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Comparison

Who prosecutes, and where they sit

Thirty-two systems against five structural questions about the prosecution service, with every answer restating a sourced claim from that country’s prosecution page. No independence score, no ranking, and the most contested questions left visibly unanswered.

How to read it

The three placement questions overlap on purpose. Austria’s prosecutors are constitutionally organs of the ordinary judiciary andsit at the end of a chain of instruction that terminates in the executive; both answers are yes, and a single “where does it sit” field would have forced one of them to be false.

Not established is an answer and there are 31 of them out of 175. Most cluster on two questions: whether a minister may instruct in an individual case, and who directs the investigation. Those are the most contested facts in this subject, several dossiers say in terms that they did not research them, and inferring them from the general shape of a system is exactly the invention this platform exists not to commit.

Every answer here restates a claim already published in that country’s prosecution page, citing the same source. This comparison contains no new research and no new claims — it is the existing corpus in a shape that can be read across.

The systems

35 systems, in alphabetical order. Order carries no meaning.

Argentina

A constitutionally independent organ with functional autonomy, described in its own dossier as a fourth branch alongside the other three.

One national prosecution service: Neither — see the note
The federal Ministerio Público Fiscal is part of the broader Public Ministry; provincial services are separate.
Part of the judiciary: No
The Constitution defines the Public Ministry as an independent organ.
Under a justice ministry: No
It has functional autonomy from the executive.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Yes
The Constitution defines it as "an independent organ with functional autonomy".
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Argentina sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Australia

Whoever made the law that was broken provides the prosecutor: Commonwealth offences to the CDPP, everything else to the state and territory services.

One national prosecution service: No
Because there is no national criminal code, the everyday work is done by the state and territory prosecuting services.
Part of the judiciary: No
The CDPP is a Commonwealth prosecuting service, not part of the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutional autonomy is claimed in the sources read.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Australia sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Austria

Constitutionally organs of the ordinary judiciary, and simultaneously at the end of a chain of instruction terminating in the executive.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Staatsanwaltschaft is a national service.
Part of the judiciary: Yes
Members are constitutionally "organs of the ordinary judiciary" exercising investigation and indictment functions.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
§2(1) of the Public Prosecution Service Act places the service at the end of a chain of instruction terminating in the executive.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No autonomy from the chain of instruction is claimed.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Yes
The service exercises investigation and indictment functions under the constitutional provision.

Prosecution in Austria sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Belgium

Constitutionally independent in individual investigations and prosecutions, while the minister retains a power over criminal policy.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The parket / parquet is the national Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Part of the judiciary: Yes
Its members are the "standing judges" — magistrates of the judicial order.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
Article 151 §1 protects independence in individual investigations and prosecutions while leaving the minister a role in criminal policy.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The independence is constitutionally granted but within the judicial order rather than as a separate branch.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Belgium sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Brazil

A permanent institution on its own constitutional footing, outside the executive and outside the judiciary.

One national prosecution service: Neither — see the note
The Ministério Público is one institution constitutionally, organised into federal and state branches.
Part of the judiciary: No
The Constitution places it on its own footing rather than within the judiciary.
Under a justice ministry: No
It is not part of the executive.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Yes
Article 127 defines it as a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, on its own constitutional footing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Brazil sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Canada

Prosecution is split between a federal Director of Public Prosecutions and separately organised provincial Crown services, by offence type and geography.

One national prosecution service: No
Prosecution is split between the federal Public Prosecution Service and the provinces.
Part of the judiciary: No
The federal service is headed by a Director of Public Prosecutions under statute, not by the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The federal Director’s office is statutory.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Canada sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Czechia

Constitutionally placed in executive power and, on the service’s own account, a component of it within the Ministry of Justice.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Public Prosecutor’s Office is a single national system.
Part of the judiciary: No
The Constitution places it in executive power.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
On the service’s own account it "is conceived as a component of the executive power. It is part of the Ministry of Justice".
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
It has no independent constitutional standing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Czechia sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Denmark

A national Prosecution Service under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, with the police districts forming its bottom tier.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Prosecution Service (Anklagemyndigheden) is national, with functions set out in Chapter 10 of the Administration of Justice Act.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is described as under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, not as part of the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
The service is "under the authority of the Ministry of Justice".
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutional autonomy is described.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
Police Commissioners are responsible for the investigations carried out by the police district and for the activities of the local prosecution.

