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Does a state of emergency actually end, and what happens to what was done under it?

Initial limits run from fourteen days to no fixed term at all, so "temporary" carries no common content. Renewal is where the systems differ most — and Brazil answers the harder question by preserving liability for unlawful acts after the regime is over.

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In short

An emergency power ends in one of three ways: the clock runs out, someone revokes it, or a chamber refuses to continue it. The interesting question is which of those is the default — and the second interesting question, which fewer texts answer, is what happens to everything that was done while it was running.

Why it exists

AnalysisA power granted for a crisis outlives the crisis unless something makes it stop, and the thing that makes it stop has to be built in at the start. The design question is who bears the burden of inertia: whether the power continues unless somebody ends it, or ends unless somebody continues it.

How it works

The initial limits alone are enough to show that "temporary" has no shared meaning. Kenya’s Article 58(2) provides that a declaration and anything done under it is effective only prospectively and for not longer than fourteen days. South Africa’s section 37(2) sets twenty-one. Brazil’s estado de defesa may not exceed thirty days. Switzerland’s security ordinances run six months. A United States national emergency terminates on its anniversary.

Renewal is where the systems separate. Kenya makes each extension harder than the last: the National Assembly may extend for no longer than two months at a time, by resolution following a public debate, the first extension supported by at least two-thirds of all members and any subsequent extension by at least three-quarters.

South Africa uses the same escalating shape with different numbers — three months at a time, the first extension by a majority of the members of the Assembly and any subsequent extension by at least sixty per cent.

Brazil takes the other route and caps it outright. The estado de defesa may not exceed thirty days podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação — renewable once, for an equal period, if the reasons that justified it persist. Sixty days is the ceiling.

Switzerland inverts the default entirely, for one class of instrument. Under Article 7d of the Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz a Federal Council ordinance made directly on Article 185(3) of the Constitution — to counter serious disturbances of public order or of internal or external security — ceases to have effect six months after entry into force unless the Federal Council has by then submitted to the Federal Assembly a draft statutory basis for its content or a draft Assembly ordinance replacing it, and it lapses on rejection of that draft or on the entry into force of the statutory basis. Article 7c, which governs ordinances made on Article 184(3) to safeguard the interests of the country, sets its own and longer clock.

The United States points the default the other way. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) a declared national emergency terminates on the anniversary of its declaration if, within the ninety-day period before each anniversary, the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect. Termination otherwise requires a joint resolution enacted into law, or a presidential proclamation.

AnalysisSo continuation runs on a notice by the person who declared it, and ending it against that person’s wishes requires legislation. That is the exact inverse of the Swiss design, where nobody need act for the ordinance to lapse and somebody must act to keep it — and the contrast is between the two defaults rather than between two levels of scrutiny.

Ireland shows that a limit can be constitutional and still not be a clock. Article 28.3.3 provides that "time of war or armed rebellion" includes such time after the termination of the war, conflict or rebellion as may elapse until each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that the national emergency occasioned by it has ceased to exist.

The hardest question is what happens to what was already done, and Brazil answers it directly. Article 141 provides that on cessation of the estado de defesa or the estado de sítio their effects also cease, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes — without prejudice to liability for unlawful acts committed by those who executed the measures or their agents.

AnalysisThe two halves belong together. Duration limits attach to the declaration, not to what was done under it — so a lapsed declaration does not by itself undo a detention, a prohibition or a requisition, and a system that wants those answered has to say so separately, as both of these do.

Common misconceptions

Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.

  • Common belief: A state of emergency is temporary, so it will be short.

    In practice: Temporary is not a length. The initial limits described here run from fourteen days to no fixed term, and Ireland’s constitutional definition keeps the state of affairs alive until each House resolves that it has ceased to exist.

  • Common belief: An emergency ends when the crisis ends.

    In practice: Not under Ireland’s Article 28.3.3, which expressly extends "time of war or armed rebellion" past the end of the conflict until both Houses resolve otherwise.

  • Common belief: Renewing an emergency needs the same approval as declaring one.

    In practice: Frequently it needs more. Kenya requires two-thirds of all members for the first extension and three-quarters for any subsequent one; South Africa requires a majority and then at least sixty per cent.

  • Common belief: Emergency measures lapse automatically when the declaration ends.

    In practice: The declaration and the measures are different objects. Brazil states expressly that liability for unlawful acts survives the end of the regime, and South Africa bars any emergency legislation from indemnifying anyone for an unlawful act.

