Justice
Can a court be asked whether the declaration itself was lawful, or only the measures under it?
Both, and systems answer them differently. South Africa lets any competent court decide the validity of a declaration, an extension, and anything done under it; Kenya narrows the forum to the Supreme Court; Spain splits it by the rank of the instrument; one constitutional court holds the declaration unreviewable.
In short
Asking whether a court can review an emergency turns out to be at least three questions with different answers. Was the declaration lawful? Was the extension lawful? Was this particular measure taken under it lawful? Several constitutions separate them expressly, and the answers are not the same even inside one system.
Why it exists
AnalysisA declaration is an exercise of public power like any other, and this platform already explains that judicial review asks whether power was exercised lawfully rather than whether the decision was right. What makes the emergency case distinctive is that the act under challenge may itself be the thing that switched on the powers — so the ordinary machinery has to answer a question about its own preconditions.
How it works
South Africa writes the decomposition into the constitution and then declines to narrow the forum. Section 37(3) provides that any competent court may decide on the validity of a declaration of a state of emergency, of any extension of a declaration, and of any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration.
Kenya uses an almost identical three-way structure and makes the opposite choice about who hears it. Article 58(5) provides that the Supreme Court may decide on the validity of a declaration, of any extension, and of any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration.
Spain divides by the rank of the instrument rather than by the object. In STC 83/2016 the Tribunal Constitucional held that decrees declaring or extending an estado de alarma possess rango o valor de ley, so they escape the administrative-law courts — and the Court was explicit that this does not make them immune from all judicial control, but channels it to the constitutional route.
The ordinary courts keep the rest. Article 3 of Ley Orgánica 4/1981 provides that acts and provisions of the public administration adopted during any of the three states are challengeable in the courts, with a right to compensation for those harmed in their person, rights or property by acts not attributable to their own conduct.
Czechia is the counter-case, and it is a constitutional court that supplies it. In Pl. ÚS 8/20 the plenum held that a government resolution declaring a nouzový stav is primarily an act of applying constitutional law — an akt vládnutí, an act of governing with normative impact — which in principle is not subject to review.
France builds a clock into the constitution and then supplies ordinary routes beneath it. Since the 2008 revision, Article 16 provides that after thirty days of the exercise of exceptional powers the Conseil constitutionnel may be seised by the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty deputies or sixty senators, to examine whether the conditions for those powers remain met.
Beneath that, the ordinary judge does the work. In décision n° 2015-527 QPC the Conseil constitutionnel held that an assignation à résidence under the state of emergency, its duration, its conditions of application and any supplementary obligations must be justified and proportionate to the reasons that motivated the measure, under the control of the administrative judge — and in décision n° 2020-800 DC it imposed a reservation of interpretation requiring prior judicial authorisation before a quarantine or isolation measure prohibiting departure could continue beyond fourteen days.
New Zealand shows the same instinct in a common-law system with no written emergency clause. In Borrowdale v Director-General of Health the High Court reviewed emergency measures on ordinary administrative-law and Bill of Rights grounds and concluded that for nine days there had been an unlawful limitation of certain rights and freedoms, while placing that in the context of a rapidly developing situation.
AnalysisWhich is worth stating plainly because of how it is often reported. A court finding part of an emergency measure unlawful is the system working as designed, not a constitutional crisis — and the same judgment upheld the rest.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: Emergency powers are never reviewable by courts.
In practice: That is not true of any system described here, and two constitutions say so in terms. South Africa’s s. 37(3) lets any competent court decide the validity of a declaration, an extension, and anything done in consequence; Kenya’s Art. 58(5) assigns the same three questions to the Supreme Court.
Common belief: If a court can review an emergency, it can review everything about it.
In practice: Not in Spain, where a declaring decree has the rank of statute and is challengeable only before the Tribunal Constitucional while administrative acts under it go to the ordinary courts.
Common belief: Every constitutional court will examine whether a declaration was lawful.
In practice: The Czech Constitutional Court held in Pl. ÚS 8/20 that a government resolution declaring a nouzový stav is an act of governing which in principle is not subject to review.
Common belief: A declaration being unreviewable means the measures under it are too.
