (the public prosecutor's guarantees), Art. 109 ("judicial authorities may directly avail themselves of the judicial police"), Art. 112 ("the public prosecutor shall have the obligation to initiate criminal proceedings" — mandatory prosecution), Art. 103 (the Council of State and administrative justice), Art. 116 (the five special-autonomy regions, with additional devolution over "justice" limited to the organizational requirements of the Justice of the Peace), Art. 117(2) — subparagraphs (l) "jurisdiction and procedural law; civil and criminal law; administrative justice", (h) "public order and security, save for local administrative police", (d) defence — establishing that all four justice functions are EXCLUSIVE State competence, and Arts. 134–135 (the Constitutional Court).

検察審査会法（昭和二十三年法律第百四十七号）— Act on Committee for Inquest of Prosecution, Arts. 1, 2, 4, 39-5, 41-6 and 41-9

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications — e-Gov (Japan) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the Committee for Inquest of Prosecution, and nothing else in Japanese oversight. NOT MONITORED, and the reason is specific rather than an omission: the readable route is the portal’s law-data endpoint, which serves XML. This platform’s normalizer supports HTML and plain text, so an observation here returns `unsupported-content` — a statement about our tooling and not about the document. Declaring anchors that nothing can check would be worse than declaring none. The authoritative Japanese text, read directly from the official law-data route; the portal’s rendered pages are client-side and serve a shell to an automated request, while this address serves the statute itself. There is no English translation of this Act in the Ministry of Justice database, so every quotation here is Japanese and no English wording is attributed to the statute. Supports Art. 1, that committees are placed at the seats of district courts and their branches designated by Cabinet Order “公訴権の実行に関し民意を反映させてその適正を図るため” — to reflect the popular will in the exercise of the power to prosecute and secure its propriety. Supports Art. 2, that the committee’s business is the examination of whether a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute was proper, and recommendations on the improvement of prosecutorial administration. Supports Art. 4, that a committee is composed of eleven members “くじで選定した” — selected by lot from those holding the right to vote in House of Representatives elections within the committee’s district. Supports Art. 39-5, which provides three forms of resolution: that prosecution is appropriate, that the decision not to prosecute was improper, and that it was proper; a resolution that prosecution is appropriate requires a majority of eight or more. Supports Art. 41-6(1), that a 起訴議決 — a resolution that prosecution SHALL be brought — is available only at the second examination and likewise requires eight or more, and that the committee must first give the prosecutor an opportunity to attend and state an opinion. Supports Arts. 41-9 and 41-10, that after such a resolution the district court designates an attorney from among lawyers to perform the duties of a prosecutor, who must bring the prosecution promptly, subject to stated exceptions such as the death of the suspect. This record establishes nothing about how often any of this happens, and no claim about frequency or outcome is made from it.

Constitution of Kenya, 2010

National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.

Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (1917, current text)

Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación / official constitutional text · Legislation · 1917-02-05 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (1917), confirmed against the Supreme Court's per-article texts and a current-text mirror in two independent passes (the consolidated official PDF at diputados.gob.mx was unreachable). Supports Art. 17 (federal and local laws shall guarantee the independence of the courts); Art. 40 (a representative, democratic, secular and federal Republic of free and sovereign States and Mexico City); Art. 124 (residual powers reserved to the States or Mexico City); Art. 73-XXI (Congress legislates federal crimes and organized crime, and enacts a single national code of criminal procedure, sentence execution and juvenile justice governing both the federal and the common order); Art. 94 (the Supreme Court of nine Ministers, plus a judicial-administration body and a Judicial Discipline Tribunal); Art. 102-A (the Public Prosecution of the Federation is organised as an autonomous public body, the Fiscalía General de la República); Art. 21 (public security is a shared function of the Federation, the states and the municipalities; the investigation of crimes corresponds to the Public Prosecutor with the police under its conduct and command); Art. 18 (the penitentiary system, organised for social reinsertion); Art. 96 and Art. 116-III (judges elected by direct citizen vote — see the 2024 reform); and Art. 102-B (the human-rights commissions and their non-binding recommendations).

The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2008 (official English translation)

Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations) · Legislation · 2008 · link verified 2026-07-26

