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Prosecution

If prosecutors are independent, who holds them to account?

Independence and accountability answer different questions, so a system can provide both. What varies is the mechanism — hierarchy, court consent, reporting, published standards, or an office that must stand for election.

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In short

The two ideas are often set against each other, as though holding a prosecution service to account meant reducing its independence. They answer different questions. Independence asks who may direct a decision. Accountability asks who may examine it afterwards, and on what basis.

Why it exists

AnalysisAccountability is harder here than for courts, and for a structural reason worth stating plainly: the most consequential prosecutorial decisions are frequently the least visible. A case that is never brought produces no hearing, no judgment and no public reasoning. There is often nothing to appeal, because nothing happened.

AnalysisThat is why the mechanisms in this area tend to be built in advance rather than applied afterwards — a threshold written down, a consent required, a standard published, a report owed. They create something to examine where the decision itself would leave no trace.

How it works

A court’s consent to a decision not to proceed
Germany’s section 153 StPO generally requires the consent of the court competent to open the main proceedings before the prosecution may refrain from prosecuting a minor matter. The check is placed on the decision most likely to escape notice, and it is placed with a body outside the prosecution.
A duty to notify the person affected
Section 170(2) StPO requires the prosecution, on terminating proceedings, to notify the accused where he was questioned as such, where a warrant of arrest had been issued, where he asked for a decision, or where a particular interest in notification is apparent. A decision that must be communicated is a decision someone can question.
A statutory line of supervision
Germany’s section 147 GVG names who holds the right of supervision and direction over which prosecutors. Hierarchy here functions as an accountability mechanism inside the institution — someone identifiable is answerable for a subordinate’s decisions.
Constitutional unity of action
Spain’s Article 124 binds the Ministerio Fiscal to unity of action and hierarchical dependence. A single national body acting as one is answerable as one, and inconsistency between offices is a matter the institution itself must resolve.
Answerability to an electorate
The Bureau of Justice Statistics records that the chief local prosecutor in the United States is "answerable to the public as an elected or appointed public official". Most are locally elected — a mechanism no other system in this corpus uses for prosecutors, and one that ties accountability directly to the public rather than through an institution.
Appointment and removal under defined provisions
United States Attorneys are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate under 28 U.S.C. § 541, for a four-year term, and are subject to removal by the President. Who appoints and who may remove is itself a form of answerability, and a different one from election.
Constitutionally stated considerations
Kenya’s Constitution requires the Director to have regard to the public interest, the interests of the administration of justice and the need to prevent and avoid abuse of the legal process. A power exercised against stated considerations can be assessed against them.

Brazil adds a mechanism that runs in the other direction. The Ministério Público exercises external control over police activity — an accountability function held by the prosecuting institution over another institution, rather than over itself. It is a reminder that a prosecution service can be a mechanism of accountability as well as a subject of one.

Common misconceptions

Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.

  • Common belief: An independent prosecutor is unaccountable.

    In practice: The systems described here combine insulation from direction with reporting, published standards, hierarchies, consent requirements and — in most of the United States — election. Independence bars direction on a decision; it does not bar examination of one.

  • Common belief: Holding prosecutors to account means letting politicians direct them.

    In practice: Court consent, notification duties, stated statutory considerations and published standards are all accountability mechanisms, and none of them is a political direction. Conflating the two argues for removing safeguards in the name of installing them.

  • Common belief: Every prosecutorial decision can be challenged in court.

    In practice: The reviewability of prosecutorial decisions varies by system and was not researched here. Germany places a court’s consent on a specific class of decision under section 153; that is a defined requirement, not a general right of review, and this site claims nothing broader.

  • Common belief: A decision not to prosecute is unexaminable because nothing happened.

    In practice: That is the risk the mechanisms are built against. Germany requires notification under section 170(2) and, for minor matters under section 153, a court’s consent — so the decision leaves a record and, in the general case, passes through another body.

How this varies between jurisdictions

A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.

Mechanisms fall into three kinds, and systems combine them differently rather than choosing one.