In practice: They are separate questions, and the Czech decision distinguishes them. Nothing in it holds that measures taken under a declaration escape review.
Common belief: Judicial review works the same way everywhere during an emergency.
In practice: It does not. One system opens it to any court, one confines it to the apex court, one splits it by the rank of the instrument, one holds the declaration in principle unreviewable, and one runs it through ordinary administrative law.
Common belief: A court holding part of an emergency measure unlawful means the system has broken down.
In practice: It is the system operating. In Borrowdale the High Court found an unlawful limitation for nine days, situated it in a rapidly developing situation, and upheld the remainder.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Six systems, five arrangements.
- Any competent court, three objects of review named in the constitution — South Africa, s. 37(3).
- The Supreme Court alone, the same three objects — Kenya, Art. 58(5).
- Split by rank: the constitutional court for the declaring decree, the ordinary courts for administrative acts — Spain, STC 83/2016 with LO 4/1981 Art. 3.
- The declaration in principle not reviewable — Czechia, Pl. ÚS 8/20.
- A thirty-day constitutional clock above, proportionality review by the administrative judge below — France, Art. 16 with the Conseil constitutionnel’s decisions.
- Ordinary administrative-law and Bill of Rights review — New Zealand, Borrowdale.
Worked examples
Systems this platform has researched. Each example links to the dossier it draws on.
- South Africa
- Decomposes the question in the constitutional text itself: s. 37(3) provides that any competent court may decide the validity of a declaration, of any extension of a declaration, and of any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of one — three separate objects of review, and no restriction on the forum.
- Kenya
- Uses the same three-way decomposition and narrows the forum to one court: Art. 58(5) assigns validity of the declaration, of any extension, and of legislation or action taken in consequence to the SUPREME COURT.
- Spain
- Splits review by the rank of the instrument. STC 83/2016 holds that a decree declaring or extending an estado de alarma has the rank or value of statute and is therefore challengeable only before the Tribunal Constitucional — while LO 4/1981 Art. 3 leaves administrative acts adopted during any of the three states challengeable in the ordinary courts.
Where the pattern does not hold
Systems at the same level that arrange this differently. The pattern above is a pattern, not a rule.
- Czechia
- The counter-case. In Pl. ÚS 8/20 the plenum of the Constitutional Court held that a government resolution declaring a nouzový stav is primarily an act of applying constitutional law — an "akt vládnutí" with normative impact — which is in principle not subject to review.
Rights and accountability
AnalysisNaming the objects of review in the constitutional text is what makes the question answerable at all. Where a text says a court may decide the validity of a declaration, of an extension, and of action taken in consequence, nobody has to argue about whether the subject matter is justiciable — the argument moves to the merits, which is where it is useful.
AnalysisAsking a court whether an emergency was lawfully declared is not an attack on the government that declared it, any more than an appeal is a criticism of the judge who decided the case. It is the question the constitution itself provides for in three of these systems, and the body answering it is doing what it was constituted to do.
AnalysisThe systems that limit review are not thereby lawless either. Spain channels it rather than removing it, and the Czech decision reaches the declaration alone. Recording the difference precisely is the whole point: "courts can review emergency powers" is true of every system here and describes none of them accurately.
What we could not establish
- Six systems are described from primary text. What any other system provides was not researched, and the spread here is wide enough that nothing should be generalised from it.
- This page describes what may be reviewed and by whom. It states no procedure, no time limit and no route for bringing any challenge, and it is not legal advice.
Where to go next
Related: constitutional review, what a reviewing court can do, and courts during a state of emergency.
Related topics
- Who is legally able to declare one, and does anyone else have to agree?
No two systems answer alike. Czechia and Spain each run three regimes with three different declaring authorities; Germany requires a two-thirds Bundestag vote before the state of defence; Ireland needs a resolution of both Houses; South Africa’s Constitution does not name the declaring authority at all.
- Who decides whether a law is constitutional?
Four different arrangements in three constitutions — and one that answers "nobody". The Dutch Constitution provides that the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament shall not be reviewed by the courts, which any general account of the subject has to survive.
- When the state gets something wrong, what is a person actually entitled to?
