Skip to main content

Prosecution

What does it mean for a prosecutor to be independent, and independent of whom?

Eight systems in this corpus answer differently, and two of them are openly contested. Independence can mean a constitutional bar on direction, functional autonomy, an office’s own statement, or a hierarchy inside which instructions may not reach individual files.

Fact-checkedSafety review clearedLast updated Last reviewed

In short

Independence is not one property. A prosecution service can be free of instruction in individual cases and answerable for its general policy; it can be constitutionally insulated and internally hierarchical; it can be formally separate from government and led by an official the government appoints. Asking whether a prosecution service is independent, without saying of whom and in respect of what, produces an answer that cannot be checked.

Institutional independence
Where the body sits — inside the executive, attached to the courts, or on its own constitutional footing — and who controls its budget and staffing.
Functional independence
Whether the body may be directed in how it exercises its powers, and by whom.
Individual autonomy
Whether a particular prosecutor may be instructed on a particular file, and by whom within the service.
Security of position
Whether the people holding the office can be moved or removed, and on what grounds.

Why it exists

The prosecuting power reaches individuals with serious consequences before anything has been determined, and it reaches them selectively — every prosecution is a case someone decided to bring. The risk that follows is specific: that the decision might turn on who the suspect is, or on who wants the case brought.

AnalysisThis is why prosecutorial independence is a harder institutional problem than judicial independence rather than a copy of it. Judges are visible: they sit in public, give reasons, and can be appealed. A decision not to prosecute produces no hearing and no judgment. So the safeguards have to be structural, because there is often nothing else to examine.

How it works

The arrangements in this corpus fall into positions that share almost nothing but the word.

A constitutional bar on direction — Kenya
Article 157(10) provides that in exercising its powers the Director "shall not require the consent of any person or authority for the commencement of criminal proceedings and … shall not be under the direction or control of any person or authority". The bar is stated in the constitution and it is stated absolutely.
Functional autonomy outside all three branches — Brazil
Article 127 makes the Ministério Público a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, with unity, indivisibility and functional independence as its institutional principles, and guarantees it functional and administrative autonomy. It is not part of the executive, the legislature or the judiciary.
An office’s own statement — Ireland
The Director of Public Prosecutions states that she is "independent in the performance of her functions". This site reports that the office states it, which is a different claim from establishing it independently, and the difference is deliberate.
Hierarchy as a constitutional principle — Spain
Article 124 gives the Ministerio Fiscal the mission of promoting the action of justice in defence of legality and the public interest, and provides that it acts "conforme a los principios de unidad de actuación y dependencia jerárquica" — unity of action and hierarchical dependence. Hierarchical dependence is written into the constitution as a principle of the institution, not recorded as a shortcoming of it.
Ministerial authority with a stated limit — France
The Ministry of Justice states that magistrats du parquet act "sous l'autorité du ministre de la Justice" and receive "des instructions générales du ministre de la Justice mais en aucun cas dans les dossiers judiciaires" — general instructions from the minister, but in no case instructions in individual judicial files. The same source records that, unlike the magistrats du siège, they do not have the guarantee of irremovability and may be reassigned without their consent.
Supervision allocated by statute — Germany
Section 147 of the Courts Constitution Act allocates the right of supervision and direction explicitly, and the allocation follows the federal structure: the Federal Minister of Justice regarding the Generalbundesanwalt and the Bundesanwälte; the Land justice administration regarding all prosecution officials of that Land; and the senior official of the prosecution office at the higher regional and regional courts regarding officials in their district.
Inside the executive — Nigeria
The Attorney-General of the Federation is "the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and a Minister of the Government of the Federation" under section 150, and holds the power to institute, take over or discontinue criminal proceedings for federal offences under section 174. Each state mirrors the arrangement.

Two of these arrangements are openly disputed, and this site says so rather than resolving them. Whether the French parquet is sufficiently independent of the executive, and whether German prosecutors are sufficiently insulated from executive influence, are live and long-running debates that European courts and bodies have examined. No page on this platform describes French or German prosecutors as either wholly independent of government or as taking ministerial instructions in individual cases, because the sources establish neither.

Common misconceptions

Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.

  • Common belief: A prosecution service outside the executive is independent.

    In practice: Position is one arrangement among four. Brazil’s Ministério Público sits outside all three branches and this corpus expressly does not characterise how its autonomy operates. Where a body sits does not establish how it behaves.

  • Common belief: A hierarchical prosecution service is politically controlled.

    In practice: Spain’s hierarchical dependence is a constitutional principle of an institution whose stated mission is the defence of legality. France’s hierarchy operates under a rule that instructions may never be given in individual judicial files. Hierarchy describes an internal chain, not an external one.