Prosecution in Denmark sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

England and Wales

A prosecution service that describes itself as independent of police and government, headed by a Director who by statute acts under the superintendence of the Attorney General.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Crown Prosecution Service prosecutes criminal cases investigated by police and other bodies across England and Wales.
Part of the judiciary: No
The service describes itself as a non-ministerial department — a government department led by civil servants — not as part of the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
Neither answer is honest on its own. The service states that it is “independent of police and the government”, and section 3 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 provides that the Director “shall discharge his functions … under the superintendence of the Attorney General”. Both are recorded; what superintendence entails was not researched.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The independence the service claims is a matter of its own description and its statutory form, not a separate constitutional standing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
The police investigate. The service states that it determines charges for complex cases and advises police during investigations, which is neither directing the investigation nor standing apart from it.

Prosecution in England and Wales sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Finland

A single National Prosecution Authority describing itself as part of the judicial system, with prosecutors autonomous in prosecution decisions.

One national prosecution service: Yes
Created in its current single-authority form by the Act on the National Prosecution Authority (32/2019).
Part of the judiciary: Neither — see the note
The Authority describes itself as "a State authority and part of the judicial system", which is not membership of the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
The ministry has an administrative role; prosecutors are autonomous in prosecution decisions.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The independence is statutory and self-described rather than a separate constitutional standing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Finland sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

France

Prosecutors are magistrates of the same body as judges, organised in a hierarchical parquet, with the Ministry of Justice describing the limits on the instructions they may receive.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The parquet is a single national hierarchy running from the procureur général at the Cour de cassation down to first-instance procureurs de la République.
Part of the judiciary: Yes
Prosecutors and judges are both magistrats drawn from the same body; the parquet is the "magistrature debout" within the magistrature.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
The parquet is part of the magistrature and simultaneously subject to the Ministry of Justice on the instructions it may receive; neither "inside the ministry" nor "free of it" states the arrangement.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The parquet has no separate constitutional standing outside the judicial authority.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Yes
Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure places the judicial police under the direction of the procureur de la République.

Prosecution in France sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Germany

Prosecution offices are attached to the courts and are overwhelmingly Land institutions, with a statutory right of supervision and direction allocated along the federal structure.

One national prosecution service: No
Because the courts are overwhelmingly Land courts, the prosecution offices attached to them are overwhelmingly Land institutions; there is no single national service.
Part of the judiciary: Neither — see the note
§ 141 GVG attaches a prosecution office to every court, which is neither membership of the judiciary nor separation from it.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
§ 147 GVG allocates the right of supervision and direction to the Federal Minister of Justice for federal prosecutors and to the Land justice administration for Land prosecutors.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutional autonomy is claimed; the supervision power is statutory and follows the federal structure.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Germany sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Greece

Prosecution offices belong to the judicial branch, with the Ministry of Justice responsible only for general conditions of service.

One national prosecution service: Neither — see the note
Offices are headed by the Prosecutor’s Office of Areios Pagos rather than organised as one service.
Part of the judiciary: Yes
The offices "belong to the ‘judicial branch’ of government and participate in the administration of justice".
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
The Ministry of Justice is responsible for prosecutors’ general conditions of service — administrative matters only.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The independence is that of the judiciary rather than a separate prosecution standing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Greece sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

India

Prosecution follows the State structure: each State has its own Directorate under the State Home Department, and the prosecutor does not direct the police.

One national prosecution service: No
Because prosecution tracks the State Home administration, there is no single national prosecution service.
Part of the judiciary: No
Directorates function under the administrative control of the State Home Department.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
The control is a State Home Department matter rather than a national justice ministry.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutional autonomy is described.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: No
In the common-law manner the prosecutor does not direct the police investigation.

Prosecution in India sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Indonesia

A government institution exercising state power in prosecution independently, whose prosecutor is dominus litis over the case.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia is headed by the Attorney-General.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is described in its enabling law as a government institution.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
It is "a government institution exercising state power in the field of prosecution … independently, free from" outside influence, which is neither ministerial subordination nor separation.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The independence is stated in the enabling law rather than the Constitution.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
The prosecutor is dominus litis, controlling the direction of the prosecution; in the ordinary model the police investigate.

Prosecution in Indonesia sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Ireland

A single independent statutory Director of Public Prosecutions, separate from both the police who investigate and the government that appoints.

One national prosecution service: Yes
Prosecution is led by the Director of Public Prosecutions, an independent statutory office established under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974.
Part of the judiciary: No
The DPP is a statutory office separate from the courts.
Under a justice ministry: No
The Director is, in the office’s own words, "independent in the performance of her functions".
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The independence is statutory rather than a separate constitutional standing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
The Gardí investigate and the DPP decides whether to prosecute; for summary matters the DPP gives general directions and specific direction when asked.

