Public Safety
Who is legally able to declare one, and does anyone else have to agree?
No two systems answer alike. Czechia and Spain each run three regimes with three different declaring authorities; Germany requires a two-thirds Bundestag vote before the state of defence; Ireland needs a resolution of both Houses; South Africa’s Constitution does not name the declaring authority at all.
In short
The answer to who may declare an emergency is one of the most jurisdiction-specific things in this whole subject. It is not usually "the president", it is often not one body, and in several systems it depends on which of several graded regimes is being declared. The instinct to generalise from one country here is the single largest source of error about emergency powers.
Why it exists
AnalysisWhoever may declare an emergency may switch on the powers that come with it, so the allocation of that decision is a decision about how easily extraordinary power becomes available. A system that requires two-thirds of a chamber has made it hard on purpose; one that lets a cabinet decide alone has made it fast on purpose. Both are defensible and they are not the same choice.
How it works
Czechia allocates each of its three regimes differently. Under Article 5, the Government may declare a nouzový stav in cases of natural disasters, ecological or industrial accidents, accidents or other danger substantially threatening life, health, property or internal order and security.
The middle tier is Parliament’s. Article 7 provides that Parliament may declare a stav ohrožení státu on a government proposal where the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the State, or its democratic foundations, are immediately threatened — and the resolution requires an absolute majority of all deputies and of all senators.
Spain grades the same way and states it in the organic law the Constitution requires. The estado de alarma is declared by the Government by decree agreed in the Council of Ministers; the estado de excepción is declared by the Government by decree in the Council of Ministers but only after prior authorisation of the Congress of Deputies; and the estado de sitio is declared by the Congress of Deputies itself by absolute majority, exclusively on the Government’s proposal.
Germany makes the determination itself a parliamentary act. Article 115a(1) of the Basic Law provides that the determination that the federal territory is being attacked by armed force, or that such an attack is imminent, is made by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat, on the application of the Federal Government, and requires a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast and at least a majority of the members of the Bundestag.
The same article provides for the case where that is impossible. Where the situation imperatively requires immediate action and insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely convening of the Bundestag, or it lacks a quorum, the Joint Committee makes the determination on the same majorities; and where the territory is attacked and the competent federal organs are unable to make the determination at all, it is deemed to have been made and promulgated at the moment the attack began.
Ireland puts the switch in the legislature and in an unexpected place. Article 28.3.3 provides that "time of war" includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State.
South Africa produces the most instructive gap. The Constitution’s section 37 sets out the conditions on a state of emergency in considerable detail — but it does not say who may declare one. That comes from the State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997, under which the President may by proclamation in the Gazette declare a state of emergency, briefly stating the reasons.
Brazil separates declaring from authorising along the same seam. The President may decree an estado de defesa alone, after hearing two advisory councils, with Congress deciding on the decree within ten days by absolute majority; but an estado de sítio requires the President to request authorisation from Congress before decreeing it.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: The president or prime minister declares a state of emergency.
In practice: Not in several systems described here. Germany’s determination is made by the Bundestag with the Bundesrat’s consent; Spain’s estado de sitio is declared by the Congress of Deputies itself; Ireland’s shield is switched on by a resolution of each House.
Common belief: A country has one procedure for declaring an emergency.
In practice: Czechia has three regimes with three different declaring authorities, and Spain has three regimes on an ascending ladder from a government decree to a decision of the Congress itself.
Common belief: The declaring authority is always in the constitution.
In practice: In South Africa it is not. Section 37 states the conditions but never names who declares; the power comes from the State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997.
Common belief: Parliamentary involvement means parliament decides first.
In practice: Not necessarily. Brazil’s Congress decides on an estado de defesa decree within ten days after it is made, but must authorise an estado de sítio before it is decreed — two different sequences in one constitution.
Common belief: If the legislature cannot meet, no emergency can be declared.
In practice: Germany provides for exactly that case. The Joint Committee may make the determination where the Bundestag cannot convene, and where no competent federal organ can act during an attack the determination is deemed made at the moment the attack began.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Six systems, and no two answers alike.
- Three tiers, three authorities — Czechia, ústavní zákon č. 110/1998 Sb. Čl. 5 and 7 with Ústava Čl. 43.