The official English translation of the Grondwet, fetched as a government.nl PDF and text-extracted. Supports Chapter 6 (administration of justice): Art. 112–113 (adjudication and trial of offences are the judiciary's), Art. 114 ("Capital punishment may not be imposed"), Art. 116 ("The courts which form part of the judiciary shall be specified by Act of Parliament"), Art. 117 (judges and the Procurator General at the Supreme Court appointed for life by Royal Decree — the independence guarantee), Art. 118 (the Supreme Court and cassation), Art. 120 ("The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts" — no constitutional review of statutes), and Art. 78a (the National Ombudsman). The authoritative text is the Dutch original; this English version is an official reference translation.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the official consolidated Dutch text of the Grondwet at wetten.overheid.nl (BWBR0001840), article by article; the Dutch text is authoritative. Supports Art. 10(1): “Ieder heeft, behoudens bij of krachtens de wet te stellen beperkingen, recht op eerbiediging van zijn persoonlijke levenssfeer”, with 10(2)-(3) on personal-data rules and access. Supports Art. 12(1)-(3): “1 Het binnentreden in een woning zonder toestemming van de bewoner is alleen geoorloofd in de gevallen bij of krachtens de wet bepaald, door hen die daartoe bij of krachtens de wet zijn aangewezen. 2 Voor het binnentreden overeenkomstig het eerste lid zijn voorafgaande legitimatie en mededeling van het doel van het binnentreden vereist, behoudens bij de wet gestelde uitzonderingen. 3 Aan de bewoner wordt zo spoedig mogelijk een schriftelijk verslag van het binnentreden verstrekt. Indien het binnentreden in het belang van de nationale veiligheid of dat van de strafvordering heeft plaatsgevonden, kan volgens bij de wet te stellen regels de verstrekking van het verslag worden uitgesteld.” The VERIFIED NEGATIVE this supports is textual: Art. 12 contains no requirement of judicial authorisation. Supports Art. 13: “1 Ieder heeft recht op eerbiediging van zijn brief- en telecommunicatiegeheim. 2 Beperking van dit recht is mogelijk in de gevallen bij de wet bepaald met machtiging van de rechter of, in het belang van de nationale veiligheid, door of met machtiging van hen die daartoe bij de wet zijn aangewezen.” Supports Art. 15(1)-(2): no one may be deprived of liberty outside cases determined by or pursuant to statute; a person deprived of liberty otherwise than by judicial order may request the court for release, is heard within a statutorily determined period, and the court orders immediate release if it judges the deprivation unlawful. Supports Art. 93: “Bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties, die naar haar inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden, hebben verbindende kracht nadat zij zijn bekendgemaakt.” Supports Art. 94: “Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties.” Supports Art. 120: “De rechter treedt niet in de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen.” Supports Art. 121, that hearings take place in public and judgments state the grounds on which they rest, except in cases determined by statute. Reading Arts. 93, 94 and 120 together is what supports the finding that a Dutch court may not review a statute against the Constitution but must decline to apply it where it conflicts with a self-executing treaty provision. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Hoge Raad, no statute, nothing about any other country.

The Dutch judicial system and the Council for the Judiciary

De Rechtspraak / Raad voor de rechtspraak (Council for the Judiciary) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The judiciary's own English portal, read as an overview. Supports that the Hoge Raad is the highest court in civil, criminal and tax matters, and that the Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de rechtspraak) "is part of the judiciary system, but does not administer justice itself" — it supports the courts' budget and operations. Establishes the judicial-council arrangement named on the oversight page.

Independent Police Conduct Authority (New Zealand) — about us

Independent Police Conduct Authority (New Zealand) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

The IPCA's own site, read directly. Supports that the Independent Police Conduct Authority is "an independent body set up by Parliament to keep watch over the Police", that "we are not part of the NZ Police" and "under law we are fully independent", that it was established in 1989, and that it receives and investigates complaints against the Police. Establishes the external police-complaints body.

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria (official text host) · Legislation · 1999 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended, the copy carrying amendments through 2011), downloaded as the full official PDF (775,326 bytes, 137 pages) and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports: s 4 and the Second Schedule (the division of legislative power — the Exclusive Legislative List for the Federation, the Concurrent List for both, and residual matters for the States under s 4(7)); Exclusive List item 45 and s 214(1) ("There shall be a police force for Nigeria … no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof" — a single national police); Exclusive List item 48 ("Prisons" — federal corrections); s 6(5) (the superior courts of record — the federal Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Federal High Court and FCT High Court, and the State High Courts, Sharia Courts of Appeal and Customary Courts of Appeal); s 230/233/235 (the Supreme Court as apex, its decisions final); s 237 (the Court of Appeal); s 275/280 (State Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal, headed by a Grand Kadi); s 150/174 (the Attorney-General of the Federation, a Minister and Chief Law Officer, with power to institute, take over or discontinue federal prosecutions) and s 195/211 (each State Attorney-General with the mirror power for state offences); s 215 (the Inspector-General commanding the Nigeria Police Force, with the President's lawful-directions power); s 153 and the Third Schedule (the National Judicial Council, the Police Service Commission and the Nigeria Police Council); and s 81(3)/292 (judicial funding through the NJC and security of tenure). Establishes that Nigeria is a federation in which police and prisons are federal, while courts, prosecution and (residually) criminal law operate at both the federal and state levels.

Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, section 51 — the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland

The National Archives (United Kingdom) · Legislation · 1998 · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, as the statute constitutes it — not the office’s own account of itself, which could not be obtained. The official consolidated text, read directly. Supports that "For the purposes of this Part there shall be a Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland", that the holder is a corporation sole, and that the Ombudsman shall exercise the powers conferred so as to secure "(a) the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the police complaints system; and (b) the confidence of the public and of members of the police force in that system". The second limb is the one worth holding: the statutory objective names confidence among police officers alongside confidence among the public, which is a different design from an office charged only with satisfying complainants. The section is shown as extending to Northern Ireland (N.I.). It establishes nothing about what the Ombudsman may do in an investigation, which is in other sections.

The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs

Spesialenheten for politisaker (Norway) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Bureau's own English site, read directly. Supports that it is "a national investigation and prosecution agency" whose purpose "is to investigate cases where employees of the police or prosecuting authority are suspected of committing criminal offences in the course of duty" — an independent police-crime body outside the ordinary police and prosecution chain.

