Prosecution
Do prosecutors choose whether to bring a case, or are they required to?
Both, depending on the system — and often within the same system. Germany’s code makes prosecution a duty and then creates statutory exceptions requiring a public-interest judgement. The legal family a country belongs to does not predict the answer.
In short
Two principles are usually contrasted. Under a principle of legality, a prosecutor who finds the threshold met must proceed. Under a principle of opportunity or discretion, a prosecutor who finds the threshold met may still decide not to. The contrast is real, and treating it as a clean division between legal families is where the description goes wrong.
Why it exists
A duty to prosecute answers a specific worry: that whether a case proceeds might depend on who the suspect is. If the prosecution must act whenever the threshold is met, the question of who is favoured does not arise, because no one is being chosen.
AnalysisDiscretion answers the opposite worry: that a system obliged to prosecute everything would prosecute trivia at the cost of what matters, and would remove any capacity to decide that a criminal trial is the wrong response to what happened. Both concerns are legitimate, and most systems end up accommodating both.
How it works
Germany states the duty and then, in the same code, provides the exception — which is why it is the useful case rather than a simple example of one pole.
- The duty — section 152(2) StPO
- The prosecution "ist, soweit nicht gesetzlich ein anderes bestimmt ist, verpflichtet, wegen aller verfolgbaren Straftaten einzuschreiten, sofern zureichende tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte vorliegen": obliged, unless the law provides otherwise, to act on all prosecutable offences where sufficient factual indications are present. Note the qualifier built into the duty itself — "unless the law provides otherwise".
- The exception — section 153 StPO
- Where the proceedings concern a Vergehen, the prosecution "kann … mit Zustimmung des für die Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens zuständigen Gerichts von der Verfolgung absehen, wenn die Schuld des Täters als gering anzusehen wäre und kein öffentliches Interesse an der Verfolgung besteht" — may, with the consent of the court competent to open the main proceedings, refrain from prosecution where guilt would be regarded as minor and there is no public interest in prosecution. The court’s consent is not required for a Vergehen carrying no increased minimum penalty where the consequences caused are minor.
Where discretion exists, its breadth still varies. The Bureau of Justice Statistics records that the chief local prosecutor in the United States holds broad discretion over who is charged, and that most are answerable to the public as elected officials — a form of control over discretion that no other system in this corpus uses.
Japan is a useful third position, because the discretion is located in the office itself. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure prosecution is instituted by a public prosecutor, and the charging decision belongs to the prosecutor, who also holds the discretion whether to prosecute at all. The decision sits with the prosecutor rather than with the investigating police — which is a separation of function as much as a grant of discretion.
And a system can constrain how a discretion is exercised without removing it. Kenya’s Constitution requires the Director of Public Prosecutions to have regard to the public interest, the interests of the administration of justice and the need to prevent and avoid abuse of the legal process in exercising the Article 157 powers. Spain’s Constitution gives the Ministerio Fiscal the mission of promoting the action of justice in defence of legality and the public interest, acting under the principles of unity of action and hierarchical dependence — structuring the judgement through the institution rather than through a stated test.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: Common-law systems give prosecutors discretion and civil-law systems do not.
In practice: Germany, the standard example of a legality system, gives its prosecutors a statutory power to refrain from prosecuting minor offences where there is no public interest. The families do not predict the answer, and using them as a shortcut produces a wrong description of the archetype.
Common belief: A legality system prosecutes every offence it learns of.
In practice: Section 152(2) itself is qualified — "unless the law provides otherwise" — and section 153 is one of the provisions that provides otherwise. A duty with statutory exceptions is not an absolute rule.
Common belief: Discretion means a prosecutor may do as they please.
In practice: Where it exists it is exercised within a legal framework, and systems structure it in different ways: stated considerations in Kenya’s constitution, hierarchical unity of action in Spain’s, court consent for the German exception, electoral answerability for most chief local prosecutors in the United States.
Common belief: A discretion not to prosecute is a decision that no offence occurred.
In practice: The German provision applies where guilt would be regarded as minor and there is no public interest in prosecution — a judgement about whether to proceed, not a finding about what happened.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Rather than sorting systems into two boxes, the useful reading asks three questions of each.
- Is acting on a met threshold a duty or a choice?
- If a duty, what exceptions does the law itself provide, and who checks their use?
- If a choice, what structures it — stated considerations, hierarchy, court consent, published guidance, or answerability to an electorate?
AnalysisGermany answers: a duty; statutory exceptions for minor matters; and in the general case a court’s consent. The United States answers: a choice; and for most chief local prosecutors, election. Those are genuinely different designs, and neither is presented here as better.