- Three regimes, ascending from government decree to a decision of the Congress — Spain, LO 4/1981 with CE Art. 116.
- A parliamentary determination on a two-thirds majority, with a substitute committee and a deeming provision — Germany, GG Art. 115a.
- A resolution of each House of the legislature — Ireland, Bunreacht na hÉireann Art. 28.3.3.
- A presidential proclamation under statute, with the constitutional conditions sitting elsewhere — South Africa, State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997 with Constitution s. 37.
- Decree first with congressional decision after, or congressional authorisation first, depending on the regime — Brazil, CF Arts. 136 and 137.
Worked examples
Systems this platform has researched. Each example links to the dossier it draws on.
- Czechia
- Three tiers, three declaring authorities: the Government declares a nouzový stav; Parliament declares a stav ohrožení státu on a government proposal, needing an absolute majority of ALL deputies and ALL senators; and Parliament decides on a válečný stav under the Constitution itself.
- Spain
- Three regimes, three authorities, ascending: the Government declares an estado de alarma by decree; an estado de excepción requires prior authorisation of the Congress; and an estado de sitio is declared by the Congress itself by absolute majority, on the Government’s proposal.
- Germany
- Makes one determination a parliamentary act: the Verteidigungsfall under Art. 115a, decided by the Bundestag with the Bundesrat’s consent, on the Federal Government’s application, by two-thirds of votes cast and at least a majority of members, with a substitute route through the Joint Committee. That threshold governs the DEFENCE emergency alone — the disaster and internal-emergency instruments of Arts. 35(3) and 91(2) carry no such requirement.
- Ireland
- Where the armed conflict is one Ireland is not party to, the Art. 28.3.3 shield is switched on not by the Government but by EACH of the two Houses of the Oireachtas resolving that a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State.
Rights and accountability
AnalysisRequiring someone other than the declaring authority to agree is the oldest control on this power, and the thresholds show how seriously each system takes it. An absolute majority of all members, a two-thirds vote, prior authorisation, a resolution of both chambers — each is a different judgement about how much friction extraordinary power should meet.
AnalysisFriction is not the same as obstruction, and the graded systems are the evidence. A government that needs to act quickly can declare the mildest regime alone; what it cannot do is reach the powers of the severest regime without going to the chamber. The design lets urgency and control coexist rather than trading one for the other.
What we could not establish
- Six systems are described from primary text. What any other system provides was not researched, and the range here is wide enough that no general rule should be inferred from it.
- This page names declaring authorities. It records no declaration, and it states nothing about whether any declaration was justified or lawful.
Where to go next
Related: how emergency powers end, reviewing an emergency declaration, and why government is bound by law.
Related topics
- What actually changes in law when a government declares a state of emergency?
Less, and more specifically, than the phrase suggests. Two constitutions answer it with closed lists of what may be done; one bars amending the constitution while it runs; two systems have no such regime at all, and handle emergencies under ordinary law.
- Does a state of emergency actually end, and what happens to what was done under it?
Initial limits run from fourteen days to no fixed term at all, so "temporary" carries no common content. Renewal is where the systems differ most — and Brazil answers the harder question by preserving liability for unlawful acts after the regime is over.
- Can a court be asked whether the declaration itself was lawful, or only the measures under it?
Both, and systems answer them differently. South Africa lets any competent court decide the validity of a declaration, an extension, and anything done under it; Kenya narrows the forum to the Supreme Court; Spain splits it by the rank of the instrument; one constitutional court holds the declaration unreviewable.