Prosecution in Ireland sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Italy

Prosecutors are magistrates of the same order as judges, which makes their independence a consequence of belonging to the judiciary.

One national prosecution service: Neither — see the note
Offices are attached to the tribunals, the courts of appeal and the Court of Cassation rather than forming a separate national service.
Part of the judiciary: Yes
Prosecutors are magistrates: they and the judges belong to the same order.
Under a justice ministry: No
It is independent because it is part of the judiciary, not the executive.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The autonomy is that of the judiciary as a whole rather than of a separate prosecution body.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Italy sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Japan

Four tiers of Public Prosecutors’ Offices, with the charging decision and the discretion whether to prosecute belonging to the prosecutor.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Ministry of Justice describes four types of Public Prosecutors’ Office in a single national structure headed by the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office.
Part of the judiciary: No
The offices are described by the Ministry of Justice, not as part of the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No separate constitutional standing is described in the sources read.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the charging decision and the discretion whether to prosecute belong to the prosecutor; direction of the police investigation was not established.

Prosecution in Japan sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Kenya

A constitutionally protected Director of Public Prosecutions who needs no consent to commence proceedings and is not under the direction of any authority.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The ODPP is a national office established by Article 157 of the Constitution.
Part of the judiciary: No
The office is separate from the courts and from the Attorney-General.
Under a justice ministry: No
The Director "shall not be under the direction or control of any person or authority".
Constitutionally autonomous body: Yes
The protection is in Article 157 of the Constitution itself.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Kenya sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Mexico

A constitutionally autonomous federal prosecution body with its own legal personality, neither judicial nor ministerial.

One national prosecution service: No
The federal Fiscalía sits alongside individual state fiscalías.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is neither part of the judiciary nor under a ministry.
Under a justice ministry: No
The Constitution organises it as an autonomous public body.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Yes
Article 102-A organises it "as an autonomous public body, with its own legal personality and assets".
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Yes
The constitutional design gives the federal prosecution an investigation-directing role.

Prosecution in Mexico sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Netherlands

The Openbaar Ministerie is part of the judiciary in its own description, and the prosecutor is in charge of the criminal investigation.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Openbaar Ministerie is the national Public Prosecution Service.
Part of the judiciary: Yes
The service states that "the Public Prosecution Service and the courts together make up the judiciary".
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No separate constitutional standing is described.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Yes
The public prosecutor directs the investigation carried out by the police, and the decision whether and what to prosecute rests with the OM.

Prosecution in Netherlands sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

New Zealand

No single Director of Public Prosecutions: prosecution is superintended by the Crown’s Law Officers, the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General.

One national prosecution service: No
New Zealand has no single Director of Public Prosecutions.
Part of the judiciary: No
Superintendence lies with the Crown’s Law Officers rather than the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
The Attorney-General is a Minister and the senior Law Officer; the Solicitor-General is the junior Law Officer and chief executive of the Crown Law Office.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutionally autonomous prosecution body exists.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in New Zealand sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Nigeria

Prosecution sits inside the executive: the Attorney-General of the Federation is a Minister of the Government and the Chief Law Officer.

One national prosecution service: No
Prosecution is dual, at federal and state level.
Part of the judiciary: No
It sits inside the executive.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
The Attorney-General of the Federation is "the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and a Minister of the Government of the Federation" (section 150).
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
The office is a Cabinet position, which is the opposite of prosecutorial autonomy.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Nigeria sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Northern Ireland

A single principal prosecuting authority led by a Director appointed by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Public Prosecution Service describes itself as the principal prosecuting authority in Northern Ireland.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is a prosecuting authority, described separately from the courts.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
Both the Director and the Deputy Director are public appointments made by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. What that entails beyond appointment was not researched.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. Nothing read establishes a constitutional standing for the service.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: No
The service makes prosecution decisions in cases investigated by the police and considers cases investigated by other statutory authorities; it does not describe itself as directing the investigation.