  • Common belief: Someone always has to vote to keep an emergency going.

    In practice: Not in the United States. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) continuation runs on a presidential notice published in the Federal Register, and ending it against the President’s wishes requires a joint resolution enacted into law.

  • Common belief: Once an emergency ends, the people who acted under it are protected.

    In practice: Brazil’s Article 141 provides the opposite in terms: effects cease without prejudice to liability for unlawful acts committed by those who executed the measures.

How this varies between jurisdictions

A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.

Six systems, and the default points both ways.

  • Fourteen days, extendable two months at a time on two-thirds then three-quarters of all members — Kenya, Art. 58(2)–(3).
  • Twenty-one days, extendable three months at a time on a majority then at least sixty per cent — South Africa, s. 37(2).
  • Thirty days, renewable once only, for a hard sixty-day ceiling — Brazil, CF Art. 136 §2.
  • Six months for a security ordinance, lapsing unless a draft statutory basis is put before the chamber — Switzerland, RVOG Art. 7d.
  • One year, continuing on a presidential notice with no legislative approval — United States, 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d).
  • No fixed term, ending only when both Houses resolve the emergency has ceased — Ireland, Art. 28.3.3.

Worked examples

Systems this platform has researched. Each example links to the dossier it draws on.

Brazil
Caps the estado de defesa at thirty days renewable ONCE — a hard sixty-day ceiling — and then answers the aftermath question in Art. 141: when the regime ceases its effects cease, expressly without prejudice to liability for unlawful acts committed by those who executed it.
Switzerland
Makes lapse the default rather than the exception: a Federal Council security ordinance ceases to have effect six months after entry into force unless a draft statutory basis has by then been put before the Federal Assembly, and lapses outright if the Assembly rejects it.
Kenya
Makes each extension harder than the last: the National Assembly may extend for no longer than two months at a time, the first extension by two-thirds of all members and any subsequent extension by three-quarters, in each case following a public debate.
South Africa
Uses the same escalating design with different numbers — three months at a time, the first extension by a majority of members and any subsequent extension by at least sixty per cent — and adds that a declaration and anything done under it may take effect only prospectively.

Where the pattern does not hold

Systems at the same level that arrange this differently. The pattern above is a pattern, not a rule.

Ireland
The counter-case to temporariness. The Art. 28.3.3 shield does not lapse when the war, armed conflict or rebellion ends: the constitutional definition extends it until each of the Houses of the Oireachtas has resolved that the national emergency has ceased to exist.

Rights and accountability

AnalysisWhere the default points determines who has to win the argument. Under a lapse-unless-renewed rule the government must persuade someone at every interval; under a continue-unless-terminated rule everyone else must assemble a majority against it. The same emergency lasts different lengths of time under those two rules for reasons that have nothing to do with the emergency.

AnalysisThe aftermath provisions are what make the whole structure worth having. A time limit with no liability rule would let a government act unlawfully for thirty days and then close the file; the Brazilian and South African provisions ensure that the end of the regime is the beginning of the accounting rather than the end of it.

AnalysisNone of which implies that ending an emergency promptly is always the right call. These are constitutional judgements about a genuine dilemma, and a system that made renewal impossible would face the opposite failure — a government unable to continue protecting people because a clock ran out.

What we could not establish

  • Six systems are described from primary text. How long any declaration has actually lasted anywhere was not researched and is not stated.
  • This page describes rules about duration and aftermath. It states no deadline applicable to anyone, describes no procedure, and says nothing about any particular measure.

Where to go next

Related: who can declare a state of emergency, reviewing an emergency declaration, and legal certainty.

Sources

  1. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988

    Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25

    The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  2. Bunreacht na hÉireann / Constitution of Ireland — Articles 15.5.2, 28.3, 38, 40.4

    Office of the Attorney General (electronic Irish Statute Book) · Legislation · 1937 · link verified 2026-08-26