  • Before the decision: written thresholds, published standards, stated considerations.
  • At the decision: a court’s consent, a hierarchy that must approve, a duty to notify.
  • After the decision: reporting, election, appointment and removal, external control functions.

AnalysisGermany uses all three. The United States relies heavily on the third for local prosecutors and on statutory remit for federal ones. Spain places the weight on institutional unity. Those are different answers to the same problem.

Rights and accountability

AnalysisFor a person affected by a prosecution decision, the mechanisms above are what make it possible to ask why. That is a modest thing and it is not nothing: a decision that must be recorded, communicated, or consented to is a decision that has to be capable of being explained.

What we could not establish

  • Disciplinary systems, complaint procedures, inspectorates and the reviewability of prosecutorial decisions were not researched from primary sources for any system here. The mechanisms described are those the corpus establishes, and the absence of others is a gap in the research.
  • Nothing here establishes that any mechanism works. A mechanism existing and a mechanism functioning are different claims, and only the first is made.

Where to go next

Related: why prosecutorial independence matters, prosecutorial objectivity, and how police are held to account.

Related topics

Where this connects

Institutions: Prosecution service, Ombuds and rights institutions.

Sources

  1. Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 153 — Absehen von der Verfolgung bei Geringfügigkeit (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26

    The authoritative German text of § 153 StPO, read directly. Supports § 153(1): where the proceedings concern a Vergehen, the prosecution "kann … mit Zustimmung des für die Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens zuständigen Gerichts von der Verfolgung absehen, wenn die Schuld des Täters als gering anzusehen wäre und kein öffentliches Interesse an der Verfolgung besteht" — may, with the consent of the court competent to open the main proceedings, refrain from prosecution where the offender's guilt would be regarded as minor and there is no public interest in prosecution; and that the court's consent is not required for a Vergehen not carrying an increased minimum penalty where the consequences caused are minor. Cited for the fact that Germany's legality principle carries express statutory exceptions involving a public-interest judgement, which is why the legality/opportunity distinction is not a binary. It supports no claim about how often the provision is used.

  2. Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 170 — Entscheidung über eine Anklageerhebung (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26

    The authoritative German text of § 170 StPO, read directly. Supports § 170(1): where the investigations offer "genügenden Anlaß zur Erhebung der öffentlichen Klage" — sufficient reason to bring the public charge — the prosecution brings it by filing an indictment with the competent court. And § 170(2): otherwise the prosecution terminates the proceedings, notifying the accused where he has been questioned as such, where a warrant of arrest had been issued against him, where he has asked for a decision, or where a particular interest in notification is apparent. Cited for the German charging threshold and for the fact that a decision not to charge is a defined statutory outcome with its own notification duties. It supports no claim about the frequency of either outcome.

  3. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) § 147 (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports that the right of supervision and direction (Aufsicht und Leitung) belongs to: (1) the Federal Minister of Justice regarding the Generalbundesanwalt and the Bundesanwälte; (2) the Landesjustizverwaltung regarding all prosecution officials of the Land concerned; (3) the senior official of the prosecution office at the Oberlandesgerichte and Landgerichte regarding all prosecution officials in their district. Supports the EXISTENCE and ALLOCATION of that formal power only. It does not establish how often, or whether, the power is exercised, and it cannot settle the contested question of prosecutorial independence in either direction. The page displays no Stand/version date.

  4. Prosecution (National Census of State Court Prosecutors)

    Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24

    Supports that the chief state-court prosecutor is 'also referred to as the district attorney, county attorney, commonwealth attorney, or state's attorney', represents the state in criminal cases, serves in the executive branch of state government, is 'answerable to the public as an elected or appointed public official', and is afforded broad charging discretion. Supports that local prosecution titles and selection methods VARY and are not uniformly 'district attorney'. Does NOT support a figure for how many are elected versus appointed.

  5. 28 U.S. Code §§ 541 and 547 (United States attorneys: appointment and duties)

    Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Verbatim: § 541 — 'The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a United States attorney for each judicial district', for a four-year term, subject to removal by the President. § 547 — each U.S. attorney shall 'prosecute for all offenses against the United States' within the district. Supports that federal prosecutors are Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, one per federal judicial district, prosecuting FEDERAL offences only. Does NOT support any claim about state or local prosecutors, who are separately organised.