Prosecution in Northern Ireland sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Norway

A three-level Prosecution Authority in which only the King in Council may prescribe general rules, and the Minister of Justice cannot instruct on the assessment of a case.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Prosecution Authority has three levels headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is a prosecuting authority distinct from the courts.
Under a justice ministry: No
The Minister of Justice cannot instruct the prosecuting authority on the assessment or decision of a case.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The independence is structural — only the King in Council may prescribe general rules — rather than a separate constitutional branch.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Norway sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Poland

The Prosecutor-General is the supreme organ of the prosecution, and that office is held by the Minister of Justice.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Prokuratura is a hierarchical national service under the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of 28 January 2016.
Part of the judiciary: No
Unlike the courts it has no dedicated basis in the 1997 Constitution; its basis is statutory.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
"The office of Prosecutor-General is held by the Minister of Justice" (Article 1 § 2) — a personal union of the two offices.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
There is no constitutional basis for the service at all.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Poland sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Portugal

An autonomous service that is neither part of the judiciary nor under a ministry — autonomy running in two directions at once.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Ministério Público is a single national service with competence under Article 219.
Part of the judiciary: No
Unlike the Italian magistrate-prosecutor, it is a separate service.
Under a justice ministry: No
It is not under a minister.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Yes
Article 219 gives it autonomy in the Constitution itself.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Portugal sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Scotland

One service that prosecutes crime, investigates every sudden or unexplained death on behalf of the Lord Advocate, and investigates criminal allegations against on-duty police officers.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service describes itself as Scotland’s prosecution service.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is a prosecution service and death investigation authority, not a court.
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The office of the Lord Advocate, and the relationship between the Lord Advocate and the Scottish Government, were not established from anything read.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. Nothing read establishes a constitutional standing for the service.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
Crime is reported to the prosecutor, who processes reported crimes and prepares cases. Two categories are investigated by the service itself rather than reported to it: deaths, on behalf of the Lord Advocate, and criminal allegations against on-duty police officers.

Prosecution in Scotland sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Singapore

One constitutional officer is both the Government’s legal adviser and the Public Prosecutor.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Attorney-General "is the Public Prosecutor and has the control and direction of criminal prosecutions and proceedings".
Part of the judiciary: No
The office is not part of the judiciary.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
The office is not a Cabinet minister and is not under a justice ministry; it advises the Government under Article 35(7) while prosecuting under Article 35(8).
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The role is constitutionally vested but combined with the adviser role in one officer.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
The Public Prosecutor has the control and direction of prosecutions and proceedings; direction of police investigation was not established.

Prosecution in Singapore sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

South Africa

A single national prosecuting authority under section 179, pairing operational independence with the political responsibility of the Justice Minister.

One national prosecution service: Yes
Section 179 establishes "a single national prosecuting authority".
Part of the judiciary: No
The NPA is not part of the judiciary.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
Its design pairs operational independence in prosecutorial decisions with the ultimate political responsibility of the Justice Minister.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The authority is constitutionally established without being placed outside the three branches.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in South Africa sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

South Korea

An external agency of the Ministry of Justice whose investigative role was reduced in 2020–2021 and which is legislated to be abolished in its current form.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Prosecution Service is a single national structure headed by the Prosecutor General.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is an external agency of the Ministry of Justice.
Under a justice ministry: Yes
The Prosecution Service is "an external agency of the Ministry of Justice".
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutional autonomy is described.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Neither — see the note
Historically the prosecution directed police investigations; a 2020–2021 adjustment moved most criminal investigation to the police.

Prosecution in South Korea sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Spain

A single national Ministerio Fiscal with a constitutional basis, unaffected by the regional asymmetry that runs through policing and prisons.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Ministerio Fiscal is national and unitary — the one part of the system that is the same everywhere.
Part of the judiciary: Neither — see the note
It has its constitutional basis in the title on the judiciary without being a court.
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
It has a constitutional basis, which is not the same as the separate-branch autonomy Brazil and Mexico give their services.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Spain sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Sweden

An independent Prosecution Authority whose prosecutors lead preliminary investigations, with the Government having no power to intervene in a specific case.

One national prosecution service: Yes
The Prosecution Authority is headed by the Prosecutor General.
Part of the judiciary: No
It is a public authority rather than part of the courts.
Under a justice ministry: No
"The Swedish Government has no powers to intervene in a public authority’s decisions in specific cases."
Constitutionally autonomous body: Neither — see the note
The protection comes from the general Swedish rule against intervening in an authority’s individual decisions rather than from a prosecution-specific constitutional standing.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Yes
In more serious matters the prosecutor leads the preliminary investigation and decides which inquiries the police should make.

Prosecution in Sweden sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Switzerland

Prosecution is by default a cantonal task, with a narrow federal exception for defined federal matters.

One national prosecution service: No
Article 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that the cantonal authorities prosecute and judge federal criminal offences, subject to legal exceptions.
Part of the judiciary: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Under a justice ministry: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
Constitutionally autonomous body: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in Switzerland sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

United States

Prosecution is split between a federal service of presidentially appointed attorneys and separately organised state and local prosecutors, most of whom are locally elected.