A remedy is what a forum can give, and constitutions state it in concrete terms: release from unlawful detention, review of an official decision, written reasons, invalidity of inconsistent law — and, in Brazil, indemnity for a wrongful conviction.
Where this connects
Institutions: Constitutional court.
Sources
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Government of South Africa (gov.za) · Legislation · 1996 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (in force 4 February 1997), fetched from the official gov.za chapters and schedules and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports s 1(c) and s 2 (constitutional supremacy — "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid"); s 165 (judicial authority vested in independent courts); s 166 (the courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Magistrates' Courts); s 167(3) (the Constitutional Court is "the highest court of the Republic", the apex for all matters since the Seventeenth Amendment); s 178 (the Judicial Service Commission); s 179 (a "single national prosecuting authority", headed by the National Director appointed by the President, exercising its functions without fear, favour or prejudice, with the Justice Minister exercising "final responsibility"); s 181 (the Chapter 9 institutions — the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and others); s 205–207 (a single national police service, the Minister determining national policing policy, the National Commissioner controlling the service, provinces limited to oversight); and Schedules 4 and 5 (which contain no provincial competence over courts, prosecution, prisons or criminal law, only police "to the extent that Chapter 11 confers"). Establishes constitutional supremacy and that all four justice functions are national. WAVE 12 ADDITION, read from the clean digital text published by the Department of Justice at justice.gov.za and corroborated against the gov.za chapter pages: s 9(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; s 33(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, s 33(2) written reasons where rights have been adversely affected, s 33(3) national legislation providing for review by a court or independent and impartial tribunal; s 34 Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum; s 35(2)(b) the right of a detained person to choose and consult a legal practitioner, s 35(2)(c) the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, s 35(2)(d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a court, and s 35(2)(e) to conditions of detention consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment. ACCESS NOTE: the scanned gazette PDF at gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf is an OCR with visible corruption and was rejected as a source; nothing is quoted from it. WAVE 14 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(3)(f) the right of every accused person to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(k) “to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language”; and s 35(4) that whenever the section requires information to be given to a person, that information must be given in a language that the person understands. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(5) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." As with the Kenyan provision, exclusion is conditional on the effect of admission rather than automatic on the violation. Also read directly from the same chapter text, the whole of s 35(2)(d) and its chapeau: "Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right u2014 u2026 (d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released". Three features of that provision are cited on this platform and each is in the text itself: that the right extends to sentenced prisoners, that the challenge is made in person before a court, and that release is the stated remedy. The provision states no procedure for bringing such a challenge and no time limit, and this record supports no claim about either. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Department of Justice chapter text. Section 37 is the most fully specified emergency clause in this wave, and its detail is the finding. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(1): “37. (1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when— (a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(2)(b): “The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(3): “(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(4): “(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and (b) the legislation— (i) is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to states of emergency; (ii) conforms to subsection (5); and (iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after being enacted.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(5) and the Table of Non-Derogable Rights: “(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise— (a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act; (b) any derogation from this section; or (c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table. Table of Non-Derogable Rights [1 Section number | 2 Section title | 3 Extent to which the right is protected] 9 | Equality | With respect to unfair discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language. 10 | Human Dignity | Entirely 11 | Life | Entirely 12 | Freedom and Security of the person | With respect to subsections (1)(d) and (e) and (2)(c). 13 | Slavery, servitude and forced labour | With respect to slavery and servitude 28 | Children | With respect to: – subsection (1)(d) and (e); – the rights in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of subsection (1)(g); and – subsection 1(i) in respect of children of 15 years and younger. 