Sources
Ústavní zákon č. 110/1998 Sb., o bezpečnosti České republiky, Čl. 2, 3, 5–12 (Czech original text)
Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu České republiky · Legislation · 1998 · link verified 2026-08-26
The Czech constitutional act on the security of the Czech Republic, read directly on the Chamber of Deputies' own site. This is the single most useful instrument in this wave for showing that a system can operate several graded emergency regimes with different declaring authorities. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 5(1)-(3): “Cl. 5 (1) Vlada muze vyhlasit nouzovy stav v pripade zivelnich pohrom, ekologickych nebo prumyslovych havarii, nehod nebo jineho nebezpeci, ktere ve znacnem rozsahu ohrozuji zivoty, zdravi nebo majetkove hodnoty anebo vnitrni poradek a bezpecnost. (2) Nouzovy stav nemuze byt vyhlasen z duvodu stavky vedene na ochranu prav a opravnenych hospodarskych a socialnich zajmu. (3) Je-li nebezpeci z prodleni, muze vyhlasit nouzovy stav predseda vlady. Jeho rozhodnuti vlada do 24 hodin od vyhlaseni schvali nebo zrusi.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 6(1): “Čl. 6 (1) Nouzový stav se může vyhlásit jen s uvedením důvodů na určitou dobu a pro určité území. Současně s vyhlášením nouzového stavu musí vláda vymezit, která práva stanovená ve zvláštním zákoně a v jakém rozsahu se v souladu s Listinou základních práv a svobod omezují a které povinnosti a v jakém rozsahu se ukládají. Podrobnosti stanovi zakon.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 6(2), first sentence: “(2) Nouzový stav se může vyhlásit nejdéle na dobu 30 dnů.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 6(2), second sentence: “Uvedená doba se může prodloužit jen po předchozím souhlasu Poslanecké sněmovny.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 6(3): “(3) Nouzový stav končí uplynutím doby, na kterou byl vyhlášen, pokud vláda nebo Poslanecká sněmovna nerozhodnou o jeho zrušení před uplynutím této doby.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 7: “Čl. 7 (1) Parlament může na návrh vlády vyhlásit stav ohrožení státu, je-li bezprostředně ohrožena svrchovanost státu nebo územní celistvost státu anebo jeho demokratické základy. (2) K přijetí usnesení o vyhlášení stavu ohrožení státu je třeba souhlasu nadpoloviční většiny všech poslanců a souhlasu nadpoloviční většiny všech senátorů.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 10: “Čl. 10 Jestliže po dobu nouzového stavu, stavu ohrožení státu nebo válečného stavu podmínky na území České republiky neumožní konat volby ve lhůtách, které jsou stanoveny pro pravidelná volební období, lze zákonem lhůty prodloužit, nejdéle však o šest měsíců.”. Supports Ustavni zakon c. 110/1998 Sb., Cl. 3: “Čl. 3 (1) Bezpečnost České republiky zajišťují ozbrojené síly, ozbrojené bezpečnostní sbory, záchranné sbory a havarijní služby. (2) Státní orgány, orgány územních samosprávných celků a právnické a fyzické osoby jsou povinny se podílet na zajišťování bezpečnosti České republiky. Rozsah povinností a další podrobnosti stanoví zákon.”. ENCODING NOTE, recorded because it changes how this record may be used and was found by adversarial review: psp.cz serves these pages in Windows-1250 without a charset declaration that survives an automated fetch, and the excerpts here were first captured with their diacritics stripped, which made a Czech phrase printed on a page unfindable in the record cited for it. The passages this platform quotes have been restored to correct Czech orthography. Any excerpt still shown without diacritics is a transcription of substance rather than a verbatim quotation, and no page quotes one. Cited for the GRADED structure of Czech emergency regimes and for the fact that the declaring authority differs by tier. It records no instance of any regime being declared, states no measure that may be taken under one — those sit in the krizový zákon, cited separately — and supports no claim about any other country.
Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio (texto consolidado)
Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) · Legislation · 1981-06-01 · link verified 2026-08-26
The consolidated Castilian text on the BOE, read directly. This is the organic law the Constitution's Art. 116 requires, and it carries the operative detail the constitutional article leaves out. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Art. 1.Uno and 1.Dos: “Artículo primero. Uno. Procederá la declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción o sitio cuando circunstancias extraordinarias hiciesen imposible el mantenimiento de la normalidad mediante los poderes ordinarios de las Autoridades competentes. Dos. Las medidas a adoptar en los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio, así como la duración de los mismos, serán en cualquier caso las estrictamente indispensables para asegurar el restablecimiento de la normalidad. Su aplicación se realizará de forma proporcionada a las circunstancias.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Arts. 6.Dos and 15.Tres: “Artículo sexto. [..] Dos. En el decreto se determinará el ámbito territorial, la duración y los efectos del estado de alarma, que no podrá exceder de quince días. Sólo se podrá prorrogar con autorización expresa del Congreso de los Diputados, que en este caso podrá establecer el alcance y las condiciones vigentes durante la prórroga. [..] Artículo quince. [..] Tres. Si persistieran las circunstancias que dieron lugar a la declaración del estado de excepción, el Gobierno podrá solicitar del Congreso de los Diputados la prórroga de aquél, que no podrá exceder de treinta días.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Arts. 1.Tres and 15.Dos: “Artículo primero. [..] Tres. Finalizada la vigencia de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio decaerán en su eficacia cuantas competencias en materia sancionadora y en orden a actuaciones preventivas correspondan a las Autoridades competentes, así como las concretas medidas adoptadas en base a éstas, salvo las que consistiesen en sanciones firmes. [..] Artículo quince. [..] Dos. El Gobierno, mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, podrá poner fin al estado de excepción antes de que finalice el período para el que fue declarado, dando cuenta de ello inmediatamente al Congreso de los Diputados.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Art. 3: “Artículo tercero. Uno. Los actos y disposiciones de la Administración Pública adoptados durante la vigencia de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio serán impugnables en vía jurisdiccional de conformidad con lo dispuesto en las leyes. Dos. Quienes como consecuencia de la aplicación de los actos y disposiciones adoptadas durante la vigencia de estos estados sufran, de forma directa, o en su persona, derechos o bienes, daños o perjuicios por actos que no les sean imputables, tendrán derecho a ser indemnizados de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en las leyes.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Art. 9: “Artículo noveno. Uno. Por la declaración del estado de alarma todas las Autoridades civiles de la Administración Pública del territorio afectado por la declaración, los integrantes de los Cuerpos de Policía de las Comunidades Autónomas y de las Corporaciones Locales, y los demás funcionarios y trabajadores al servicio de las mismas, quedarán bajo las órdenes directas de la Autoridad competente en cuanto sea necesaria para la protección de personas, bienes y lugares, pudiendo imponerles servicios extraordinarios por su duración o por su naturaleza. Dos. Cuando la Autoridad competente sea el Presidente de una Comunidad Autónoma podrá requerir la colaboración de los Cuerpos y Fuerzas de Seguridad del Estado, que actuarán bajo la dirección de sus mandos naturales.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, their differing declaring authorities and durations, the express challengeability of administrative acts adopted during any of them, and the lapse of sanctioning competences on expiry. It records no instance of any regime being declared and supports no claim about any other country.
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz), English translation
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · 1949-05-23 · link verified 2026-07-24
Translation by Professors Christian Tomuschat, David P. Currie, Donald P. Kommers and Raymond Kerr in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag; offered subject to stated conditions of use. The page states the text reflects amendments up to 22 March 2025. THE GERMAN TEXT IS AUTHORITATIVE and the translation may lag later amendments. Supports: Art. 20(1) federal state; Art. 30 (exercise of state powers is a matter for the Länder except as otherwise provided); Art. 70 (Länder legislate unless the Basic Law confers power on the Federation; exclusive vs concurrent); Art. 73(1) no. 10 (cooperation in criminal police matters; establishment of a Federal Criminal Police Office); Art. 74(1) no. 1 (concurrent legislation over criminal law and court organisation and procedure, EXCEPT the law on pre-trial detention); Art. 83 (Länder execute federal laws in their own right); Art. 87(1) (federal law may establish Federal Border Police authorities and central police offices); Art. 92 (judicial power vested in the Federal Constitutional Court, federal courts and the courts of the Länder); Art. 95(1) (the five federal supreme courts); Art. 96 (further federal courts); Art. 97 (judicial independence); Art. 35 (mutual legal and administrative assistance). Does NOT support any claim about how a particular Land organises its