    The consolidated text on the electronic Irish Statute Book, read directly. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 28.3.3 (definition of "time of war"): “In this subsection "time of war" includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 15.5.2 (read with Article 28.3.3): “2° The Oireachtas shall not enact any law providing for the imposition of the death penalty.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.4.1 and 40.4.2: “4 1° No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law. 2° Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with the law.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.4.3: “3° Where the body of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained is produced before the High Court in pursuance of an order in that behalf made under this section and that Court is satisfied that such person is being detained in accordance with a law but that such law is invalid having regard to the provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall refer the question of the validity of such law to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated and may, at the time of such reference or at any time thereafter, allow the said person to be at liberty on such bail and subject to such conditions as the High Court shall fix until the Court of Appeal has determined the question so referred to it.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.4.5: “5° Nothing in this section, however, shall be invoked to prohibit, control, or interfere with any act of the Defence Forces during the existence of a state of war or armed rebellion.”. Supports Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 38.3.1, 38.4.1, 38.5: “3 1° Special courts may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order. [..] 4 1° Military tribunals may be established for the trial of offences against military law alleged to have been committed by persons while subject to military law and also to deal with a state of war or armed rebellion. [..] 5 Save in the case of the trial of offences under section 2, section 3 or section 4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury.”. Cited for four findings the general accounts get wrong: that the Article 28.3.3 shield is switched on and off by resolutions of BOTH Houses rather than by the Government; that it does not lapse when the conflict ends; that special courts are constitutionally PERMITTED where the ordinary courts are determined inadequate, which is the counter-example to the prohibition found elsewhere; and that the habeas corpus section is expressly disapplied as against acts of the Defence Forces during war or armed rebellion. It records no emergency, states no instance of any of these provisions being used, and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read again from the same Irish Statute Book text of Bunreacht na hÉireann. Supports Art. 29.6 verbatim: “No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.” Supports Art. 40.4.1°: “No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.” Supports Art. 40.4.2°, and specifically that the remedy is worded more widely than the right it enforces: “Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with the law.” Supports Art. 40.5: “The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.” Supports Art. 40.6.1° i, that the State guarantees liberty for the exercise of “the right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions”, subject to public order and morality. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that Art. 40 repeatedly words rights for the citizen while Art. 40.4.2° words the habeas remedy for any person. IMPORTANT LIMITATION, stated on every page relying on this record: this establishes what the constitutional TEXT says about who holds the right. How the Irish courts have construed “citizen” in Article 40 was NOT researched for this wave, and this record supports no claim about it. WAVE 31 EXTENSION — Article 38 read in full at the same address rather than duplicated into a second record. Supports Art. 38.5 verbatim: “Save in the case of the trial of offences under section 2, section 3 or section 4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury.” Supports the three exceptions it points to: Art. 38.2 (“Minor offences may be tried by courts of summary jurisdiction.”), Art. 38.3.1° (special courts where it is determined that “the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order”), and Art. 38.4 (military tribunals). DOES NOT SUPPORT the size of an Irish jury or how jurors are selected: Article 38 states neither.

  3. Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz vom 21. März 1997 (RVOG; SR 172.010), Arts. 7c and 7d — Verordnungen und Verfügungen zur Wahrung der Interessen des Landes und zum Schutz der öffentlichen Ordnung

    Bundeskanzlei der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (Fedlex) · Legislation · 1997-03-21 · link verified 2026-08-26