  6. Constitución Española de 1978

    Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe.es), BOE-A-1978-31229 · Legislation · 1978-12-29 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The authoritative Castilian text, read in full. Supports: art. 2 (the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation and the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions); art. 137 (the State organised into municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities); art. 145.1 ('En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas' — federation is constitutionally forbidden, so Spain is a decentralised UNITARY state); art. 148 (competences the Communities MAY assume) and art. 149.1 (the State's EXCLUSIVE competences), including art. 149.1.6 ('Legislación mercantil, penal y penitenciaria; legislación procesal' — criminal, penitentiary and procedural LEGISLATION is exclusively the State's), art. 149.1.5 (Administration of Justice), and art. 149.1.29 (public security, 'sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de creación de policías por las Comunidades Autónomas' — the basis for autonomous police); art. 104 (security forces under the Government); art. 117.5 ('El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales' — judicial unity); art. 122 (the Consejo General del Poder Judicial as the judiciary's governing body); art. 123 (the Tribunal Supremo, 'con jurisdicción en toda España, es el órgano jurisdiccional superior en todos los órdenes'); art. 124 (the Ministerio Fiscal, national, acting under unidad de actuación y dependencia jerárquica); art. 152.1 (a Tribunal Superior de Justicia culminating the judicial organisation in each community, without prejudice to the Supreme Court); and arts. 24-25 (due-process and penal principles). WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authoritative Castilian text. Supports art. 53.1, that the rights and liberties recognised in Chapter Two bind all public powers and may be regulated only by law respecting their essential content, protected in accordance with art. 161.1.a); and art. 53.2 in terms: "Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional" — protection is sought first before the ORDINARY courts by a preferential and summary procedure, and where appropriate thereafter by amparo before the Constitutional Court. Supports art. 54, that an organic law regulates the Defensor del Pueblo as high commissioner of the Cortes Generales for the defence of the rights in that Title, who may supervise the activity of the Administration and reports to the Cortes. Cited for the SEQUENCE — ordinary courts first, constitutional court where appropriate — and not for any claim about admissibility criteria or outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authoritative Castilian text on the BOE. Spain writes the emergency architecture into the constitution itself in more detail than almost any system in this wave. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(1): “1. Una ley orgánica regulará los estados de alarma, de excepción y de sitio, y las competencias y limitaciones correspondientes.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(2), (3) and (4): “2. El estado de alarma será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros por un plazo máximo de quince días, dando cuenta al Congreso de los Diputados, reunido inmediatamente al efecto y sin cuya autorización no podrá ser prorrogado dicho plazo. El decreto determinará el ámbito territorial a que se extienden los efectos de la declaración. 3. El estado de excepción será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, previa autorización del Congreso de los Diputados. La autorización y proclamación del estado de excepción deberá determinar expresamente los efectos del mismo, el ámbito territorial a que se extiende y su duración, que no podrá exceder de treinta días, prorrogables por otro plazo igual, con los mismos requisitos. 4. El estado de sitio será declarado por la mayoría absoluta del Congreso de los Diputados, a propuesta exclusiva del Gobierno. El Congreso determinará su ámbito territorial, duración y condiciones.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 55(1): “1. Los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 17, 18, apartados 2 y 3, artículos 19, 20, apartados 1, a) y d), y 5, artículos 21, 28, apartado 2, y artículo 37, apartado 2, podrán ser suspendidos cuando se acuerde la declaración del estado de excepción o de sitio en los términos previstos en la Constitución. Se exceptúa de lo establecido anteriormente el apartado 3 del artículo 17 para el supuesto de declaración de estado de excepción.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(5); cf. Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 1.Cuatro ("La declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio no interrumpe el normal funcionamiento de los poderes constitucionales del Estado."): “5. No podrá procederse a la disolución del Congreso mientras estén declarados algunos de los estados comprendidos en el presente artículo, quedando automáticamente convocadas las Cámaras si no estuvieren en período de sesiones. Su funcionamiento, así como el de los demás poderes constitucionales del Estado, no podrán interrumpirse durante la vigencia de estos estados. Disuelto el Congreso o expirado su mandato, si se produjere alguna de las situaciones que dan lugar a cualquiera de dichos estados, las competencias del Congreso serán asumidas por su Diputación Permanente.