institutions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official English translation page. NOTE ON NUMBERING, verified rather than assumed: in the current text the COMPOSITION of the Federal Constitutional Court is Article 93 and its JURISDICTION is Article 94 — the reverse of the allocation these two articles carried historically and of the numbering most secondary sources still cite. Supports Art. 93(5): a federal law regulates the organisation and procedure of the Court, and "the law may require that all other legal remedies be exhausted before a constitutional complaint may be filed and may provide for a separate proceeding to determine whether the complaint will be accepted for decision". Supports Art. 94(1) no. 2, ABSTRACT review: the Court rules "in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning the formal or substantive compatibility of federal law or Land law with this Basic Law or the compatibility of Land law with other federal law on application of the Federal Government, of a Land government or of one fourth of the Members of the Bundestag". Supports Art. 94(1) no. 4a, the INDIVIDUAL constitutional complaint: the Court rules "on constitutional complaints, which may be filed by any person alleging that one of his basic rights or one of his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or under Article 33, 38, 101, 103 or 104 has been infringed by public authority". Supports Art. 94(1) no. 4b and 4c (municipal complaints and complaints by associations about non-recognition as political parties), and Art. 94(4), that decisions of the Court bind the constitutional organs. Supports Art. 100(1), CONCRETE review: "If a court concludes that a law on whose validity its decision depends is unconstitutional, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be obtained from the Land court with jurisdiction over constitutional disputes where the constitution of a Land is held to be violated or from the Federal Constitutional Court where this Basic Law is held to be violated" — that is, the ordinary court must refer and may not itself disapply the statute. Supports Art. 100(3), that a Land constitutional court proposing to derogate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court must obtain a decision from it. The German text remains authoritative and the translation may lag later amendments. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official English translation page and cross-checked against the German original at gesetze-im-internet.de, article by article. The Grundgesetz carries THREE distinct emergency regimes, and conflating them is the commonest error about it. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 35(1), (2) sentence 2: “(1) Alle Behörden des Bundes und der Länder leisten sich gegenseitig Rechts- und Amtshilfe. (2) [...] Zur Hilfe bei einer Naturkatastrophe oder bei einem besonders schweren Unglücksfall kann ein Land Polizeikräfte anderer Länder, Kräfte und Einrichtungen anderer Verwaltungen sowie des Bundesgrenzschutzes und der Streitkräfte anfordern.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 35(3): “(3) Gefährdet die Naturkatastrophe oder der Unglücksfall das Gebiet mehr als eines Landes, so kann die Bundesregierung, soweit es zur wirksamen Bekämpfung erforderlich ist, den Landesregierungen die Weisung erteilen, Polizeikräfte anderen Ländern zur Verfügung zu stellen, sowie Einheiten des Bundesgrenzschutzes und der Streitkräfte zur Unterstützung der Polizeikräfte einsetzen. Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung nach Satz 1 sind jederzeit auf Verlangen des Bundesrates, im übrigen unverzüglich nach Beseitigung der Gefahr aufzuheben.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 91(2): “(2) Ist das Land, in dem die Gefahr droht, nicht selbst zur Bekämpfung der Gefahr bereit oder in der Lage, so kann die Bundesregierung die Polizei in diesem Lande und die Polizeikräfte anderer Länder ihren Weisungen unterstellen sowie Einheiten des Bundesgrenzschutzes einsetzen. Die Anordnung ist nach Beseitigung der Gefahr, im übrigen jederzeit auf Verlangen des Bundesrates aufzuheben.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 87a(2), (4): “(2) Außer zur Verteidigung dürfen die Streitkräfte nur eingesetzt werden, soweit dieses Grundgesetz es ausdrücklich zuläßt. [...] (4) Zur Abwehr einer drohenden Gefahr für den Bestand oder die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung des Bundes oder eines Landes kann die Bundesregierung, wenn die Voraussetzungen des Artikels 91 Abs. 2 vorliegen und die Polizeikräfte sowie der Bundesgrenzschutz nicht ausreichen, Streitkräfte zur Unterstützung der Polizei und des Bundesgrenzschutzes beim Schutze von zivilen Objekten und bei der Bekämpfung organisierter und militärisch bewaffneter Aufständischer einsetzen. Der Einsatz von Streitkräften ist einzustellen, wenn der Bundestag oder der Bundesrat es verlangen.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115a(1): “(1) Die Feststellung, daß das Bundesgebiet mit Waffengewalt angegriffen wird oder ein solcher Angriff unmittelbar droht (Verteidigungsfall), trifft der Bundestag mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates. Die Feststellung erfolgt auf Antrag der Bundesregierung und bedarf einer Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln der abgegebenen Stimmen, mindestens der Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Bundestages.