About us — the Parliamentary Ombud

Sivilombudet (Norwegian Parliamentary Ombud) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Parliamentary Ombud's own English site, read directly. Supports that the Storting appoints the Parliamentary Ombud "to safeguard the rights of individuals in their dealings with the public administration", that it "is an independent body" elected by the Storting, and that it hosts Norway's National Preventive Mechanism under OPCAT, visiting police custody facilities, prisons and psychiatric institutions.

The Norwegian Courts Administration

Norges Domstoler (domstol.no) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Norwegian Courts Administration's own English page, read directly. Supports that "The Norwegian Courts Administration (DA) is responsible for the central administration of the courts" — a deliberately independent agency that administers the courts without interfering in judicial decisions, giving effect to Constitution Art. 91.

Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 — official English translation

Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Tribunal of Poland) · Legislation · 1997-04-02 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Constitutional Tribunal's English text of the 1997 Constitution, read directly. Supports Art. 3 ("The Republic of Poland shall be a unitary State"); Art. 10 (separation of powers); Art. 173 (courts and tribunals a separate power); Art. 175(1) (the administration of justice is implemented by the Supreme Court, the common courts, the administrative courts and the military courts); Art. 178–179 (judicial independence; appointment by the President on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary); Art. 183 (the Supreme Court and its First President); Art. 184 (the administrative courts and their apex — rendered "Chief Administrative Court" in this official translation); Art. 186–187 (the National Council of the Judiciary — its role safeguarding independence, its composition, and the delegation of the members' selection method to statute); Art. 188–190 (the Constitutional Tribunal); and Art. 208–210 (the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights). Naming caveat: this official translation renders the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny as "Chief Administrative Court"; the institution's own conventional English name "Supreme Administrative Court" was not independently verified.

Law of 8 December 2017 amending the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary, consolidated

Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (ISAP / ELI legal-acts service) · Legislation · 2017-12-08 · link verified 2026-07-26

The amending law of 8 December 2017 (Dz.U. 2018 poz. 3), fetched from the Sejm's official ELI service (status: in force) and confirmed verbatim. Supports the new Art. 9a — "Sejm wybiera spośród sędziów Sądu Najwyższego, sądów powszechnych, sądów administracyjnych i sądów wojskowych piętnastu członków Rady na wspólną czteroletnią kadencję" (the Sejm elects fifteen members of the National Council of the Judiciary from among the judges of the Supreme Court, the common, administrative and military courts, for a joint four-year term). Cited, factually and neutrally, to record that the selection method for the fifteen judicial members of the Council was changed so that they are elected by the Sejm, whereas under the original 2011 Law on the National Council of the Judiciary (Dz.U. 2011 nr 126 poz. 714) they were elected by assemblies of judges.

Missão, Visão e Valores — Inspeção-Geral da Administração Interna

Inspeção-Geral da Administração Interna (Portugal) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the inspectorate’s own account of its mission. The body’s own page, read directly — which is the point of this record: Portugal’s oversight module previously described this body from a search result rather than from a fetched official page, and said so. Supports that the IGAI “tem por missão assegurar as funções de auditoria, inspeção e fiscalização de alto nível, relativamente a todas as entidades, serviços e organismos, dependentes, ou cuja atividade é legalmente tutelada ou regulada pelo membro do Governo responsável pela área da Administração Interna”. Supports that its work includes “averiguar todas as notícias de violação grave dos direitos fundamentais de cidadãos/ãs, por parte das forças e serviços de segurança”. Two features are worth separating. Its jurisdiction is defined by MINISTERIAL DEPENDENCY rather than by naming forces, so it reaches every entity under the interior minister rather than the police alone; and its rights mandate is triggered by news of a serious violation rather than only by a complaint. It establishes nothing about the inspectorate’s powers, what follows an inspection, or the internal-affairs arrangements of the forces themselves.

Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (1976, 7th revision 2005) — official English translation

Assembleia da República (Parliament of Portugal) · Legislation · 1976 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Assembly of the Republic's official English translation of the Constitution (seventh revision, Constitutional Law 1/2005), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted, confirmed verbatim in both passes (the Portuguese text was also fetched). Supports Art. 6 ("the state is unitary"; the Azores and Madeira as autonomous regions), Art. 23 (the Ombudsman / Provedor de Justiça), Art. 164(u) and 165(1)(c)+(p) (the security-forces regime, criminal law, and the organisation of the courts and the Public Prosecution Service reserved to Parliament — and, via Art. 227(1)(b), excluded from regional legislation), Art. 202–204 (the courts as organs of sovereignty, independent, with diffuse constitutional review), Art. 209 (the categories of courts: Supreme Court of Justice, Supreme Administrative Court, Court of Auditors), Art. 217–218 (the High Council for the Judiciary), Art. 219–220 (the Public Prosecution Service — "its own statute and autonomy" — and the Prosecutor General's Office), Art. 221–222 (the Constitutional Court, thirteen judges), and Art. 272(4) ("each such force shall have a sole organisational structure for the whole of Portuguese territory").

About PIRC — Police Investigations and Review Commissioner

Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (Scotland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the PIRC's own account of its aim and priorities. The commissioner's about page, read directly. Supports that its aim is to secure public confidence in policing in Scotland and that its stated priorities include delivering investigations, delivering Complaint Handling Reviews and audits, and strengthening independent investigation and oversight of complaints. It establishes nothing about the commissioner's statutory powers, which were not researched.