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 117(5)-(6); Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 35 ("En la declaración del estado de sitio el Congreso de los Diputados podrá determinar los delitos que durante su vigencia quedan sometidos a la Jurisdicción Militar."): “5. El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales. La ley regulará el ejercicio de la jurisdicción militar en el ámbito estrictamente castrense y en los supuestos de estado de sitio, de acuerdo con los principios de la Constitución. 6. Se prohíben los Tribunales de excepción.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, the closed list of suspendable rights and the express bar on suspension under the estado de alarma, the institutional-continuity guarantee, and the confinement of military jurisdiction. It records no declaration and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same BOE consolidated text, article by article. Supports Art. 17(1)-(4): “1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad. Nadie puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de lo establecido en este artículo y en los casos y en la forma previstos en la ley. 2. La detención preventiva no podrá durar más del tiempo estrictamente necesario para la realización de las averiguaciones tendentes al esclarecimiento de los hechos, y, en todo caso, en el plazo máximo de setenta y dos horas, el detenido deberá ser puesto en libertad o a disposición de la autoridad judicial. 3. Toda persona detenida debe ser informada de forma inmediata, y de modo que le sea comprensible, de sus derechos y de las razones de su detención, no pudiendo ser obligada a declarar. Se garantiza la asistencia de abogado al detenido en las diligencias policiales y judiciales, en los términos que la ley establezca. 4. La ley regulará un procedimiento de «habeas corpus» [...]” Supports Art. 18(1)-(4): “1. Se garantiza el derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen. 2. El domicilio es inviolable. Ninguna entrada o registro podrá hacerse en él sin consentimiento del titular o resolución judicial, salvo en caso de flagrante delito. 3. Se garantiza el secreto de las comunicaciones y, en especial, de las postales, telegráficas y telefónicas, salvo resolución judicial. 4. La ley limitará el uso de la informática para garantizar el honor y la intimidad personal y familiar de los ciudadanos y el pleno ejercicio de sus derechos.” Supports Art. 19, and specifically its rights-holder wording: “Los españoles tienen derecho a elegir libremente su residencia y a circular por el territorio nacional” — against Art. 17(1)'s “Toda persona”. Supports Art. 24(1)-(2), including the right to effective judicial protection without indefensión, and the rights “al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción de inocencia”. Supports Art. 24(1) verbatim, including the phrase quoted on the equality-of-arms page: “1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión.” Supports Art. 53(1) AND 53(2): “1. Los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Capítulo segundo del presente Título vinculan a todos los poderes públicos. Sólo por ley, que en todo caso deberá respetar su contenido esencial, podrá regularse el ejercicio de tales derechos y libertades, que se tutelarán de acuerdo con lo previsto en el artículo 161, 1, a). 2. Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional.” Constitutional text only — no decision of the Tribunal Constitucional, no provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, nothing about any other country.

  7. Constitution of Kenya, 2010

    National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  8. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988

    Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25

    The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  9. About Us — Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

    Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Ireland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-25

    Read directly. Supports: that the Office of the DPP was established under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974; that the Director is 'independent in the performance of her functions'; that the DPP's principal duty is to direct and supervise public prosecutions on indictment and to give general direction and advice to An Garda Síochána on summary cases; and the division of roles — An Garda Síochána investigates, the DPP decides whether to prosecute. Supports the statutory prosecution structure and the DPP's stated independence; it does not, by itself, establish how independence operates in any individual case.

  10. Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors

    United Nations (adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August – 7 September 1990) · International organisation · 1990 · link verified 2026-07-23

    Supports the international standards expected of prosecutors: impartiality, protection of the public interest, respect for human dignity, and the separation of prosecutorial from judicial functions. Non-binding guidance, not a description of any national prosecution service.