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115a(2), (3), (4): “(2) Erfordert die Lage unabweisbar ein sofortiges Handeln und stehen einem rechtzeitigen Zusammentritt des Bundestages unüberwindliche Hindernisse entgegen oder ist er nicht beschlußfähig, so trifft der Gemeinsame Ausschuß diese Feststellung mit einer Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln der abgegebenen Stimmen, mindestens der Mehrheit seiner Mitglieder. [...] (4) Wird das Bundesgebiet mit Waffengewalt angegriffen und sind die zuständigen Bundesorgane außerstande, sofort die Feststellung nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 zu treffen, so gilt diese Feststellung als getroffen und als zu dem Zeitpunkt verkündet, in dem der Angriff begonnen hat.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115g: “Die verfassungsmäßige Stellung und die Erfüllung der verfassungsmäßigen Aufgaben des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes und seiner Richter dürfen nicht beeinträchtigt werden. Das Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht darf durch ein Gesetz des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses nur insoweit geändert werden, als dies auch nach Auffassung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes zur Aufrechterhaltung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Gerichtes erforderlich ist. Bis zum Erlaß eines solchen Gesetzes kann das Bundesverfassungsgericht die zur Erhaltung der Arbeitsfähigkeit des Gerichtes erforderlichen Maßnahmen treffen.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115l(1), (2): “(1) Der Bundestag kann jederzeit mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates Gesetze des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses aufheben. [...] (2) Der Bundestag kann mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates jederzeit durch einen vom Bundespräsidenten zu verkündenden Beschluß den Verteidigungsfall für beendet erklären. Der Bundesrat kann verlangen, daß der Bundestag hierüber beschließt. Der Verteidigungsfall ist unverzüglich für beendet zu erklären, wenn die Voraussetzungen für seine Feststellung nicht mehr gegeben sind.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 101: “(1) Ausnahmegerichte sind unzulässig. Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden. (2) Gerichte für besondere Sachgebiete können nur durch Gesetz errichtet werden.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 19(2) and Art. 79(3): “In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden. [Art. 19(2)] — Eine Änderung dieses Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig. [Art. 79(3)]”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115c(1), (3): “(1) Der Bund hat für den Verteidigungsfall das Recht der konkurrierenden Gesetzgebung auch auf den Sachgebieten, die zur Gesetzgebungszuständigkeit der Länder gehören. Diese Gesetze bedürfen der Zustimmung des Bundesrates. [...] (3) Soweit es zur Abwehr eines gegenwärtigen oder unmittelbar drohenden Angriffs erforderlich ist, kann für den Verteidigungsfall durch Bundesgesetz mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates die Verwaltung und das Finanzwesen des Bundes und der Länder abweichend von den Abschnitten VIII, VIIIa und X geregelt werden, wobei die Lebensfähigkeit der Länder, Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände, insbesondere auch in finanzieller Hinsicht, zu wahren ist.”. These provisions support the STRUCTURE of German emergency law and nothing about its application. They record no instance of any regime being invoked, state no measure taken under one, and support no claim about any Land's own disaster-protection law or about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read again from the same official English translation page and checked article by article against the authoritative German original at gesetze-im-internet.de/gg. Supports the LIMITATION architecture: Art. 19(1)-(2), “(1) Soweit nach diesem Grundgesetz ein Grundrecht durch Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes eingeschränkt werden kann, muß das Gesetz allgemein und nicht nur für den Einzelfall gelten. Außerdem muß das Gesetz das Grundrecht unter Angabe des Artikels nennen. (2) In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden.”, and Art. 19(3)-(4) (basic rights apply to domestic legal persons so far as their nature permits; recourse to the courts where rights are violated by public authority, with the second sentence of Art. 10(2) expressly unaffected). Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER finding, verified in the German text rather than the translation because the finding is about a word: Art. 8(1) “Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, sich ohne Anmeldung oder Erlaubnis friedlich und ohne Waffen zu versammeln”; Art. 9(1) “Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, Vereine und Gesellschaften zu bilden”; Art. 11(1) “Alle Deutschen genießen Freizügigkeit im ganzen Bundesgebiet”; Art. 12(1) “Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, Beruf, Arbeitsplatz und Ausbildungsstätte frei zu wählen” — against Art. 2(1) “Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit”, Art. 3(1) “Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich”, and the two provisions that name no holder at all: Art. 10(1) “Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis sind unverletzlich” and Art. 13(1) “Die Wohnung ist unverletzlich”. Supports Art. 1(3), that the basic rights bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. Supports Art. 2(2), that everyone has the right to life and physical integrity, that freedom of the person is inviolable, and that these rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law. Supports the HOME provision in full: Art. 13(2) “Durchsuchungen dürfen nur durch den Richter, bei Gefahr im Verzuge auch durch die in den Gesetzen vorgesehenen anderen Organe angeordnet und nur in der dort vorgeschriebenen Form durchgeführt werden”; Art. 13(3), acoustic