About COPFS — Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service

Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (Scotland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: COPFS's own account of its remit. The service's about page, read directly. Supports that it describes itself as “Scotland's prosecution service and death investigation authority”; that death investigations are conducted by COPFS on behalf of the Lord Advocate and cover all sudden, suspicious, accidental and unexplained deaths; and that it has a role in investigating criminal allegations against on-duty police officers. The combination of prosecution, death investigation and police-conduct investigation in one service is what this source establishes; it establishes nothing about how any of them is conducted.

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Revised Edition)

Singapore Statutes Online — Attorney-General's Chambers · Legislation · 1965 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore on the official Singapore Statutes Online (2020 Revised Edition, latest amendment Act 31 of 2024, validity date 9 December 2024), read directly; Articles 35, 94 and 98 re-confirmed verbatim (Art. 35(8) re-confirmed by hand at authoring time). Supports Art. 93 (judicial power vested in a single Supreme Court and subordinate courts — a unitary judiciary); Art. 94 (the Supreme Court consists of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, the latter with an Appellate Division and a General Division, from the 2019/2021 restructuring); Art. 98 (judicial tenure and removal only by a tribunal of Supreme Court judges — independence); and Art. 35 — the Attorney-General is appointed from persons qualified as a Supreme Court judge (35(1)), removable only via a judicial tribunal (35(6)), has the duty to advise the Government (35(7)), and has the power "exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence" (35(8)).

Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011 (South Africa)

Government of South Africa (gov.za) · Legislation · 2011 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011 (commenced 1 April 2012), from gov.za. Supports the establishment of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) as the independent body that investigates certain serious matters involving the police — deaths in custody or as a result of police action, the discharge of official firearms, and allegations of torture, assault or corruption by police officers. Establishes the external police-complaints/investigation body.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

Government of South Africa (gov.za) · Legislation · 1996 · link verified 2026-07-27

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (in force 4 February 1997), fetched from the official gov.za chapters and schedules and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports s 1(c) and s 2 (constitutional supremacy — "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid"); s 165 (judicial authority vested in independent courts); s 166 (the courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Magistrates' Courts); s 167(3) (the Constitutional Court is "the highest court of the Republic", the apex for all matters since the Seventeenth Amendment); s 178 (the Judicial Service Commission); s 179 (a "single national prosecuting authority", headed by the National Director appointed by the President, exercising its functions without fear, favour or prejudice, with the Justice Minister exercising "final responsibility"); s 181 (the Chapter 9 institutions — the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and others); s 205–207 (a single national police service, the Minister determining national policing policy, the National Commissioner controlling the service, provinces limited to oversight); and Schedules 4 and 5 (which contain no provincial competence over courts, prosecution, prisons or criminal law, only police "to the extent that Chapter 11 confers"). Establishes constitutional supremacy and that all four justice functions are national. WAVE 12 ADDITION, read from the clean digital text published by the Department of Justice at justice.gov.za and corroborated against the gov.za chapter pages: s 9(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; s 33(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, s 33(2) written reasons where rights have been adversely affected, s 33(3) national legislation providing for review by a court or independent and impartial tribunal; s 34 Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum; s 35(2)(b) the right of a detained person to choose and consult a legal practitioner, s 35(2)(c) the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, s 35(2)(d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a court, and s 35(2)(e) to conditions of detention consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment. ACCESS NOTE: the scanned gazette PDF at gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf is an OCR with visible corruption and was rejected as a source; nothing is quoted from it. WAVE 14 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(3)(f) the right of every accused person to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(k) “to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language”; and s 35(4) that whenever the section requires information to be given to a person, that information must be given in a language that the person understands. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(5) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." As with the Kenyan provision, exclusion is conditional on the effect of admission rather than automatic on the violation. Also read directly from the same chapter text, the whole of s 35(2)(d) and its chapeau: "Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right u2014 u2026 (d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released". Three features of that provision are cited on this platform and each is in the text itself: that the right extends to sentenced prisoners, that the challenge is made in person before a court, and that release is the stated remedy. The provision states no procedure for bringing such a challenge and no time limit, and this record supports no claim about either. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Department of Justice chapter text. Section 37 is the most fully specified emergency clause in this wave, and its detail is the finding. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(1): “37. (1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when— (a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(2)(b): “The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(3): “(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(4): “(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and (b) the legislation— (i) is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to states of emergency; (ii) conforms to subsection (5); and (iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after being enacted.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(5) and the Table of Non-Derogable Rights: “(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise— (a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act; (b) any derogation from this section; or (c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table. Table of Non-Derogable Rights [1 Section number | 2 Section title | 3 Extent to which the right is protected] 9 | Equality | With respect to unfair discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language. 10 | Human Dignity | Entirely 11 | Life | Entirely 12 | Freedom and Security of the person | With respect to subsections (1)(d) and (e) and (2)(c). 13 | Slavery, servitude and forced labour | With respect to slavery and servitude 28 | Children | With respect to: – subsection (1)(d) and (e); – the rights in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of subsection (1)(g); and – subsection 1(i) in respect of children of 15 years and younger. 35 | Arrested, detained and accused persons | With respect to: – subsections (1)(a), (b) and (c) and (2)(d); – the rights in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3), excluding paragraph (d) – subsection (4); and – subsection (5) with respect to the exclusion of evidence if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(6)-(8): “(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed: (a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained. (b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the person being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained. (c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a medical practitioner. (d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal representative. (e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. ... (7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person. (8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under international humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.36: “36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.201; cf. ss.198(d), 199(6): “201. (1) A member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence. (2) Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence force— (a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in defence of the Republic; or (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation. (3) When the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of— (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force; (b) any place where the force is being employed; (c) the number of people involved; and (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed. (4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.”. Cited for prospective-only effect, the twenty-one-day limit and the escalating extension majorities, validity review by any competent court, the strictly-required test, the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, the absolute bar on indemnifying unlawful acts, and the conditions on detention without trial. It records no state of emergency ever declared under this Constitution and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) read from the South African Government's own published text at gov.za. Supports s. 12(1)-(2) (freedom and security of the person, including not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, not to be detained without trial, freedom from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, and not to be tortured or treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; and bodily and psychological integrity, including security in and control over one's body and freedom from medical or scientific experiments without informed consent). Supports s. 14 verbatim: “Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Note what this provision does NOT contain, which the page relying on it states: no warrant requirement and no authorisation rule of any kind. Supports s. 35(1) (rights of arrested persons, including (a) to remain silent; (b) to be informed promptly of the right to remain silent AND of the consequences of not remaining silent; (c) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 48 hours after arrest, or the end of the first court day after the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a non-court day; (e) and (f)). Supports s. 35(2) (rights of detained persons, including prompt information of the reason, choice of and consultation with a legal practitioner and prompt information of that right, state-assigned counsel where substantial injustice would otherwise result, and the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and be released if it is unlawful). Supports s. 35(3) (fair-trial rights, including (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; (b) adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) a public trial before an ordinary court; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence; (j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; (k) to be tried in a language the accused understands or to have the proceedings interpreted). Supports s. 36(1)-(2), the general limitation clause: rights may be limited “only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”, and that except as provided in s. 36(1) or elsewhere in the Constitution, no law may limit any entrenched right. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that ss. 12, 14 and 35 are worded “Everyone” while political rights under s. 19 are for “every citizen”. Constitutional text only: no Constitutional Court decision, no statute, and nothing about any other country.