35 | Arrested, detained and accused persons | With respect to: – subsections (1)(a), (b) and (c) and (2)(d); – the rights in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3), excluding paragraph (d) – subsection (4); and – subsection (5) with respect to the exclusion of evidence if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(6)-(8): “(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed: (a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained. (b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the person being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained. (c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a medical practitioner. (d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal representative. (e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. ... (7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person. (8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under international humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.36: “36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.201; cf. ss.198(d), 199(6): “201. (1) A member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence. (2) Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence force— (a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in defence of the Republic; or (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation. (3) When the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of— (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force; (b) any place where the force is being employed; (c) the number of people involved; and (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed. (4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.”. Cited for prospective-only effect, the twenty-one-day limit and the escalating extension majorities, validity review by any competent court, the strictly-required test, the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, the absolute bar on indemnifying unlawful acts, and the conditions on detention without trial. It records no state of emergency ever declared under this Constitution and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) read from the South African Government's own published text at gov.za. Supports s. 12(1)-(2) (freedom and security of the person, including not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, not to be detained without trial, freedom from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, and not to be tortured or treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; and bodily and psychological integrity, including security in and control over one's body and freedom from medical or scientific experiments without informed consent). Supports s. 14 verbatim: “Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Note what this provision does NOT contain, which the page relying on it states: no warrant requirement and no authorisation rule of any kind. Supports s. 35(1) (rights of arrested persons, including (a) to remain silent; (b) to be informed promptly of the right to remain silent AND of the consequences of not remaining silent; (c) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 48 hours after arrest, or the end of the first court day after the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a non-court day; (e) and (f)). Supports s. 35(2) (rights of detained persons, including prompt information of the reason, choice of and consultation with a legal practitioner and prompt information of that right, state-assigned counsel where substantial injustice would otherwise result, and the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and be released if it is unlawful). Supports s. 35(3) (fair-trial rights, including (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; (b) adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) a public trial before an ordinary court; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence; (j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; (k) to be tried in a language the accused understands or to have the proceedings interpreted). Supports s. 36(1)-(2), the general limitation clause: rights may be limited “only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”, and that except as provided in s. 36(1) or elsewhere in the Constitution, no law may limit any entrenched right. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that ss. 12, 14 and 35 are worded “Everyone” while political rights under s. 19 are for “every citizen”. Constitutional text only: no Constitutional Court decision, no statute, and nothing about any other country.
National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.
Tribunal Constitucional de España, published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado · Court record · 2016-04-28 · link verified 2026-08-26
Both judgments read directly in the BOE's official publication of the Court's text. Together they answer two different questions — which forum may review a declaration, and where the line between limiting a right and suspending it falls. Supports Tribunal Constitucional (Pleno), Sentencia 83/2016, de 28 de abril de 2016, FJ 11 (published as BOE-A-2016-5195): “Ello no supone, como vienen a sostener los demandantes de amparo, que los citados Reales Decretos resulten inmunes a todo control jurisdiccional, sino que, al poseer rango y valor de ley, pese a revestir la forma de decreto, sólo cabe impugnarlos, de acuerdo con el modelo de jurisdicción de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, ante este Tribunal Constitucional a través de los procesos constitucionales previstos en la Constitución y en la Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional, que tienen por objeto el control de constitucionalidad de las leyes, disposiciones y actos con fuerza o valor de ley [arts. 161 y 163 CE, 27.2 b) LOTC]. Sin perjuicio, como es evidente, de que los actos y disposiciones que puedan dictarse en su aplicación puedan impugnarse ante la jurisdicción ordinaria en cada caso competente (art. 3.2 de la Ley Orgánica 4/1981) y los órganos judiciales puedan, al enjuiciarlos, promover cuestión de inconstitucionalidad contra los actos, decisiones o resoluciones con valor de ley de los que son aplicación, cuando consideren que puedan ser contrarios a la Constitución”. Supports Tribunal Constitucional (Pleno), Sentencia 148/2021, de 14 de julio de 2021, FJ 5 (published as BOE-A-2021-13032): “A menos que se quiera despojar de significado sustantivo alguno al término «suspensión», parece difícil negar que una norma que prohíbe circular a todas las personas, por cualquier sitio y en cualquier momento, salvo en los casos expresamente considerados como justificados, supone un vaciamiento de hecho o, si se quiere, una suspensión del derecho, proscritos como se ha reiterado ya en el estado de alarma.”. Cited for the RANK of the declaring instrument and the consequences of that rank for which court may review it, and for the Court's reasoning on when a restriction becomes a suspension. It is not cited for the political merits of either measure, and it supports no claim about the position in any other country — the rango-de-ley reasoning turns on a feature of Spanish constitutional law that has no automatic counterpart elsewhere.
Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio (texto consolidado)
Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) · Legislation · 1981-06-01 · link verified 2026-08-26
The consolidated Castilian text on the BOE, read directly. This is the organic law the Constitution's Art. 116 requires, and it carries the operative detail the constitutional article leaves out. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Art. 1.Uno and 1.Dos: “Artículo primero. Uno. Procederá la declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción o sitio cuando circunstancias extraordinarias hiciesen imposible el mantenimiento de la normalidad mediante los poderes ordinarios de las Autoridades competentes. Dos. Las medidas a adoptar en los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio, así como la duración de los mismos, serán en cualquier caso las estrictamente indispensables para asegurar el restablecimiento de la normalidad. Su aplicación se realizará de forma proporcionada a las circunstancias.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Arts. 6.Dos and 15.Tres: “Artículo sexto. [..] Dos. En el decreto se determinará el ámbito territorial, la duración y los efectos del estado de alarma, que no podrá exceder de quince días. Sólo se podrá prorrogar con autorización expresa del Congreso de los Diputados, que en este caso podrá establecer el alcance y las condiciones vigentes durante la prórroga. [..] Artículo quince. [..] Tres. Si persistieran las circunstancias que dieron lugar a la declaración del estado de excepción, el Gobierno podrá solicitar del Congreso de los Diputados la prórroga de aquél, que no podrá exceder de treinta días.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Arts. 1.Tres and 15.Dos: “Artículo primero. [..] Tres. Finalizada la vigencia de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio decaerán en su eficacia cuantas competencias en materia sancionadora y en orden a actuaciones preventivas correspondan a las Autoridades competentes, así como las concretas medidas adoptadas en base a éstas, salvo las que consistiesen en sanciones firmes. [..] Artículo quince. [..] Dos. El Gobierno, mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, podrá poner fin al estado de excepción antes de que finalice el período para el que fue declarado, dando cuenta de ello inmediatamente al Congreso de los Diputados.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Art. 3: “Artículo tercero. Uno. Los actos y disposiciones de la Administración Pública adoptados durante la vigencia de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio serán impugnables en vía jurisdiccional de conformidad con lo dispuesto en las leyes. Dos. Quienes como consecuencia de la aplicación de los actos y disposiciones adoptadas durante la vigencia de estos estados sufran, de forma directa, o en su persona, derechos o bienes, daños o perjuicios por actos que no les sean imputables, tendrán derecho a ser indemnizados de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en las leyes.”. Supports Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de junio, Art. 9: “Artículo noveno. Uno. Por la declaración del estado de alarma todas las Autoridades civiles de la Administración Pública del territorio afectado por la declaración, los integrantes de los Cuerpos de Policía de las Comunidades Autónomas y de las Corporaciones Locales, y los demás funcionarios y trabajadores al servicio de las mismas, quedarán bajo las órdenes directas de la Autoridad competente en cuanto sea necesaria para la protección de personas, bienes y lugares, pudiendo imponerles servicios extraordinarios por su duración o por su naturaleza. Dos. Cuando la Autoridad competente sea el Presidente de una Comunidad Autónoma podrá requerir la colaboración de los Cuerpos y Fuerzas de Seguridad del Estado, que actuarán bajo la dirección de sus mandos naturales.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, their differing declaring authorities and durations, the express challengeability of administrative acts adopted during any of them, and the lapse of sanctioning competences on expiry. It records no instance of any regime being declared and supports no claim about any other country.