surveillance of a home on judicial order where particular facts justify suspicion of an especially serious crime specifically defined by law and alternative methods would be disproportionately difficult or unproductive, for a limited time, ordered by a panel of three judges (a single judge where time is of the essence); Art. 13(4), technical surveillance to avert acute dangers only on judicial order, with a subsequent judicial decision without delay where time was of the essence; Art. 13(5); Art. 13(6), annual reporting to the Bundestag and parliamentary oversight by an elected panel, with comparable oversight in the Länder; and Art. 13(7). Supports the COMMUNICATIONS provision: Art. 10(2), that restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law and that where the restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may provide that the person affected shall not be informed and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by review by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature. Supports Art. 103(1) (“Vor Gericht hat jedermann Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör”) and Art. 104(1)-(4), including Art. 104(2) “Die Polizei darf aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit niemanden länger als bis zum Ende des Tages nach dem Ergreifen in eigenem Gewahrsam halten” and Art. 104(3), that a person provisionally detained on suspicion of an offence is brought before a judge no later than the day following arrest, who informs, examines, and either issues a written reasoned arrest warrant or orders release. VERIFIED NEGATIVE, and it is stated as a fact about the text and not about German law: the Grundgesetz contains no privilege against self-incrimination and no right to silence. An exhaustive search of the authoritative German text for “Selbstbelastung”, “schweigen”, “Aussage zu verweigern” and “Geständnis” returns zero occurrences, as does a search of the English translation for “incriminat”, “silent”, “silence”, “confession” and “witness against”. This record therefore does NOT support any claim that the principle is absent from German law — it supports only that it is absent from this constitutional text. The German text remains authoritative and the translation may lag later amendments.
State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997 (South Africa), ss. 1–5
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, South Africa · Legislation · 1997 · link verified 2026-08-26
The consolidated text published by the Department of Justice, read directly. The finding that makes this record worth having is a negative one about the Constitution: s. 37 sets the conditions on a state of emergency but does NOT name who may declare one — that comes from this Act. Supports State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997, s.1(1)-(2): “1 Declaration of state of emergency (1) Subject to the provisions of section 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ( Act 108 of 1996 ), the President may by proclamation in the Gazette declare a state of emergency in the Republic or in any area within the Republic. (2) The reasons for the declaration of the state of emergency shall be stated briefly in the proclamation.”. Supports State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997, ss.1(3) and 4(1): “(3) The President may at any time withdraw the proclamation by like proclamation in the Gazette . .. 4 Lapsing of emergency regulations (1) Any regulation, order, rule or bylaw made in pursuance of the declaration of a particular state of emergency, or any provision thereof, shall cease to be of force and effect- (a) as from the date on which the proclamation declaring that state of emergency is withdrawn by the President under section 1 (3); (b) as from the date on which the National Assembly- (i) resolves under section 37 (2) (b) of the Constitution .. not to extend the declaration of that state of emergency; or (ii) resolves under section 3 (2) (a) to disapprove of any such regulation, order, rule, bylaw or provision, to the extent to which it is so disapproved; or (c) as from the date on which the declaration of that state of emergency lapses as contemplated in the said section 37 (2) (b) , whichever is the earlier date.”. Supports State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997, s.2(3)-(4): “(3) No provision of this section shall- (a) authorise the making of any regulations which are inconsistent with this Act or section 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ( Act 108 of 1996 ); or (b) authorise the making of any regulations whereby- (i) provision is made for the imposition of imprisonment for a period exceeding three years; (ii) any duty to render military service other than that provided for in the Defence Act, 1957 ( Act 44 of 1957 ), is imposed; or (iii) any law relating to the qualifications, nomination, election or tenure of office of members of Parliament or a provincial legislature, the sittings of Parliament or a provincial legislature or the powers, privileges or immunities of Parliament or a provincial legislature or of the members or committees thereof, is amended or suspended. (4) Regulations governing the detention of persons shall provide for such international humanitarian organisations as may be recognised by the Republic to have access to persons detained under such regulations in order to monitor the circumstances under which such persons are detained.”. Cited for the declaring authority, the withdrawal power, the lapsing of emergency regulations, and the express statutory bars on what such regulations may contain. It records no declaration, states no regulation ever made, and supports no claim about any other country.