One national prosecution service: No
Prosecution is split between the federal system and the states, and within the states between separately organised local offices.
Part of the judiciary: No
State and local prosecution is organised in the executive branch of state government.
Under a justice ministry: Neither — see the note
Federal prosecutors are appointed by the President with Senate consent; state and local prosecutors answer to no national ministry at all.
Constitutionally autonomous body: No
No constitutionally autonomous prosecution body; the Tenth Amendment reservation is what leaves prosecution to the states.
The prosecutor directs the investigation: Not established
NOT RESEARCHED. The dossier states explicitly that this was not established, and a filled cell here would be an invention.

Prosecution in United States sets out the same facts in full, with the sources.

Facts last checked against sources on 18 September 2026.

Sources

  1. Constitution of the Argentine Nation (1853, reformed 1994)

    Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University) — official constitutional text · Legislation · 1853 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of the Argentine Nation (1853, comprehensively reformed 1994), confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports Art. 5 (each province shall enact its own constitution and guarantee its own administration of justice); Art. 75 inc. 12 (Congress enacts the national codes — Civil, Commercial, Criminal, etc. — "without such codes altering the local jurisdictions", their application corresponding to the federal or provincial courts by subject-matter); Art. 108 (the judicial power of the Nation is exercised by a Supreme Court of Justice and inferior tribunals); Art. 110 (life tenure during good behaviour and irreducible compensation — judicial independence); Art. 114 (the Council of the Magistracy selects judges and administers the judiciary); Art. 120 (the Public Ministry is an independent organ with functional autonomy and financial self-governance — a fourth, extra-branch body); Art. 121 (the provinces keep all power not delegated to the federal Government — the reserved-powers clause); and Art. 86 (the Ombudsman, Defensor del Pueblo). Establishes the federation, the national codes applied by provincial courts, the autonomous Public Ministry, and the reserved-powers rule.

  2. How we differ from state and territory DPPs

    Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (cdpp.gov.au) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Commonwealth DPP's own account (official page, obtained by search retrieval; cdpp.gov.au blocks automated fetching). Supports that the CDPP prosecutes offences against COMMONWEALTH law, while offences against state and territory law are prosecuted by the relevant state or territory Director of Public Prosecutions — the Commonwealth/state split in prosecution. Structural facts only; no verbatim quotation is asserted from a page not read in full.

  3. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (the Australian Constitution)

    Parliament of Australia (aph.gov.au) / Federal Register of Legislation · Legislation · 1901-01-01 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The founding instrument, read verbatim from the official Parliament of Australia consolidated PDF. Supports: s.51, the ENUMERATED legislative powers of the Commonwealth ('The Parliament shall ... have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to' 39 heads) — there is NO general criminal-law head; s.107 (Saving of Power of State Parliaments): 'Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue' — so residual power is RESERVED to the States (the US model, the inverse of Canada); s.71 (the judicial power of the Commonwealth vested in the High Court of Australia and other courts); s.77(iii) (the Commonwealth may invest a State court with federal jurisdiction); and s.122 (the territories power). Establishes that criminal law is largely a State/Territory matter with no national code. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Federal Register of Legislation text. Supports Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s. 51(vi): “(vi.) The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth:”. Supports Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s. 61: “The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exerciseable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.”. Supports Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s. 119: “The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.”. Cited for the constitutional footing of Commonwealth defence and protective power and for the State-application condition in s. 119. It supports no claim about State or Territory emergency law, none of which was read, and no claim about any other country.

  4. Public Prosecution Service Act (Staatsanwaltschaftsgesetz, StAG), consolidated

    Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes (RIS), Bundeskanzleramt (Austria) · Legislation · 1986 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The consolidated Austrian Public Prosecution Service Act (RIS); §2(1) was fetched at its ELI address and confirmed verbatim in two passes. Supports §2(1) — "Die Staatsanwaltschaften sind den Oberstaatsanwaltschaften und diese sowie die Generalprokuratur dem Bundesminister für Justiz unmittelbar untergeordnet und weisungsgebunden" — establishing that the prosecutors' offices (Staatsanwaltschaften) are subordinate to the senior prosecutors' offices (Oberstaatsanwaltschaften), and those together with the Procurator General (Generalprokuratur) are directly subordinate and bound by instructions to the Federal Minister of Justice. Establishes the chain of instruction (Weisungskette) and its apex, and the three-tier structure of the prosecution.