Usnesení Ústavního soudu Pl. ÚS 8/20 ze dne 22. dubna 2020 — Nouzový stav v době pandemie koronaviru
Ústavní soud České republiky (NALUS) · Court record · 2020-04-22 · link verified 2026-08-26
The plenum's own text, read directly in the Constitutional Court's database. This is the counter-example the wave needs: a constitutional court holding that the declaration itself is in principle beyond review. Supports Usneseni Ustavniho soudu Pl. US 8/20 ze dne 22. 4. 2020 (U 6/99 SbNU 485), 'Nouzovy stav v dobe pandemie koronaviru': “Vyhlaseni nouzoveho stavu vladou je v nyni projednavane veci primarne aktem aplikace ustavniho prava; predstavuje "akt vladnuti", ktery ma normativni dopad, zasadne nepodleha kontrole Ustavniho soudu a je "prezkoumatelny" primarne demokraticky zvolenym politickym ("nesoudnim") organem, kterym je Poslanecka snemovna. [..] Naopak - v pripade, ze by konkretni krizova opatreni byla stanovena primo v rozhodnuti o nouzovem stavu, prezkum Ustavniho soudu by nemohl byt absolutne vyloucen vuci te casti rozhodnuti, ktera by obsahovala konkretni krizova opatreni obsahujici obecne zavazna normativni pravidla chovani, coz vsak neni pripad nyni projednavane veci.”. Cited only for what the plenum said about the reviewability of a government resolution declaring a nouzový stav. It is not cited for the outcome of the case, for any measure taken during that emergency, or for the position in any other country — and it does not establish that measures TAKEN under a declaration are unreviewable, which is a different question the decision distinguishes.
Conseil constitutionnel (France) · Court record · 2015-12-22 · link verified 2026-08-26
Four decisions, each read directly on the Conseil constitutionnel's own site. ACCESS NOTE, consistent with what the France pilot recorded: legifrance.gouv.fr bot-walls automated requests, so the statutory text of the loi du 3 avril 1955 is taken from where the Conseil constitutionnel and the Sénat quote it verbatim rather than from Légifrance. Supports Conseil constitutionnel, décision n° 2015-527 QPC du 22 décembre 2015, cons. 8: “8. Considérant que la Constitution n'exclut pas la possibilité pour le législateur de prévoir un régime d'état d'urgence ; qu'il lui appartient, dans ce cadre, d'assurer la conciliation entre, d'une part, la prévention des atteintes à l'ordre public et, d'autre part, le respect des droits et libertés reconnus à tous ceux qui résident sur le territoire de la République ; que parmi ces droits et libertés figurent la liberté d'aller et de venir, composante de la liberté personnelle protégée par les articles 2 et 4 de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789”. Supports Conseil constitutionnel, décision n° 2015-527 QPC du 22 décembre 2015, cons. 12 and 15: “12. Considérant, en deuxième lieu, que tant la mesure d'assignation à résidence que sa durée, ses conditions d'application et les obligations complémentaires dont elle peut être assortie doivent être justifiées et proportionnées aux raisons ayant motivé la mesure dans les circonstances particulières ayant conduit à la déclaration de l'état d'urgence ; que le juge administratif est chargé de s'assurer que cette mesure est adaptée, nécessaire et proportionnée à la finalité qu'elle poursuit [..] 15. Considérant que les dispositions contestées ne privent pas les personnes à l'encontre desquelles est prononcée une assignation à résidence du droit de contester devant le juge administratif, y compris par la voie du référé, cette mesure”. Supports Conseil constitutionnel, décision n° 2020-800 DC du 11 mai 2020, para. 43 (réserve d'interprétation on CSP art. L. 3131-17 II): “43. En second lieu, les dispositions du cinquième alinéa du paragraphe II de l'article L. 3131-17 prévoient que les mesures de mise en quarantaine ou de placement en isolement interdisant toute sortie de l'intéressé hors du lieu où se déroule la quarantaine ou l'isolement ne peuvent se poursuivre au-delà d'un délai de quatorze jours sans que le juge des libertés et de la détention, préalablement saisi par le préfet, ait autorisé cette prolongation. Toutefois, aucune intervention systématique d'un juge judiciaire n'est prévue dans les autres hypothèses. Dès lors, ces dispositions ne sauraient, sans méconnaître les exigences de l'article 66 de la Constitution, permettre la prolongation des mesures de mise en quarantaine ou de placement en isolement imposant à l'intéressé de demeurer à son domicile ou dans son lieu d'hébergement pendant une plage horaire de plus de douze heures par jour sans l'autorisation du juge judiciaire.”. Supports Conseil constitutionnel, décision n° 85-187 DC du 25 janvier 1985, cons. 9-10: “10. Considérant que, si la régularité au regard de la Constitution des termes d'une loi promulguée peut être utilement contestée à l'occasion de l'examen de dispositions législatives qui la modifient, la complètent ou affectent son domaine, il ne saurait en être de même lorsqu'il s'agit de la simple mise en application d'une telle loi ; que, dès lors, les moyens développés par les auteurs de saisines ne peuvent être accueillis”. Supports Conseil constitutionnel, décision n° 2022-840 DC du 30 juillet 2022, para. 1: “1. Les députés requérants défèrent au Conseil constitutionnel la loi mettant fin aux régimes d'exception créés pour lutter contre l'épidémie liée à la covid-19. Ils contestent la conformité à la Constitution de certaines dispositions de son article 3.”. Cited for the French CONCEPTUAL FRAMING — that an emergency regime is treated not as a derogation from the Constitution but as an exercise of the legislature's Article 34 competence subject to a duty of conciliation — and for two concrete judicial controls: full proportionality review of an assignation à résidence, and a reservation of interpretation requiring prior judicial authorisation before a quarantine or isolation measure prohibiting departure may continue beyond fourteen days. It records no measure taken against any person, states no procedure for challenging one, and supports no claim about any other country.
Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 (texte intégral en vigueur)
Conseil constitutionnel · Legislation · 1958-10-04 · link verified 2026-08-10
Authentic consolidated text published by the Conseil constitutionnel. Supports: Article 1 (indivisible Republic; decentralised organisation); Article 64 (President as guarantor of the independence of the judicial authority, assisted by the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature); Article 66 (judicial authority as guardian of individual liberty); Article 72 (categories of territorial collectivity); Article 72-3 (the ten named overseas territories); Articles 73 and 74 (the two overseas regimes); the title of Title VIII ('De l'autorité judiciaire') and of Title XIII (transitional provisions on New Caledonia). Re-verified on 10 August 2026 for Wave 6, which additionally establishes from the same text: Article 65, that the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature comprises a formation for magistrats du siège and one for magistrats du parquet, that the siège formation 'statue comme conseil de discipline des magistrats du siège' and that the parquet formation 'donne son avis sur les sanctions disciplinaires qui les concernent'; and Article 71-1, that 'Le Défenseur des droits veille au respect des droits et libertés par les administrations de l'Etat, les collectivités territoriales, les établissements publics, ainsi que par tout organisme investi d'une mission de service public', that he may be seized by any person believing themselves harmed and may act d'office, that he is appointed by the President of the Republic for a non-renewable mandate of six years incompatible with membership of the Government or Parliament, and that he reports on his activity to the President of the Republic and to Parliament. Does NOT support any claim about how these provisions are applied in practice, nor about the internal organisation of any institution. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authentic consolidated text (version to the constitutional revision of 8 March 2024). Supports Article 61, review BEFORE promulgation: organic laws before promulgation, the propositions de loi mentioned in Article 11 before being submitted to referendum, and the rules of the parliamentary assemblies before their entry into application "doivent être soumis au Conseil constitutionnel qui se prononce sur leur conformité à la Constitution"; that for the same purposes ordinary laws "peuvent être déférées au Conseil constitutionnel, avant leur promulgation" by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, or sixty deputies or sixty senators; that the Council must rule within one month, reduced to eight days at the Government's request in urgency; and that referral suspends the time limit for promulgation. Supports Article 61-1, review AFTER promulgation on referral: "Lorsque, à l'occasion d'une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu'une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d'État ou de la Cour de cassation qui se prononce dans un délai déterminé" — the question reaches the Council only through one of the two apex courts, which acts as a filter. Supports Article 62, the differing EFFECTS: a provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61 "ne peut être promulguée ni mise en application"; a provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61-1 "est abrogée à compter de la publication de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel ou d'une date ultérieure fixée par cette décision", with the Council determining the conditions and limits within which effects the provision has already produced may be called into question; and that the decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel "ne sont susceptibles d'aucun recours" and bind the public powers and all administrative and judicial authorities. Supports no claim about how often either route is used or about outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authentic consolidated text on the Conseil constitutionnel's site. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 36: “ARTICLE 36. L'état de siège est décrété en Conseil des ministres. Sa prorogation au-delà de douze jours ne peut être autorisée que par le Parlement.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 16, first two paragraphs: “Lorsque les institutions de la République, l'indépendance de la nation, l'intégrité de son territoire ou l'exécution de ses engagements internationaux sont menacées d'une manière grave et immédiate et que le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels est interrompu, le Président de la République prend les mesures exigées par ces circonstances, après consultation officielle du Premier ministre, des présidents des assemblées ainsi que du Conseil constitutionnel. Il en informe la nation par un message.