Rights and accountability
AnalysisDiscretion is where a prosecution system is least visible. A case that is never brought produces no hearing, no judgment and no public reasoning, which is why systems that permit discretion generally attach something to it — published standards, a requirement of consent, a hierarchy that can be asked, or an office that must stand for election.
What we could not establish
- Only Germany’s legality provisions and the United States position on local prosecutorial discretion are established from sources in this corpus. Other systems are named on this page only where a source supports the specific statement made.
- This page describes what systems permit. It says nothing about how discretion is exercised in practice anywhere, which is an empirical question these sources cannot answer.
Where to go next
Related: how charging decisions work, prosecutorial accountability, and Germany.
Related topics
- What has to be true before a criminal charge is brought?
There is no universal charging test. Germany obliges its prosecutors to act on sufficient factual indications; other systems apply an evidential assessment and a public-interest judgement; some give local prosecutors broad discretion with no national standard at all.
- If prosecutors are independent, who holds them to account?
Independence and accountability answer different questions, so a system can provide both. What varies is the mechanism — hierarchy, court consent, reporting, published standards, or an office that must stand for election.
- Why is the decision to bring a criminal case a public function?
Someone has to decide whether the state’s case should proceed, and the choice of who has consequences. Placing it in a public office separates it from the people who investigated, from the person harmed, and from the court that will decide.
Where this connects
Institutions: Prosecution service.
Sources
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 152 — Anklagebehörde; Legalitätsgrundsatz (German original text)
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26
The authoritative German text of § 152 StPO, headed "Anklagebehörde; Legalitätsgrundsatz", read directly. Supports § 152(1): "Zur Erhebung der öffentlichen Klage ist die Staatsanwaltschaft berufen" — the public prosecution office is the body called upon to bring the public charge. And § 152(2) verbatim: "Sie ist, soweit nicht gesetzlich ein anderes bestimmt ist, verpflichtet, wegen aller verfolgbaren Straftaten einzuschreiten, sofern zureichende tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte vorliegen" — it is OBLIGED, unless the law provides otherwise, to take action in respect of all prosecutable offences, provided sufficient factual indications are present. Cited for the German principle of legality, for the fact that acting is a DUTY rather than a choice, and for the threshold being sufficient factual indications. It establishes no test framed in terms of the prospects of conviction, and it supports no claim about any other country.
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26
The authoritative German text of § 153 StPO, read directly. Supports § 153(1): where the proceedings concern a Vergehen, the prosecution "kann … mit Zustimmung des für die Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens zuständigen Gerichts von der Verfolgung absehen, wenn die Schuld des Täters als gering anzusehen wäre und kein öffentliches Interesse an der Verfolgung besteht" — may, with the consent of the court competent to open the main proceedings, refrain from prosecution where the offender's guilt would be regarded as minor and there is no public interest in prosecution; and that the court's consent is not required for a Vergehen not carrying an increased minimum penalty where the consequences caused are minor. Cited for the fact that Germany's legality principle carries express statutory exceptions involving a public-interest judgement, which is why the legality/opportunity distinction is not a binary. It supports no claim about how often the provision is used.
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 170 — Entscheidung über eine Anklageerhebung (German original text)
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26
The authoritative German text of § 170 StPO, read directly. Supports § 170(1): where the investigations offer "genügenden Anlaß zur Erhebung der öffentlichen Klage" — sufficient reason to bring the public charge — the prosecution brings it by filing an indictment with the competent court. And § 170(2): otherwise the prosecution terminates the proceedings, notifying the accused where he has been questioned as such, where a warrant of arrest had been issued against him, where he has asked for a decision, or where a particular interest in notification is apparent. Cited for the German charging threshold and for the fact that a decision not to charge is a defined statutory outcome with its own notification duties. It supports no claim about the frequency of either outcome.
Prosecution (National Census of State Court Prosecutors)
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24
Supports that the chief state-court prosecutor is 'also referred to as the district attorney, county attorney, commonwealth attorney, or state's attorney', represents the state in criminal cases, serves in the executive branch of state government, is 'answerable to the public as an elected or appointed public official', and is afforded broad charging discretion. Supports that local prosecution titles and selection methods VARY and are not uniformly 'district attorney'. Does NOT support a figure for how many are elected versus appointed.
National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.
Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe.es), BOE-A-1978-31229 · Legislation · 1978-12-29 · link verified 2026-07-26
The authoritative Castilian text, read in full. Supports: art. 2 (the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation and the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions); art. 137 (the State organised into municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities); art. 145.1 ('En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas' — federation is constitutionally forbidden, so Spain is a decentralised UNITARY state); art. 148 (competences the Communities MAY assume) and art. 149.1 (the State's EXCLUSIVE competences), including art. 149.1.6 ('Legislación mercantil, penal y penitenciaria; legislación procesal' — criminal, penitentiary and procedural LEGISLATION is exclusively the State's), art. 149.1.5 (Administration of Justice), and art. 149.1.29 (public security, 'sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de creación de policías por las Comunidades Autónomas' — the basis for autonomous police); art. 104 (security forces under the Government); art. 117.5 ('El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales' — judicial unity); art. 122 (the Consejo General del Poder Judicial as the judiciary's governing body); art. 123 (the Tribunal Supremo, 'con jurisdicción en toda España, es el órgano jurisdiccional superior en todos los órdenes'); art. 124 (the Ministerio Fiscal, national, acting under unidad de actuación y dependencia jerárquica); art. 152.1 (a Tribunal Superior de Justicia culminating the judicial organisation in each community, without prejudice to the Supreme Court); and arts. 24-25 (due-process and penal principles). WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authoritative Castilian text. Supports art. 53.1, that the rights and liberties recognised in Chapter Two bind all public powers and may be regulated only by law respecting their essential content, protected in accordance with art. 161.1.a); and art. 53.2 in terms: "Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional" — protection is sought first before the ORDINARY courts by a preferential and summary procedure, and where appropriate thereafter by amparo before the Constitutional Court. Supports art. 54, that an organic law regulates the Defensor del Pueblo as high commissioner of the Cortes Generales for the defence of the rights in that Title, who may supervise the activity of the Administration and reports to the Cortes. Cited for the SEQUENCE — ordinary courts first, constitutional court where appropriate — and not for any claim about admissibility criteria or outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authoritative Castilian text on the BOE. Spain writes the emergency architecture into the constitution itself in more detail than almost any system in this wave. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(1): “1. Una ley orgánica regulará los estados de alarma, de excepción y de sitio, y las competencias y limitaciones correspondientes.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(2), (3) and (4): “2. El estado de alarma será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros por un plazo máximo de quince días, dando cuenta al Congreso de los Diputados, reunido inmediatamente al efecto y sin cuya autorización no podrá ser prorrogado dicho plazo. El decreto determinará el ámbito territorial a que se extienden los efectos de la declaración. 3. El estado de excepción será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, previa autorización del Congreso de los Diputados. La autorización y proclamación del estado de excepción deberá determinar expresamente los efectos del mismo, el ámbito territorial a que se extiende y su duración, que no podrá exceder de treinta días, prorrogables por otro plazo igual, con los mismos requisitos. 4. El estado de sitio será declarado por la mayoría absoluta del Congreso de los Diputados, a propuesta exclusiva del Gobierno. El Congreso determinará su ámbito territorial, duración y condiciones.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 55(1): “1. Los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 17, 18, apartados 2 y 3, artículos 19, 20, apartados 1, a) y d), y 5, artículos 21, 28, apartado 2, y artículo 37, apartado 2, podrán ser suspendidos cuando se acuerde la declaración del estado de excepción o de sitio en los términos previstos en la Constitución. Se exceptúa de lo establecido anteriormente el apartado 3 del artículo 17 para el supuesto de declaración de estado de excepción.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(5); cf. Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 1.Cuatro ("La declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio no interrumpe el normal funcionamiento de los poderes constitucionales del Estado."): “5. No podrá procederse a la disolución del Congreso mientras estén declarados algunos de los estados comprendidos en el presente artículo, quedando automáticamente convocadas las Cámaras si no estuvieren en período de sesiones. Su funcionamiento, así como el de los demás poderes constitucionales del Estado, no podrán interrumpirse durante la vigencia de estos estados. Disuelto el Congreso o expirado su mandato, si se produjere alguna de las situaciones que dan lugar a cualquiera de dichos estados, las competencias del Congreso serán asumidas por su Diputación Permanente.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 117(5)-(6); Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 35 ("En la declaración del estado de sitio el Congreso de los Diputados podrá determinar los delitos que durante su vigencia quedan sometidos a la Jurisdicción Militar."): “5. El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales. La ley regulará el ejercicio de la jurisdicción militar en el ámbito estrictamente castrense y en los supuestos de estado de sitio, de acuerdo con los principios de la Constitución. 6. Se prohíben los Tribunales de excepción.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, the closed list of suspendable rights and the express bar on suspension under the estado de alarma, the institutional-continuity guarantee, and the confinement of military jurisdiction. It records no declaration and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same BOE consolidated text, article by article. Supports Art. 17(1)-(4): “1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad. Nadie puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de lo establecido en este artículo y en los casos y en la forma previstos en la ley. 2. La detención preventiva no podrá durar más del tiempo estrictamente necesario para la realización de las averiguaciones tendentes al esclarecimiento de los hechos, y, en todo caso, en el plazo máximo de setenta y dos horas, el detenido deberá ser puesto en libertad o a disposición de la autoridad judicial. 