Bunreacht na hÉireann / Constitution of Ireland — Articles 15.5.2, 28.3, 38, 40.4
Office of the Attorney General (electronic Irish Statute Book) · Legislation · 1937 · link verified 2026-08-26
The consolidated text on the electronic Irish Statute Book, read directly. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 28.3.3 (definition of "time of war"): “In this subsection "time of war" includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 15.5.2 (read with Article 28.3.3): “2° The Oireachtas shall not enact any law providing for the imposition of the death penalty.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.4.1 and 40.4.2: “4 1° No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law. 2° Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with the law.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.4.3: “3° Where the body of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained is produced before the High Court in pursuance of an order in that behalf made under this section and that Court is satisfied that such person is being detained in accordance with a law but that such law is invalid having regard to the provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall refer the question of the validity of such law to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated and may, at the time of such reference or at any time thereafter, allow the said person to be at liberty on such bail and subject to such conditions as the High Court shall fix until the Court of Appeal has determined the question so referred to it.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.4.5: “5° Nothing in this section, however, shall be invoked to prohibit, control, or interfere with any act of the Defence Forces during the existence of a state of war or armed rebellion.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 38.3.1, 38.4.1, 38.5: “3 1° Special courts may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order. [..] 4 1° Military tribunals may be established for the trial of offences against military law alleged to have been committed by persons while subject to military law and also to deal with a state of war or armed rebellion. [..] 5 Save in the case of the trial of offences under section 2, section 3 or section 4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury.”. Cited for four findings the general accounts get wrong: that the Article 28.3.3 shield is switched on and off by resolutions of BOTH Houses rather than by the Government; that it does not lapse when the conflict ends; that special courts are constitutionally PERMITTED where the ordinary courts are determined inadequate, which is the counter-example to the prohibition found elsewhere; and that the habeas corpus section is expressly disapplied as against acts of the Defence Forces during war or armed rebellion. It records no emergency, states no instance of any of these provisions being used, and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read again from the same Irish Statute Book text of Bunreacht na hÉireann. Supports Art. 29.6 verbatim: “No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.” Supports Art. 40.4.1°: “No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.” Supports Art. 40.4.2°, and specifically that the remedy is worded more widely than the right it enforces: “Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with the law.” Supports Art. 40.5: “The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.” Supports Art. 40.6.1° i, that the State guarantees liberty for the exercise of “the right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions”, subject to public order and morality. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that Art. 40 repeatedly words rights for the citizen while Art. 40.4.2° words the habeas remedy for any person. IMPORTANT LIMITATION, stated on every page relying on this record: this establishes what the constitutional TEXT says about who holds the right. How the Irish courts have construed “citizen” in Article 40 was NOT researched for this wave, and this record supports no claim about it. WAVE 31 EXTENSION — Article 38 read in full at the same address rather than duplicated into a second record. Supports Art. 38.5 verbatim: “Save in the case of the trial of offences under section 2, section 3 or section 4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury.” Supports the three exceptions it points to: Art. 38.2 (“Minor offences may be tried by courts of summary jurisdiction.”), Art. 38.3.1° (special courts where it is determined that “the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order”), and Art. 38.4 (military tribunals). DOES NOT SUPPORT the size of an Irish jury or how jurors are selected: Article 38 states neither.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988
Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25
The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.