  5. Federal Constitutional Law of Austria (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, B-VG), consolidated

    Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes (RIS), Bundeskanzleramt (Austria) · Legislation · 1930 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The consolidated Austrian Federal Constitutional Law in the official legal-information system of the Federation (RIS). Individual articles were fetched at their ELI addresses and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports Art. 10(1) Z 6 and Z 7 (civil and criminal law, the administration of justice, protective institutions, and the security police — except the local security police — are FEDERAL matters of both legislation and execution); Art. 78a(1) and 78b(1) (the Federal Minister of the Interior is the supreme security authority; one Landespolizeidirektion per Land, subordinate to that Minister — federal authorities, not Land police forces); Art. 82(1) ("Die ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit geht vom Bund aus" — ordinary jurisdiction emanates from the Federation), reworded to "ordentliche" with effect from 1 January 2014 by the 2012 administrative-jurisdiction reform; Art. 87(1) (judges independent); Art. 90a (public prosecutors as organs of the ordinary judiciary, bound by instructions as provided by federal law); Art. 92(1) (the Oberster Gerichtshof is the highest instance in civil and criminal matters); Art. 129/133 (the administrative courts and the Verwaltungsgerichtshof); Art. 144 (the Verfassungsgerichtshof); and Art. 148a (the Volksanwaltschaft handles complaints of maladministration in federal administration).

  6. National justice systems — Belgium (European e-Justice Portal)

    European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

    The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on Belgium, read directly. Supports the ordinary-court hierarchy — courts of first instance across 12 judicial districts, five courts of appeal ("Brussels, Liege, Mons, Ghent and Antwerp"), and the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation / Hof van Cassatie) at the apex; the prosecution as the "State Counsel's Office or Prosecutor's Office (ministère public / openbaar ministerie)", the "standing judges" (magistrature debout / staande magistratuur, the parquet / parket) distinct from the "sitting judges" who adjudicate; and Article 151(1) on the independence of judges. An intergovernmental (EU) source describing Belgium.

  7. The Belgian Constitution (official English translation, coordinated text)

    Belgian House of Representatives (de Kamer / la Chambre) · Legislation · 1994 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The official English translation of the coordinated Constitution, fetched as the House of Representatives PDF and text-extracted. Verbatim: Art. 1 "Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions"; Art. 40 "Judiciary power is exercised by the courts. Court decisions are executed in the name of the King"; Art. 142 "There is for all Belgium a Constitutional Court, the composition, competences and functioning of which are established by the law"; Art. 147 "There is a Supreme Court for all Belgium. This Court has no competence over the substance of the case" (the institution named is the Court of Cassation — see be-cassation); Art. 151 §1 "Judges are independent in the exercise of their jurisdictional competences. The public prosecutor is independent in conducting individual investigations and prosecutions, without prejudice to the right of the competent minister to order prosecutions and to enact binding directives of criminal policy". The "for all Belgium" single-body wording of Arts. 142/147/151 establishes that the judiciary, the constitutional court, and prosecution are federal (national) institutions, not Community/Region ones. Authoritative texts are Dutch/French/German; this is the official English reference translation.

  8. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988

    Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25

    The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  9. Sobre o Ministério Público da União — Institucional

    Ministério Público da União (MPU) · Institutional (self-description) · link verified 2026-07-25

    The MPU's own institutional page, read in full. Supports that the Ministério Público da União comprises 'os seguintes ramos: a) O Ministério Público Federal (MPF); b) O Ministério Público do Trabalho (MPT); c) O Ministério Público Militar (MPM); d) O Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios (MPDFT)', that alongside it stand 'os Ministérios Públicos dos Estados', and that 'ao MPU é assegurada autonomia funcional, administrativa e financeira'. Confirms the MP's federative structure and autonomy in the institution's own words.

  10. Director of Public Prosecutions Act (SC 2006, c. 9, s. 121)

    Government of Canada — Justice Laws Website (laws-lois.justice.gc.ca) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-26

    The statute establishing the federal Director of Public Prosecutions (English; French equally authoritative), read for the relevant sections. Supports s.3(1): the Governor in Council 'shall, on the recommendation of the Attorney General, appoint a Director of Public Prosecutions' — the statutory head of the PPSC, which initiates and conducts prosecutions within the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. Both versions have legal effect.