  • Common belief: A constitution saying a prosecutor is independent settles the question.

    In practice: It establishes an arrangement. Whether the arrangement functions is an empirical question about appointments, budgets, pressure and practice, which no constitutional text can answer and which this site does not attempt from text alone.

  • Common belief: Independence means a prosecution service answers to no one.

    In practice: The arrangements described on this site coexist with reporting duties, hierarchies, court consent requirements and, for most chief local prosecutors in the United States, election. What independence protects against is improper direction, not being answerable, which the prosecutorial accountability page sets out.

  • Common belief: Prosecutorial independence works the same way as judicial independence.

    In practice: Judges decide in public and give reasons that can be appealed. A decision not to prosecute produces no hearing and no reasoned judgment, so the same guarantees do not do the same work.

How this varies between jurisdictions

A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.

The disciplined way to read a claim of prosecutorial independence is to ask what kind of statement is being made.

  1. A constitutional or statutory bar on direction — Kenya, Article 157(10).
  2. A constitutional guarantee of functional and administrative autonomy — Brazil, Article 127.
  3. A statement by the office about itself — Ireland.
  4. A stated limit inside a relationship of authority — France, where instructions may not reach individual files.
  5. A statutory allocation of who may supervise whom — Germany, section 147 GVG.
  6. A constitutional principle of hierarchical dependence — Spain, Article 124.
  7. No separation claimed — Nigeria, where the prosecuting authority is a serving minister.

AnalysisThose are seven different kinds of proposition, not seven degrees of one. Reading any of them through another country’s vocabulary — describing Spain’s Ministerio Fiscal in the language used for Ireland’s DPP, for instance — asserts something the Spanish constitution does not say and contradicts something it does.

Rights and accountability

The United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors address the impartiality expected of prosecutors and the separation of prosecutorial from judicial functions. That is an international standard, and it establishes what is expected rather than what any state provides. Where this page describes a country, it does so from that country’s own instruments.

What we could not establish

  • This page describes constitutional and statutory arrangements, and in two cases an office’s statement about itself. It assesses no country’s prosecution service, ranks none, and does not establish that any prosecution is independent in practice.
  • For France and Germany the adequacy of the arrangements is a live and long-running debate examined by European bodies. This site records the provisions and the existence of the dispute. It does not resolve it, in either direction.
  • The relationship between United States Attorneys and the Attorney General, the degree of independence of elected local prosecutors, the appointment of Spain’s Fiscal General del Estado, and the relationship between Brazil’s Procurador-Geral and the executive that appoints them were not researched from primary sources and are not described.

Where to go next

Related: prosecutorial accountability, why judicial independence matters, and how prosecution systems are organised.

  • If prosecutors are independent, who holds them to account?

    Independence and accountability answer different questions, so a system can provide both. What varies is the mechanism — hierarchy, court consent, reporting, published standards, or an office that must stand for election.

  • Does a country have one prosecution service, several, or none?

    All three answers occur. Spain has a single national body; Germany has offices attached to every court and no national service; the United States has federal prosecutors and separately organised state and local prosecution; Nigeria places the power in serving ministers.

  • Why is the decision to bring a criminal case a public function?

    Someone has to decide whether the state’s case should proceed, and the choice of who has consequences. Placing it in a public office separates it from the people who investigated, from the person harmed, and from the court that will decide.

Where this connects

Sources

  1. Constitution of Kenya, 2010

    National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  2. Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Kenya)

    Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Kenya) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, retrieved and confirmed. Corroborates that the ODPP is the independent national prosecuting office established by Article 157 of the Constitution, de-linked from the Attorney-General, which decides on and conducts criminal prosecutions. Cited only for the existence and mandate of the office, in support of the constitutional text. WAVE 12 ADDITION, read directly from the consolidated text: Art. 10 makes the national values and principles of governance — including the rule of law, human dignity, equity, social justice, equality, human rights and non-discrimination — binding on all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of them applies or interprets the Constitution, enacts, applies or interprets any law, or makes or implements public policy decisions. Art. 48: The State shall ensure access to justice for all persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede access to justice. Art. 50(1): every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body; Art. 50(2) lists the fair-trial rights of an accused person, beginning with the presumption of innocence. Art. 159(1)-(2): judicial authority is derived from the people and vests in the courts and tribunals; in exercising it they are guided by principles including that justice shall be done to all irrespective of status, that justice shall not be delayed, that alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution shall be promoted, and that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. WAVE 14 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 48 in full — “The State shall ensure access to justice for all persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede access to justice”; Art. 50(1) the right of every person to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body; Art. 50(2)(g) to choose, and be represented by, an advocate, and to be informed of this right promptly; Art. 50(2)(h) to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; Art. 50(2)(m) to have the assistance of an interpreter without payment if the accused person cannot understand the language used at the trial; Art. 50(3) that where the Article requires information to be given to a person, it shall be given in a language that the person understands; Art. 50(5)(b) the right to a copy of the record of proceedings within a reasonable period after they are concluded, “in return for a reasonable fee as prescribed by law”; Art. 50(7) that in the interest of justice a court may allow an intermediary to assist a complainant or an accused person to communicate with the court; Art. 50(9) that Parliament shall enact legislation providing for the protection, rights and welfare of victims of offences; Art. 172(1) that the Judicial Service Commission shall promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent administration of justice, and shall recommend persons for appointment as judges (a), review and make recommendations on conditions of service of judges and judicial officers other than their remuneration and of the staff of the Judiciary (b), appoint, receive complaints against, investigate and remove from office or otherwise discipline registrars, magistrates, other judicial officers and other staff of the Judiciary (c), prepare and implement programmes for continuing education and training of judges and judicial officers (d), and advise the national government on improving the efficiency of the administration of justice (e); and Art. 173 establishing the Judiciary Fund, administered by the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary, used for administrative expenses of the Judiciary, with the Chief Registrar preparing annual estimates for approval by the National Assembly and the expenditure of the Judiciary being a charge on the Consolidated Fund paid directly into the Fund.

  3. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988

    Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25

    The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  4. Sobre o Ministério Público da União — Institucional

    Ministério Público da União (MPU) · Institutional (self-description) · link verified 2026-07-25

    The MPU's own institutional page, read in full. Supports that the Ministério Público da União comprises 'os seguintes ramos: a) O Ministério Público Federal (MPF); b) O Ministério Público do Trabalho (MPT); c) O Ministério Público Militar (MPM); d) O Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios (MPDFT)', that alongside it stand 'os Ministérios Públicos dos Estados', and that 'ao MPU é assegurada autonomia funcional, administrativa e financeira'. Confirms the MP's federative structure and autonomy in the institution's own words.

  5. About Us — Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

    Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Ireland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-25

    Read directly. Supports: that the Office of the DPP was established under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974; that the Director is 'independent in the performance of her functions'; that the DPP's principal duty is to direct and supervise public prosecutions on indictment and to give general direction and advice to An Garda Síochána on summary cases; and the division of roles — An Garda Síochána investigates, the DPP decides whether to prosecute. Supports the statutory prosecution structure and the DPP's stated independence; it does not, by itself, establish how independence operates in any individual case.