    The consolidated German text on Fedlex, read directly at the filestore HTML rather than at the ELI permalink, which returns HTTP 200 while serving only a JavaScript shell. These are the provisions that put a statutory clock on an emergency ordinance made directly on constitutional authority. Supports Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz vom 21. März 1997 (RVOG, SR 172.010), Art. 7d(1): “Art. 7d Verordnungen zur Wahrung der inneren oder äusseren Sicherheit. 1 Der Bundesrat kann, unmittelbar gestützt auf Artikel 185 Absatz 3 der Bundesverfassung, eine Verordnung erlassen, um eingetretenen oder unmittelbar drohenden schweren Störungen der öffentlichen Ordnung oder der inneren oder äusseren Sicherheit zu begegnen.”. Supports RVOG (SR 172.010), Art. 7c: “Art. 7c Verordnungen zur Wahrung der Interessen des Landes. 1 Der Bundesrat kann, unmittelbar gestützt auf Artikel 184 Absatz 3 der Bundesverfassung, eine Verordnung erlassen, wenn die Wahrung der Interessen des Landes es erfordert. 2 Er befristet die Verordnung angemessen; ihre Geltungsdauer beträgt höchstens vier Jahre. 3 Er kann die Geltungsdauer einmal verlängern. In diesem Fall tritt die Verordnung sechs Monate nach dem Inkrafttreten ihrer Verlängerung ausser Kraft, wenn der Bundesrat bis dahin der Bundesversammlung keinen Entwurf einer gesetzlichen Grundlage für den Inhalt der Verordnung unterbreitet.”. Supports RVOG (SR 172.010), Art. 7d(2)-(3); cf. Art. 7c(2): “Art. 7d [..] 2 Die Verordnung tritt ausser Kraft: a. sechs Monate nach ihrem Inkrafttreten, wenn der Bundesrat bis dahin der Bundesversammlung keinen Entwurf unterbreitet: 1. einer gesetzlichen Grundlage für den Inhalt der Verordnung, oder 2. einer Verordnung der Bundesversammlung gemäss Artikel 173 Absatz 1 Buchstabe c der Bundesverfassung, welche die Verordnung des Bundesrates ersetzt; b. nach der Ablehnung des Entwurfes durch die Bundesversammlung; oder c. wenn die gesetzliche Grundlage oder die sie ersetzende Verordnung der Bundesversammlung in Kraft tritt. 3 Eine Verordnung der Bundesversammlung nach Absatz 2 Buchstabe a Ziffer 2 tritt spätestens drei Jahre nach ihrem Inkrafttreten ausser Kraft.”. Supports RVOG (SR 172.010), Art. 7d(2)(b)-(c): “2 Die Verordnung tritt ausser Kraft: [..] b. nach der Ablehnung des Entwurfes durch die Bundesversammlung; oder c. wenn die gesetzliche Grundlage oder die sie ersetzende Verordnung der Bundesversammlung in Kraft tritt.”. Cited for the SUNSET-BY-DEFAULT structure: an ordinance resting directly on the constitution lapses unless a statutory basis is put before the Federal Assembly within a fixed period. It states no ground on which such an ordinance may be made, records no instance of one, and supports no claim about any other country.

  4. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 34 — §§ 1621, 1622 and 1631

    U.S. Government Publishing Office (govinfo) · Legislation · 1976 · link verified 2026-08-26

    The official United States Code text on govinfo, read directly. Supports 50 U.S.C. §1621(a): “The President is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.”. Supports 50 U.S.C. §1621(b): “Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be exercised during a national emergency shall be effective and remain in effect (1) only when the President..specifically declares a national emergency, and (2) only in accordance with this chapter.”. Supports 50 U.S.C. §1631: “no powers or authorities made available by statute for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised unless and until the President specifies the provisions of law under which he proposes that he, or other officers will act”. Supports 50 U.S.C. §1622(d): “shall terminate on the anniversary of the declaration of that emergency if, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.”. Supports 50 U.S.C. §1622(a)(1); §1622(a)(2) ("the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency"): “there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the emergency”. Cited for the DECLARATION, CONTINUATION and TERMINATION architecture only, and specifically for the finding that continuation runs on a presidential notice rather than on any legislative act. It supports no claim about which statutory powers any particular declaration has activated, no claim about any specific emergency, and no claim about any other country.

  5. Constitution of Kenya, 2010

    National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  6. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