  11. Constitution Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (UK))

    Government of Canada — Justice Laws Website (laws-lois.justice.gc.ca) · Legislation · 1867-07-01 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The authoritative consolidated text (English; the French 'Loi constitutionnelle de 1867' is equally authoritative), read in full. THE backbone of the division of powers. Supports: s.91(27) FEDERAL exclusive authority over 'The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters'; s.91(28) federal 'Penitentiaries'; the s.91 opening 'exclusive Legislative Authority' plus the residual 'Peace, Order, and good Government' power (POGG is FEDERAL — the inverse of the United States); s.92(14) PROVINCIAL exclusive authority over 'The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction'; s.92(6) provincial 'Public and Reformatory Prisons'; s.96 'The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province'; s.100 (Parliament fixes and pays superior-court judges' salaries); s.101 (Parliament may establish a general court of appeal and additional federal courts). Establishes the characteristic Canadian arrangement: one federal criminal law, provincially administered. Both language versions have legal effect.

  12. Public Prosecution Service of the Czech Republic — Prosecutor General's Office and governing legislation

    Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství (Public Prosecution Service, Czech Republic) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Public Prosecution Service's own English pages (the legislation page and the Prosecutor General's Office page), read directly. Supports that the service is governed by Act No. 283/1993 Coll. on the Public Prosecutor's Office (effective 1 January 1994); that it "is conceived as a component of the executive power. It is part of the Ministry of Justice, and it has no independent relations with constitutional authorities such as the Parliament and the President"; and that the Prosecutor General's Office (Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství, in Brno) is the supreme body of a hierarchical system running down through high, regional and district public prosecutor's offices.

  13. Constitution of the Czech Republic (Act No. 1/1993 Coll., as amended) — official English translation

    Ústavní soud (Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic) · Legislation · 1993-01-01 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Constitutional Court's official English translation of the Constitution (constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Coll., adopted 16 December 1992, in force 1 January 1993, as amended to Act No. 98/2013), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted. Supports Art. 80(1) ("The State Attorney's Office shall issue and argue public indictments in criminal proceedings") and 80(2), placing the prosecution in executive power with its status set by statute; Art. 81–82 (judicial power exercised by independent courts; judges independent); Art. 83–84 (the Constitutional Court as the judicial body responsible for the protection of constitutionality, fifteen Justices for ten-year terms); Art. 87 (its jurisdiction, including annulment of statutes and constitutional complaints); Art. 90 ("Only a court may decide upon guilt and determine the punishment"); Art. 91(1) ("The court system comprises the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, superior, regional, and district courts"); and Art. 92 (the Supreme Court as the highest court save for matters of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Administrative Court). WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official text on the Chamber of Deputies' site, together with the Listina. Supports Ustava Ceske republiky (ustavni zakon c. 1/1993 Sb., as amended), Cl. 43(1) and Cl. 39(3): “Clanek 43 (1) Parlament rozhoduje o vyhlaseni valecneho stavu, je-li Ceska republika napadena, nebo je-li treba plnit mezinarodni smluvni zavazky o spolecne obrane proti napadeni. [Clanek 39] (3) K prijeti usneseni o vyhlaseni valecneho stavu a k prijeti usneseni o souhlasu s vyslanim ozbrojenych sil Ceske republiky mimo uzemi Ceske republiky nebo s pobytem ozbrojenych sil jinych statu na uzemi Ceske republiky, jakoz i k prijeti usneseni o ucasti Ceske republiky v obrannych systemech mezinarodni organizace, jiz je Ceska republika clenem, je treba souhlasu nadpolovicni vetsiny vsech poslancu a nadpolovicni vetsiny vsech senatoru.”. Supports Ustava Ceske republiky, Cl. 87(1)(a),(b),(d): “Clanek 87 (1) Ustavni soud rozhoduje a) o zruseni zakonu nebo jejich jednotlivych ustanoveni, jsou-li v rozporu s ustavnim poradkem, b) o zruseni jinych pravnich predpisu nebo jejich jednotlivych ustanoveni, jsou-li v rozporu s ustavnim poradkem nebo zakonem, [...] d) o ustavni stiznosti proti pravomocnemu rozhodnuti a jinemu zasahu organu verejne moci do ustavne zarucenych zakladnich prav a svobod,”. Supports Listina zakladnich prav a svobod (ustavni zakon c. 2/1993 Sb., as amended by ustavni zakon c. 162/1998 Sb. and c. 295/2021 Sb.), Cl. 4: “Clanek 4 (1) Povinnosti mohou byt ukladany toliko na zaklade zakona a v jeho mezich a jen pri zachovani zakladnich prav a svobod. (2) Meze zakladnich prav a svobod mohou byt za podminek stanovenych Listinou zakladnich prav a svobod (dale jen "Listina") upraveny pouze zakonem. (3) Zakonna omezeni zakladnich prav a svobod musi platit stejne pro vsechny pripady, ktere splnuji stanovene podminky. (4) Pri pouzivani ustanoveni o mezich zakladnich prav a svobod musi byt setreno jejich podstaty a smyslu. Takova omezeni nesmeji byt zneuzivana k jinym ucelum, nez pro ktere byla stanovena.”. Cited for the constitutional allocation of the war-state decision to Parliament, for the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, and for the finding that the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms contains NO emergency derogation clause. It supports no claim about any measure taken during any Czech emergency and no claim about any other country.