  6. Constitución Española de 1978

    Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe.es), BOE-A-1978-31229 · Legislation · 1978-12-29 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The authoritative Castilian text, read in full. Supports: art. 2 (the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation and the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions); art. 137 (the State organised into municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities); art. 145.1 ('En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas' — federation is constitutionally forbidden, so Spain is a decentralised UNITARY state); art. 148 (competences the Communities MAY assume) and art. 149.1 (the State's EXCLUSIVE competences), including art. 149.1.6 ('Legislación mercantil, penal y penitenciaria; legislación procesal' — criminal, penitentiary and procedural LEGISLATION is exclusively the State's), art. 149.1.5 (Administration of Justice), and art. 149.1.29 (public security, 'sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de creación de policías por las Comunidades Autónomas' — the basis for autonomous police); art. 104 (security forces under the Government); art. 117.5 ('El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales' — judicial unity); art. 122 (the Consejo General del Poder Judicial as the judiciary's governing body); art. 123 (the Tribunal Supremo, 'con jurisdicción en toda España, es el órgano jurisdiccional superior en todos los órdenes'); art. 124 (the Ministerio Fiscal, national, acting under unidad de actuación y dependencia jerárquica); art. 152.1 (a Tribunal Superior de Justicia culminating the judicial organisation in each community, without prejudice to the Supreme Court); and arts. 24-25 (due-process and penal principles). WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authoritative Castilian text. Supports art. 53.1, that the rights and liberties recognised in Chapter Two bind all public powers and may be regulated only by law respecting their essential content, protected in accordance with art. 161.1.a); and art. 53.2 in terms: "Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional" — protection is sought first before the ORDINARY courts by a preferential and summary procedure, and where appropriate thereafter by amparo before the Constitutional Court. Supports art. 54, that an organic law regulates the Defensor del Pueblo as high commissioner of the Cortes Generales for the defence of the rights in that Title, who may supervise the activity of the Administration and reports to the Cortes. Cited for the SEQUENCE — ordinary courts first, constitutional court where appropriate — and not for any claim about admissibility criteria or outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authoritative Castilian text on the BOE. Spain writes the emergency architecture into the constitution itself in more detail than almost any system in this wave. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(1): “1. Una ley orgánica regulará los estados de alarma, de excepción y de sitio, y las competencias y limitaciones correspondientes.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(2), (3) and (4): “2. El estado de alarma será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros por un plazo máximo de quince días, dando cuenta al Congreso de los Diputados, reunido inmediatamente al efecto y sin cuya autorización no podrá ser prorrogado dicho plazo. El decreto determinará el ámbito territorial a que se extienden los efectos de la declaración. 3. El estado de excepción será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, previa autorización del Congreso de los Diputados. La autorización y proclamación del estado de excepción deberá determinar expresamente los efectos del mismo, el ámbito territorial a que se extiende y su duración, que no podrá exceder de treinta días, prorrogables por otro plazo igual, con los mismos requisitos. 4. El estado de sitio será declarado por la mayoría absoluta del Congreso de los Diputados, a propuesta exclusiva del Gobierno. El Congreso determinará su ámbito territorial, duración y condiciones.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 55(1): “1. Los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 17, 18, apartados 2 y 3, artículos 19, 20, apartados 1, a) y d), y 5, artículos 21, 28, apartado 2, y artículo 37, apartado 2, podrán ser suspendidos cuando se acuerde la declaración del estado de excepción o de sitio en los términos previstos en la Constitución. Se exceptúa de lo establecido anteriormente el apartado 3 del artículo 17 para el supuesto de declaración de estado de excepción.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(5); cf. Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 1.Cuatro ("La declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio no interrumpe el normal funcionamiento de los poderes constitucionales del Estado."): “5. No podrá procederse a la disolución del Congreso mientras estén declarados algunos de los estados comprendidos en el presente artículo, quedando automáticamente convocadas las Cámaras si no estuvieren en período de sesiones. Su funcionamiento, así como el de los demás poderes constitucionales del Estado, no podrán interrumpirse durante la vigencia de estos estados. Disuelto el Congreso o expirado su mandato, si se produjere alguna de las situaciones que dan lugar a cualquiera de dichos estados, las competencias del Congreso serán asumidas por su Diputación Permanente.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 117(5)-(6); Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 35 ("En la declaración del estado de sitio el Congreso de los Diputados podrá determinar los delitos que durante su vigencia quedan sometidos a la Jurisdicción Militar."): “5. El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales. La ley regulará el ejercicio de la jurisdicción militar en el ámbito estrictamente castrense y en los supuestos de estado de sitio, de acuerdo con los principios de la Constitución. 6. Se prohíben los Tribunales de excepción.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, the closed list of suspendable rights and the express bar on suspension under the estado de alarma, the institutional-continuity guarantee, and the confinement of military jurisdiction. It records no declaration and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same BOE consolidated text, article by article. Supports Art. 17(1)-(4): “1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad. Nadie puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de lo establecido en este artículo y en los casos y en la forma previstos en la ley. 2. La detención preventiva no podrá durar más del tiempo estrictamente necesario para la realización de las averiguaciones tendentes al esclarecimiento de los hechos, y, en todo caso, en el plazo máximo de setenta y dos horas, el detenido deberá ser puesto en libertad o a disposición de la autoridad judicial. 3. Toda persona detenida debe ser informada de forma inmediata, y de modo que le sea comprensible, de sus derechos y de las razones de su detención, no pudiendo ser obligada a declarar. Se garantiza la asistencia de abogado al detenido en las diligencias policiales y judiciales, en los términos que la ley establezca. 4. La ley regulará un procedimiento de «habeas corpus» [...]” Supports Art. 18(1)-(4): “1. Se garantiza el derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen. 2. El domicilio es inviolable. Ninguna entrada o registro podrá hacerse en él sin consentimiento del titular o resolución judicial, salvo en caso de flagrante delito. 3. Se garantiza el secreto de las comunicaciones y, en especial, de las postales, telegráficas y telefónicas, salvo resolución judicial. 4. La ley limitará el uso de la informática para garantizar el honor y la intimidad personal y familiar de los ciudadanos y el pleno ejercicio de sus derechos.” Supports Art. 19, and specifically its rights-holder wording: “Los españoles tienen derecho a elegir libremente su residencia y a circular por el territorio nacional” — against Art. 17(1)'s “Toda persona”. Supports Art. 24(1)-(2), including the right to effective judicial protection without indefensión, and the rights “al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción de inocencia”. Supports Art. 24(1) verbatim, including the phrase quoted on the equality-of-arms page: “1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión.” Supports Art. 53(1) AND 53(2): “1. Los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Capítulo segundo del presente Título vinculan a todos los poderes públicos. Sólo por ley, que en todo caso deberá respetar su contenido esencial, podrá regularse el ejercicio de tales derechos y libertades, que se tutelarán de acuerdo con lo previsto en el artículo 161, 1, a). 2. Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional.” Constitutional text only — no decision of the Tribunal Constitucional, no provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, nothing about any other country.