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 16, final paragraph: “Après trente jours d'exercice des pouvoirs exceptionnels, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi par le Président de l'Assemblée nationale, le Président du Sénat, soixante députés ou soixante sénateurs, aux fins d'examiner si les conditions énoncées au premier alinéa demeurent réunies. Il se prononce dans les délais les plus brefs par un avis public. Il procède de plein droit à cet examen et se prononce dans les mêmes conditions au terme de soixante jours d'exercice des pouvoirs exceptionnels et à tout moment au-delà de cette durée.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 66: “ARTICLE 66. Nul ne peut être arbitrairement détenu. L'autorité judiciaire, gardienne de la liberté individuelle, assure le respect de ce principe dans les conditions prévues par la loi.”. Cited for the constitutional architecture of French exceptional powers and for the thirty-day review clock the 2008 revision built into Article 16. It records no use of Article 16, states nothing about the état d'urgence, which is statutory and cited separately, and supports no claim about any other country.
Borrowdale v Director-General of Health [2020] NZHC 2090 (Thomas, Venning and Ellis JJ)
Courts of New Zealand · Court record · 2020-08-19 · link verified 2026-08-26
The judgment as published by the Courts of New Zealand, read directly. Supports New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss. 5 and 6 — applied at [95]-[97] of Borrowdale v Director-General of Health [2020] NZHC 2090: “the NZBORA is a "Bill of reasonable protection for rights". The rights presently in issue are not absolute and "must accommodate the rights of others and the legitimate interests of society as a whole", including the wider interest in protecting public health. [..] So the critical question must be what limitations on those rights can be justified in light of the public health interests in play — that is what s 5 requires to be asked and demands to be answered. Section 5 thus remains central to our inquiry, and s 6 must be read subject to it. That is the continued effect of the R v Hansen majority decisions, which are binding on us. [..] So the relevant NZBORA question here is whether the limitations of rights resulting from the actual exercise of the s 70(1)(f) or (m) powers were necessary, reasonable, and proportionate.”. Supports Borrowdale v Director-General of Health [2020] NZHC 2090 (Thomas, Venning and Ellis JJ), at [290]-[292]: “Although we have concluded that there was for nine days an unlawful limitation of certain rights and freedoms, that must be seen in the context of the rapidly developing public health emergency the nation was facing. We agree with Mr Borrowdale that — although not prescribed by law — the limits were nevertheless reasonable, necessary and proportionate. [..] it is equally so that in times of emergency the courts' constitutional role in keeping a weather eye on the rule of law assumes particular importance. For these reasons we conclude that it would be appropriate to make a declaration. [..] The second cause of action and the third cause of action fail and are dismissed. The first cause of action succeeds in part, and we make the following declaration”. Supports Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (NZ), ss. 66, 67, 68 — as described at [67] of Borrowdale v Director-General of Health [2020] NZHC 2090: “The CDEMA allows for a state of emergency to be declared over the whole or part of New Zealand. Once a state of national emergency is declared, Parliament must meet within seven days. [footnote 40: Sections 66 and 68. footnote 41: Section 67.]”. ACCESS LIMITATION, recorded rather than hidden: legislation.govt.nz and NZLII both returned HTTP 403, so the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 was NEVER READ DIRECTLY. Everything this platform states about the New Zealand statutory architecture comes from this judgment, from gazetted declarations, and from Ministry of Justice guidance. This record is cited for the proposition that ordinary courts review emergency measures on ordinary administrative-law and Bill of Rights grounds, and that such review found part of a measure unlawful. It supports no claim about the outcome of any other case, no claim about the merits of the measures, and no claim about any other country.