Judiciaries Worldwide — Republic of Korea (U.S. Federal Judicial Center)

U.S. Federal Judicial Center (foreign-government reference on Korea) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

The U.S. Federal Judicial Center's Judiciaries Worldwide profile of the Republic of Korea, read directly. A FOREIGN-GOVERNMENT reference (the research/education arm of the U.S. federal judiciary), named as such. Supports the three-tier ordinary court system (18 district courts → high courts → Supreme Court), the Supreme Court as court of final appeal with fourteen Justices including the Chief Justice, and that "the Constitutional Court is an independent entity and not part of Korea's three tier court system" with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional matters; and that court administration runs through the National Court Administration, "under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court", with authority "delegated by the Chief Justice" (i.e. no European-style external judicial council).

Ley Orgánica 3/1981, de 6 de abril, del Defensor del Pueblo (texto consolidado)

Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) · Legislation · 1981-04-06 · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the state-level ombudsman, its investigative reach, and the one subject it must hand on. The official consolidated Spanish text on the BOE, read directly. Supports Art. 1, that “El Defensor del Pueblo es el alto comisionado de las Cortes Generales designado por éstas para la defensa de los derechos comprendidos en el Título I de la Constitución”; Art. 9, that it “podrá iniciar y proseguir de oficio o a petición de parte, cualquier investigación conducente al esclarecimiento de los actos y resoluciones de la Administración pública”, its attributions extending to “la actividad de los ministros, autoridades administrativas, funcionarios”; and Art. 13, that where it receives complaints “referidas al funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia”, it must direct them to the Ministerio Fiscal to investigate, or pass them to the Consejo General del Poder Judicial as the case requires. Article 13 is why this record is cited by section rather than as an Act: the ombudsman’s reach over the administration and its EXPLICIT non-reach over the administration of justice are the same institution’s two halves, and a page carrying only the first would overstate it. Nothing here establishes any autonomous-community ombudsman, each of which has its own statute.

¿Qué es el Defensor? — Defensor del Pueblo

Defensor del Pueblo (España) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the institution’s own account of what it is and how it is chosen. The Defensor’s own page, read directly. Supports that it is “encargada de defender los derechos constitucionales de los ciudadanos mediante la supervisión de la actividad de las administraciones públicas españolas”; that “El Defensor del Pueblo es elegido por el Congreso de los Diputados y el Senado, por una mayoría de tres quintos”; and that it acts “con independencia e imparcialidad, con autonomía y según su criterio” and “no recibe órdenes ni instrucciones de ninguna autoridad”. The three-fifths threshold is the fact worth keeping: it is a supermajority, so the office cannot be filled by a bare parliamentary majority acting alone. The page also quotes the constitutional provision under which a ley orgánica regulates the institution as “alto comisionado de las Cortes Generales”. It does not state whether the office may supervise the administration of justice; that question is answered by the organic law rather than here, and it is answered there in the negative.