  7. Les magistrats du parquet

    Ministère de la justice (France) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24

    Supports: the definition of the parquet / ministère public; the 'magistrature debout' description and the siège/parquet distinction; the hierarchy from procureur général to procureur de la République; that parquet magistrates act 'sous l'autorité du ministre de la Justice' and receive 'des instructions générales du ministre de la Justice mais en aucun cas dans les dossiers judiciaires'; that they do not benefit from the guarantee of inamovibilité; and the prosecutor's direction of investigation and discretion over case outcomes. An official self-description of the formal rule. It does NOT establish that the rule is observed in practice, and cannot settle the contested question of prosecutorial independence in either direction.

  8. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) § 147 (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports that the right of supervision and direction (Aufsicht und Leitung) belongs to: (1) the Federal Minister of Justice regarding the Generalbundesanwalt and the Bundesanwälte; (2) the Landesjustizverwaltung regarding all prosecution officials of the Land concerned; (3) the senior official of the prosecution office at the Oberlandesgerichte and Landgerichte regarding all prosecution officials in their district. Supports the EXISTENCE and ALLOCATION of that formal power only. It does not establish how often, or whether, the power is exercised, and it cannot settle the contested question of prosecutorial independence in either direction. The page displays no Stand/version date.

  9. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) § 141 (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports the single sentence 'Bei jedem Gericht soll eine Staatsanwaltschaft bestehen' — a public prosecution office shall exist at every court. Supports the structural pairing of prosecution offices to courts and nothing more; it does not say who staffs, funds or supervises them, and it does not describe any Land's arrangements. The page displays no Stand/version date, so currency rests on the publisher rather than a printed date.

  10. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

    National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria (official text host) · Legislation · 1999 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended, the copy carrying amendments through 2011), downloaded as the full official PDF (775,326 bytes, 137 pages) and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports: s 4 and the Second Schedule (the division of legislative power — the Exclusive Legislative List for the Federation, the Concurrent List for both, and residual matters for the States under s 4(7)); Exclusive List item 45 and s 214(1) ("There shall be a police force for Nigeria … no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof" — a single national police); Exclusive List item 48 ("Prisons" — federal corrections); s 6(5) (the superior courts of record — the federal Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Federal High Court and FCT High Court, and the State High Courts, Sharia Courts of Appeal and Customary Courts of Appeal); s 230/233/235 (the Supreme Court as apex, its decisions final); s 237 (the Court of Appeal); s 275/280 (State Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal, headed by a Grand Kadi); s 150/174 (the Attorney-General of the Federation, a Minister and Chief Law Officer, with power to institute, take over or discontinue federal prosecutions) and s 195/211 (each State Attorney-General with the mirror power for state offences); s 215 (the Inspector-General commanding the Nigeria Police Force, with the President's lawful-directions power); s 153 and the Third Schedule (the National Judicial Council, the Police Service Commission and the Nigeria Police Council); and s 81(3)/292 (judicial funding through the NJC and security of tenure). Establishes that Nigeria is a federation in which police and prisons are federal, while courts, prosecution and (residually) criminal law operate at both the federal and state levels.

  11. 28 U.S. Code §§ 541 and 547 (United States attorneys: appointment and duties)

    Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Verbatim: § 541 — 'The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a United States attorney for each judicial district', for a four-year term, subject to removal by the President. § 547 — each U.S. attorney shall 'prosecute for all offenses against the United States' within the district. Supports that federal prosecutors are Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, one per federal judicial district, prosecuting FEDERAL offences only. Does NOT support any claim about state or local prosecutors, who are separately organised.

  12. Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors

    United Nations (adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August – 7 September 1990) · International organisation · 1990 · link verified 2026-07-23

    Supports the international standards expected of prosecutors: impartiality, protection of the public interest, respect for human dignity, and the separation of prosecutorial from judicial functions. Non-binding guidance, not a description of any national prosecution service.