    Government of South Africa (gov.za) · Legislation · 1996 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (in force 4 February 1997), fetched from the official gov.za chapters and schedules and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports s 1(c) and s 2 (constitutional supremacy — "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid"); s 165 (judicial authority vested in independent courts); s 166 (the courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Magistrates' Courts); s 167(3) (the Constitutional Court is "the highest court of the Republic", the apex for all matters since the Seventeenth Amendment); s 178 (the Judicial Service Commission); s 179 (a "single national prosecuting authority", headed by the National Director appointed by the President, exercising its functions without fear, favour or prejudice, with the Justice Minister exercising "final responsibility"); s 181 (the Chapter 9 institutions — the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and others); s 205–207 (a single national police service, the Minister determining national policing policy, the National Commissioner controlling the service, provinces limited to oversight); and Schedules 4 and 5 (which contain no provincial competence over courts, prosecution, prisons or criminal law, only police "to the extent that Chapter 11 confers"). Establishes constitutional supremacy and that all four justice functions are national. WAVE 12 ADDITION, read from the clean digital text published by the Department of Justice at justice.gov.za and corroborated against the gov.za chapter pages: s 9(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; s 33(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, s 33(2) written reasons where rights have been adversely affected, s 33(3) national legislation providing for review by a court or independent and impartial tribunal; s 34 Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum; s 35(2)(b) the right of a detained person to choose and consult a legal practitioner, s 35(2)(c) the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, s 35(2)(d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a court, and s 35(2)(e) to conditions of detention consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment. ACCESS NOTE: the scanned gazette PDF at gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf is an OCR with visible corruption and was rejected as a source; nothing is quoted from it. WAVE 14 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(3)(f) the right of every accused person to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(k) “to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language”; and s 35(4) that whenever the section requires information to be given to a person, that information must be given in a language that the person understands. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(5) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." As with the Kenyan provision, exclusion is conditional on the effect of admission rather than automatic on the violation. Also read directly from the same chapter text, the whole of s 35(2)(d) and its chapeau: "Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right u2014 u2026 (d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released". Three features of that provision are cited on this platform and each is in the text itself: that the right extends to sentenced prisoners, that the challenge is made in person before a court, and that release is the stated remedy. The provision states no procedure for bringing such a challenge and no time limit, and this record supports no claim about either. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Department of Justice chapter text. Section 37 is the most fully specified emergency clause in this wave, and its detail is the finding. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(1): “37. (1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when— (a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(2)(b): “The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(3): “(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(4): “(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and (b) the legislation— (i) is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to states of emergency; (ii) conforms to subsection (5); and (iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after being enacted.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(5) and the Table of Non-Derogable Rights: “(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise— (a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act; (b) any derogation from this section; or (c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table. Table of Non-Derogable Rights [1 Section number | 2 Section title | 3 Extent to which the right is protected] 9 | Equality | With respect to unfair discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language. 10 | Human Dignity | Entirely 11 | Life | Entirely 12 | Freedom and Security of the person | With respect to subsections (1)(d) and (e) and (2)(c). 13 | Slavery, servitude and forced labour | With respect to slavery and servitude 28 | Children | With respect to: – subsection (1)(d) and (e); – the rights in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of subsection (1)(g); and – subsection 1(i) in respect of children of 15 years and younger. 35 | Arrested, detained and accused persons | With respect to: – subsections (1)(a), (b) and (c) and (2)(d); – the rights in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3), excluding paragraph (d) – subsection (4); and – subsection (5) with respect to the exclusion of evidence if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(6)-(8): “(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed: (a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained. (b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the person being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained. (c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a medical practitioner. (d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal representative. (e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. ... (7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person. (8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under international humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.36: “36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.201; cf. ss.198(d), 199(6): “201. (1) A member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence. (2) Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence force— (a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in defence of the Republic; or (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation. (3) When the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of— (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force; (b) any place where the force is being employed; (c) the number of people involved; and (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed. (4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.”. Cited for prospective-only effect, the twenty-one-day limit and the escalating extension majorities, validity review by any competent court, the strictly-required test, the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, the absolute bar on indemnifying unlawful acts, and the conditions on detention without trial. It records no state of emergency ever declared under this Constitution and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) read from the South African Government's own published text at gov.za. Supports s. 12(1)-(2) (freedom and security of the person, including not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, not to be detained without trial, freedom from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, and not to be tortured or treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; and bodily and psychological integrity, including security in and control over one's body and freedom from medical or scientific experiments without informed consent). Supports s. 14 verbatim: “Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Note what this provision does NOT contain, which the page relying on it states: no warrant requirement and no authorisation rule of any kind. Supports s. 35(1) (rights of arrested persons, including (a) to remain silent; (b) to be informed promptly of the right to remain silent AND of the consequences of not remaining silent; (c) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 48 hours after arrest, or the end of the first court day after the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a non-court day; (e) and (f)). Supports s. 35(2) (rights of detained persons, including prompt information of the reason, choice of and consultation with a legal practitioner and prompt information of that right, state-assigned counsel where substantial injustice would otherwise result, and the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and be released if it is unlawful). Supports s. 35(3) (fair-trial rights, including (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; (b) adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) a public trial before an ordinary court; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence; (j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; (k) to be tried in a language the accused understands or to have the proceedings interpreted). Supports s. 36(1)-(2), the general limitation clause: rights may be limited “only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”, and that except as provided in s. 36(1) or elsewhere in the Constitution, no law may limit any entrenched right. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that ss. 12, 14 and 35 are worded “Everyone” while political rights under s. 19 are for “every citizen”. Constitutional text only: no Constitutional Court decision, no statute, and nothing about any other country.