The Swedish Police Authority

Polismyndigheten (Swedish Police Authority) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Swedish Police Authority's own English page, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports that the police are a single national authority comprising "7 Police Regions", "25 Police Districts" and "95 Local Police Districts", the Office of the National Police Commissioner, and a Department of Special Investigations; that it is "led by National Police Commissioner Petra Lundh"; and that the Department of Special Investigations investigates, on the direction of the Special Prosecution Office, complaints against police officials, prosecutors, judges and members of Parliament. The single-national-authority merger (from 21 regional authorities, 2015) is well attested but only secondary-sourced, so the date is not asserted as primary-verified.

The Parliamentary Ombudsmen (JO)

Riksdagens ombudsmän / Justitieombudsmannen (JO), Sweden · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

The Parliamentary Ombudsmen's own English site, read directly. Supports that "the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (JO) are appointed by the Swedish Riksdag (parliament) to ensure that public authorities and their staff comply with the laws and other statutes governing their actions" — an oversight body under the Riksdag (not the Government), the constitutional basis being Instrument of Government Ch. 13 Art. 6.

The Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen, SFS 1974:152), 2023 English edition

Sveriges riksdag (Parliament of Sweden) · Legislation · 1974 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Instrument of Government, the central one of Sweden's four fundamental laws, fetched as the riksdagen.se official English-edition PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by me and in the verification pass). Supports: Ch. 1 Art. 3 (the four fundamental laws — the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression); Ch. 1 Art. 8 (courts for the administration of justice, administrative authorities for public administration); Ch. 11 Art. 1 (two branches — general courts up to the Supreme Court, and general administrative courts up to the Supreme Administrative Court); Ch. 11 Art. 3 (judicial independence); Ch. 11 Art. 14 (every court reviews whether a provision conflicts with fundamental law — diffuse constitutional review, no constitutional court); Ch. 12 Art. 1 (administrative authorities come under the Government unless under the Riksdag); Ch. 12 Art. 2 — the defining provision — "No public authority, including the Riksdag … may determine how an administrative authority shall decide in a particular case relating to the exercise of public authority vis-à-vis an individual … or relating to the application of law" (the prohibition on ministerstyre); and Ch. 13 Art. 6 (the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, elected by the Riksdag). The authoritative text is Swedish. WAVE 20 ADDITION. PROVENANCE, stated precisely because this record's url and title are the English edition: every Swedish passage quoted below was read at the Riksdag's consolidated Svensk författningssamling text of kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform. The English-edition PDF at this record's url carries no Swedish wording, and the Swedish is the text with legal effect. Chapter 15 is the whole of Sweden's constitutional emergency provision, and its scope is the finding. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 1 § (Lag 2010:1408): “Kommer riket i krig eller krigsfara ska regeringen eller talmannen kalla riksdagen till sammanträde. Den som utfärdar kallelsen kan besluta att riksdagen ska sammanträda någon annanstans än i Stockholm.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 2 § första och andra styckena (Lag 2010:1408): “Är riket i krig eller krigsfara, ska en inom riksdagen utsedd krigsdelegation träda i riksdagens ställe, om förhållandena kräver det. Om riket är i krig, meddelas beslut att krigsdelegationen ska träda i riksdagens ställe av Utrikesnämndens ledamöter enligt närmare bestämmelser i riksdagsordningen. Innan beslut meddelas ska samråd ske med statsministern, om det är möjligt. Hindras nämndens ledamöter av krigsförhållandena att sammanträda, meddelas beslutet av regeringen. Om riket är i krigsfara, meddelas beslutet av Utrikesnämndens ledamöter i förening med statsministern. För ett sådant beslut krävs att statsministern och sex av nämndens ledamöter röstar för det.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 3 § (Lag 2010:1408): “Medan krigsdelegationen är i riksdagens ställe utövar den riksdagens befogenheter. Den får dock inte fatta beslut som avses i 11 § första stycket första meningen eller andra eller fjärde stycket. Krigsdelegationen beslutar själv om formerna för sin verksamhet.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 2 § tredje stycket (Lag 2010:1408): “Krigsdelegationen och regeringen kan i samråd eller var för sig besluta att riksdagen ska återta sina befogenheter. Beslutet ska fattas så snart förhållandena medger det.”. Supports Regeringsformen 2 kap. 11 § första stycket: “Domstol får inte inrättas för en redan begången gärning och inte heller för en viss tvist eller i övrigt för ett visst mål.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 11 §: “Är riket i krig, får val till riksdagen hållas endast efter beslut av riksdagen. Är riket i krigsfara, när ordinarie val ska hållas, kan riksdagen besluta att skjuta upp valet.”. Cited for the War Delegation mechanism, its carve-outs and the constitutional duty to hand power back as soon as conditions permit, and for the prohibition on constituting a court for a particular case. Chapter 15 addresses WAR and DANGER OF WAR; this record establishes nothing about a peacetime state of emergency, and Sweden's peacetime arrangements rest on ordinary statute cited separately. It supports no claim about any other country.

Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 (SR 101)

Swiss Confederation — Fedlex (fedlex.admin.ch) · Legislation · 1999-04-18 · link verified 2026-07-26

The Federal Constitution, read in full from the official fedlex text (English is a non-authoritative translation; German, French and Italian are equally authentic). Supports: art. 1 (the Confederation of the People and the 26 Cantons); art. 3, 'The Cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. They exercise all rights that are not vested in the Confederation' — residual power with the CANTONS (like the United States and Australia); art. 46 (the Cantons implement federal law — executive federalism); art. 122 (the Confederation legislates civil law, but 'the Cantons are responsible for the organisation of the courts and the administration of justice in civil matters'); art. 123 ('The Confederation is responsible for legislation in the field of criminal law and the law of criminal procedure', while 'the Cantons are responsible for the organisation of the courts, the administration of justice in criminal cases as well as for the execution of penalties and measures') — so the law is federal and unified but the administration, including corrections, is cantonal; art. 188 (the Federal Supreme Court as the supreme judicial authority); art. 48 (inter-cantonal treaties, the basis for the corrections concordats); art. 70 (German, French and Italian as official languages); and the direct-democracy provisions (arts. 138-142: popular initiative, mandatory and optional referendums). WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same consolidated Fedlex text in German, with the official English rendering consulted alongside. Supports Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (SR 101), Art. 185: “Art. 185 Äussere und innere Sicherheit. 1 Der Bundesrat trifft Massnahmen zur Wahrung der äusseren Sicherheit, der Unabhängigkeit und der Neutralität der Schweiz. 2 Er trifft Massnahmen zur Wahrung der inneren Sicherheit. 3 Er kann, unmittelbar gestützt auf diesen Artikel, Verordnungen und Verfügungen erlassen, um eingetretenen oder unmittelbar drohenden schweren Störungen der öffentlichen Ordnung oder der inneren oder äusseren Sicherheit zu begegnen. Solche Verordnungen sind zu befristen. 4 In dringlichen Fällen kann er Truppen aufbieten. Bietet er mehr als 4000 Angehörige der Armee für den Aktivdienst auf oder dauert dieser Einsatz voraussichtlich länger als drei Wochen, so ist unverzüglich die Bundesversammlung einzuberufen.”. Supports Bundesverfassung (SR 101), Art. 173(1)(a)-(d): “Art. 173 Weitere Aufgaben und Befugnisse. 1 Die Bundesversammlung hat zudem folgende Aufgaben und Befugnisse: a. Sie trifft Massnahmen zur Wahrung der äusseren Sicherheit, der Unabhängigkeit und der Neutralität der Schweiz. b. Sie trifft Massnahmen zur Wahrung der inneren Sicherheit. c. Wenn ausserordentliche Umstände es erfordern, kann sie zur Erfüllung der Aufgaben nach den Buchstaben a und b Verordnungen oder einfache Bundesbeschlüsse erlassen. d. Sie ordnet den Aktivdienst an und bietet dafür die Armee oder Teile davon auf.”. Supports Bundesverfassung (SR 101), Art. 36(4): “4 Der Kerngehalt der Grundrechte ist unantastbar.”. Supports Bundesverfassung (SR 101), Arts. 189(4) and 190: “Art. 189 [...] 4 Akte der Bundesversammlung und des Bundesrates können beim Bundesgericht nicht angefochten werden. Ausnahmen bestimmt das Gesetz. [...] Art. 190 Massgebendes Recht. Bundesgesetze und Völkerrecht sind für das Bundesgericht und die anderen rechtsanwendenden Behörden massgebend.”. Supports Bundesverfassung (SR 101), Art. 58(2)-(3), read with Arts. 173(1)(d) and 185(4): “Art. 58 Armee. [...] 2 Die Armee dient der Kriegsverhinderung und trägt bei zur Erhaltung des Friedens; sie verteidigt das Land und seine Bevölkerung. Sie unterstützt die zivilen Behörden bei der Abwehr schwerwiegender Bedrohungen der inneren Sicherheit und bei der Bewältigung anderer ausserordentlicher Lagen. Das Gesetz kann weitere Aufgaben vorsehen. 3 Der Einsatz der Armee ist Sache des Bundes.”. Supports Bundesverfassung (SR 101), Art. 61; cf. Art. 102 (Landesversorgung: "Der Bund stellt die Versorgung des Landes mit lebenswichtigen Gütern und Dienstleistungen sicher für den Fall machtpolitischer oder kriegerischer Bedrohungen sowie in schweren Mangellagen, denen die Wirtschaft nicht selbst zu begegnen vermag."): “Art. 61 Zivilschutz. 1 Die Gesetzgebung über den zivilen Schutz von Personen und Gütern vor den Auswirkungen bewaffneter Konflikte ist Sache des Bundes. 2 Der Bund erlässt Vorschriften über den Einsatz des Zivilschutzes bei Katastrophen und in Notlagen. 3 Er kann den Schutzdienst für Männer obligatorisch erklären. Für Frauen ist dieser freiwillig.”. Supports Bundesverfassung (SR 101), Arts. 3, 5a and 57: “Art. 3 Kantone. Die Kantone sind souverän, soweit ihre Souveränität nicht durch die Bundesverfassung beschränkt ist; sie üben alle Rechte aus, die nicht dem Bund übertragen sind. [...] Art. 5a Subsidiarität. Bei der Zuweisung und Erfüllung staatlicher Aufgaben ist der Grundsatz der Subsidiarität zu beachten. [...] Art. 57 Sicherheit. 1 Bund und Kantone sorgen im Rahmen ihrer Zuständigkeiten für die Sicherheit des Landes und den Schutz der Bevölkerung. 2 Sie koordinieren ihre Anstrengungen im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit.”. Cited for the finding that Switzerland protects a CORE CONTENT of every fundamental right rather than listing non-derogable rights, that its civil protection is constitutionally split between armed-conflict protection and disaster deployment, and that review of federal acts is structurally constrained. It records no ordinance, states no cantonal arrangement, and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the consolidated Fedlex text of 3 March 2024 in both the authoritative German and the official English rendering, article by article. Supports Art. 5 “Grundsätze rechtsstaatlichen Handelns”: “1 Grundlage und Schranke staatlichen Handelns ist das Recht. 2 Staatliches Handeln muss im öffentlichen Interesse liegen und verhältnismässig sein. 3 Staatliche Organe und Private handeln nach Treu und Glauben. 4 Bund und Kantone beachten das Völkerrecht.” — note that Art. 5(2) requires ALL state activity to be proportionate, which is a different provision doing a different job from Art. 36(3). Supports Art. 36 in full: “1 Einschränkungen von Grundrechten bedürfen einer gesetzlichen Grundlage. Schwerwiegende Einschränkungen müssen im Gesetz selbst vorgesehen sein. Ausgenommen sind Fälle ernster, unmittelbarer und nicht anders abwendbarer Gefahr. 2 Einschränkungen von Grundrechten müssen durch ein öffentliches Interesse oder durch den Schutz von Grundrechten Dritter gerechtfertigt sein. 3 Einschränkungen von Grundrechten müssen verhältnismässig sein. 4 Der Kerngehalt der Grundrechte ist unantastbar.” Supports Art. 13 “Schutz der Privatsphäre”: “1 Jede Person hat Anspruch auf Achtung ihres Privat- und Familienlebens, ihrer Wohnung sowie ihres Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldeverkehrs. 2 Jede Person hat Anspruch auf Schutz vor Missbrauch ihrer persönlichen Daten.” — one provision covering private and family life, the home, and mail and telecommunications together. Supports Art. 10(2), that every person has the right to personal liberty and in particular to physical and mental integrity and to freedom of movement. Supports Art. 31 “Freiheitsentzug” in full, including 31(2) (notification without delay, in a language the person understands, of the reasons and of their rights, with the opportunity to exercise them and in particular to have next-of-kin informed), 31(3) (a person in pre-trial detention has the right to be brought before a court without delay, which decides on continued detention or release, and to have their case decided within a reasonable time) and 31(4) (a person deprived of liberty by a body other than a court has the right of recourse to a court at any time, which decides as quickly as possible on the legality of the detention). Supports Art. 32(1)-(3) (presumption of innocence until a legally enforceable judgment; notification of the charge as quickly and comprehensively as possible with the opportunity to assert defence rights; review of a conviction by a higher court save where the Federal Supreme Court sits at first instance). Supports Art. 35 “Verwirklichung der Grundrechte”: fundamental rights must be upheld throughout the legal system; whoever acts on behalf of the state is bound by them and under a duty to contribute to their implementation; and the authorities shall ensure that fundamental rights, where appropriate, apply to relationships among private persons. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that the rights read here are worded “Jede Person” / “Every person” rather than for Swiss citizens. English is a non-authoritative translation; German, French and Italian are equally authentic. This record establishes constitutional TEXT only — no decision of the Bundesgericht, no cantonal arrangement, and nothing about any other country.

Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Strafbehörden des Bundes (Strafbehördenorganisationsgesetz, StBOG; SR 173.71), Art. 23 — Wahl und Zusammensetzung der Aufsichtsbehörde

Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft — Fedlex · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the federal supervisory authority over the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland — a federal body supervising a federal body, and nothing cantonal. The consolidated German text of 1 January 2024, read directly from the Fedlex filestore HTML, which is the readable route: the ELI addresses are client-rendered and serve a shell. Supports Art. 23, that “Die Aufsichtsbehörde wird von der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung gewählt” and that it “umfasst sieben Mitglieder”. Election by the United Federal Assembly rather than appointment by the executive is the structural fact: the body supervising federal prosecution is constituted by parliament. German is authoritative here; this record carries no English wording of the statute. It establishes nothing about the police, who in Switzerland are overwhelmingly cantonal.

About the Office — Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: one federal inspector general, inside one federal department. The office’s own about page, read directly. Supports that the OIG describes itself as “a statutorily created independent entity” within the Department of Justice; that the Inspector General is “appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation” and “reports to the Attorney General and Congress”; that its work is to detect and deter “waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the DOJ”; and that its reach runs to “DOJ employees, operations, grantees, and contractors”. The dual reporting line is the institutional fact, because an office that reports only to the department it examines is a different thing. NEGATIVE, and load-bearing for the American page: nothing here extends to a state or local police department, of which there are many thousands. This is a departmental office with a departmental remit, and it is cited as one.

Special Litigation Section — Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

SCOPE: the federal civil-rights route into state and local institutions, as the section describes it. The section’s own page, read directly. Supports that its work covers “the rights of people in state or local institutions, including: jails, prisons, juvenile detention facilities, and health care facilities for persons with disabilities” and “the rights of people who interact with state or local police or sheriffs’ departments”, and that the page names as the authorities it works under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997), the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (34 U.S.C. § 12601) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc). This record is cited for the SHAPE of the mechanism: a federal civil route that reaches police forces the federal government does not run. The statutory texts themselves were not read this wave — the official U.S. Code hosts refused the connection or returned 404 — so no wording of § 12601 is quoted anywhere from this record, and no claim is made about what a court has held.