3. Toda persona detenida debe ser informada de forma inmediata, y de modo que le sea comprensible, de sus derechos y de las razones de su detención, no pudiendo ser obligada a declarar. Se garantiza la asistencia de abogado al detenido en las diligencias policiales y judiciales, en los términos que la ley establezca. 4. La ley regulará un procedimiento de «habeas corpus» [...]” Supports Art. 18(1)-(4): “1. Se garantiza el derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen. 2. El domicilio es inviolable. Ninguna entrada o registro podrá hacerse en él sin consentimiento del titular o resolución judicial, salvo en caso de flagrante delito. 3. Se garantiza el secreto de las comunicaciones y, en especial, de las postales, telegráficas y telefónicas, salvo resolución judicial. 4. La ley limitará el uso de la informática para garantizar el honor y la intimidad personal y familiar de los ciudadanos y el pleno ejercicio de sus derechos.” Supports Art. 19, and specifically its rights-holder wording: “Los españoles tienen derecho a elegir libremente su residencia y a circular por el territorio nacional” — against Art. 17(1)'s “Toda persona”. Supports Art. 24(1)-(2), including the right to effective judicial protection without indefensión, and the rights “al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción de inocencia”. Supports Art. 24(1) verbatim, including the phrase quoted on the equality-of-arms page: “1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión.” Supports Art. 53(1) AND 53(2): “1. Los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Capítulo segundo del presente Título vinculan a todos los poderes públicos. Sólo por ley, que en todo caso deberá respetar su contenido esencial, podrá regularse el ejercicio de tales derechos y libertades, que se tutelarán de acuerdo con lo previsto en el artículo 161, 1, a). 2. Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional.” Constitutional text only — no decision of the Tribunal Constitucional, no provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, nothing about any other country.
Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法), English translation
Ministry of Justice (Japanese Law Translation database) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-25
Cited from the official Japanese Law Translation database (reference only; original Japanese text has legal effect). Supports, at the structural level: that police officials act as judicial police officials investigating offences (Article 189); that public prosecutors may themselves investigate offences (Article 191); and that prosecution is instituted by a public prosecutor (Article 247), who holds the discretion whether to prosecute. Supports the allocation of investigative and charging responsibility; the English is not authoritative and no operational detail is drawn from it. WAVE 22 ADDITION. Read again from the same Japanese Law Translation page, this time from the database's own XML export of the Code (s23Aa001310201en2.0_h18A36.xml), fetched with the law page as referrer. TEMPORAL LIMITATION, stated because it is load-bearing for this wave: the version identifier indicates a translation reflecting amendments to 2006, so it MAY LAG later amendments, and only structural propositions present in that version are drawn from it. Supports Art. 197(1): with regard to investigation, “such examination as is necessary to achieve its objective may be conducted; provided, however, that compulsory dispositions shall not be applied unless special provisions have been established in this Code.” Supports Art. 218(1), that a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for investigation of an offense, conduct search, seizure or inspection UPON A WARRANT ISSUED BY A JUDGE, and Art. 218(3), that the warrant is issued upon their request. Supports Art. 219(1), that the warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offense, THE ARTICLES TO BE SEIZED or the place, body or articles to be searched, the place or articles to be inspected, the valid period, and a statement that the search, seizure or inspection shall not be commenced after the lapse of that period and that the warrant shall then be returned to the court. Supports Art. 222-2 in full: “Compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts.” Cited for three propositions: that a national code can state as a general rule that a compulsory measure requires a specific statutory provision; that the warrant instrument itself distinguishes what may be seized from what may be searched; and that a system may place the interception power OUTSIDE its general procedure code. The Act to which Art. 222-2 refers was NOT read, and this record supports no claim about its content. The English is a reference translation and the Japanese text has legal effect.
History and Organization of Public Prosecutors' Offices
Ministry of Justice of Japan (moj.go.jp) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-25
The Ministry of Justice's own English account, read directly. Supports: that there are four types of Public Prosecutors' Offices — the Supreme Public Prosecutors' Office, high public prosecutors' offices, district public prosecutors' offices and local public prosecutors' offices — located corresponding to their respective courts; and that prosecutors' offices are attached to the courts but are not part of them. Supports the prosecution structure and its correspondence to the court hierarchy. It does NOT here establish the Minister of Justice's power of direction over prosecutors: the Public Prosecutor's Office Act is marked 'not yet translated' on the official database, so that relationship is left unstated rather than asserted from an unread source.
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors
United Nations (adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August – 7 September 1990) · International organisation · 1990 · link verified 2026-07-23
Supports the international standards expected of prosecutors: impartiality, protection of the public interest, respect for human dignity, and the separation of prosecutorial from judicial functions. Non-binding guidance, not a description of any national prosecution service.