  14. Types of legal professions — Denmark (European e-Justice Portal)

    European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

    The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on Denmark's legal professions, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports that the Prosecution Service is "under the authority of the Ministry of Justice" (i.e. not institutionally independent of the executive); its statutory basis in Chapter 10 of the Administration of Justice Act (retsplejeloven), sections 95–107; its three tiers (the Director of Public Prosecutions / Rigsadvokaten, the regional Public Prosecutors / statsadvokaterne, and the Police Commissioners / politidirektørerne); and the integrated model — that the Police Commissioners are "responsible for the investigations carried out by the police district and the activities of the local prosecution service", so the district police head is also the local prosecutor.

  15. About the Prosecution Service / Director of Public Prosecutions

    Anklagemyndigheden (Danish Prosecution Service) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Prosecution Service's own English pages, read directly. Supports the service's name (Anklagemyndigheden), the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Rigsadvokaten) as the hierarchical superior of the other prosecutors who prosecutes before the Supreme Court, and the three-tier structure. Used for the institution's own account of itself; its subordination to the Ministry of Justice is established by the e-Justice source.

  16. About CPS — Crown Prosecution Service

    Crown Prosecution Service (England and Wales) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

    SCOPE: the Crown Prosecution Service's own account of itself. The service's about page, read directly. Supports that the CPS describes itself as “an independent organisation that prosecutes criminal cases investigated by police and other bodies in England and Wales” and as “independent of police and the government”; that its responsibilities include deciding which cases to prosecute, determining charges for complex cases, advising police during investigations, presenting cases in court and supporting victims and witnesses; and that it is “a non-ministerial department (a government department led by civil servants, not a minister)” accountable to Parliament and the public. It is a self-description and is published here alongside the statutory provision that qualifies it.

  17. Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 3 (Functions of the Director) — legislation.gov.uk

    The National Archives (United Kingdom) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-18

    SCOPE: the statutory position of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The official consolidated text, read directly. Supports that “the Director shall discharge his functions under this or any other enactment under the superintendence of the Attorney General”, and that it is the Director's duty to take over the conduct of all criminal proceedings other than specified proceedings instituted on behalf of a police force. The section is shown as extending to England and Wales (E+W). It is the provision that has to be read alongside the Crown Prosecution Service's own description of itself as independent of government.

  18. The National Prosecution Authority

    Syyttäjälaitos / National Prosecution Authority (Finland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    The National Prosecution Authority's own English site, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports that "the independent National Prosecution Authority is a State authority and part of the judicial system", that "in the decisions they make in prosecution matters, prosecutors are autonomous and independent administrators of justice", and that it "belongs to the administrative branch of the Ministry of Justice" — decisional independence within the ministry's administrative branch. Also supports the statutory basis (the Act on the National Prosecution Authority 32/2019 and Government Decree 798/2019), the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the five prosecution districts (Southern, Western, Northern and Eastern Finland, and Åland).

  19. The Constitution of Finland (731/1999) — Ministry of Justice English translation

    Ministry of Justice, Finland (via FAOLEX; original at finlex.fi) · Legislation · 1999 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Ministry of Justice official English translation of the 1999 Constitution, fetched as a PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by me and in the verification pass). Supports: Section 1 ("Finland is a sovereign republic"; "Finland is a Member State of the European Union"); Section 3 ("the judicial powers are exercised by independent courts of law, with the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court as the highest instances"); Section 17 ("the national languages of Finland are Finnish and Swedish"); Section 98 (the general courts and the general administrative courts); Section 99 (the Supreme Court is final in civil, commercial and criminal matters; the Supreme Administrative Court is final in administrative matters); Section 104 (the Prosecutor-General, appointed by the President of the Republic); Section 106 (a court gives primacy to the Constitution where an Act's application would be in "evident conflict" with it — diffuse review, no constitutional court); and Sections 108–109 (the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman). The authoritative texts are Finnish and Swedish.

  20. Les magistrats du parquet

    Ministère de la justice (France) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24

    Supports: the definition of the parquet / ministère public; the 'magistrature debout' description and the siège/parquet distinction; the hierarchy from procureur général to procureur de la République; that parquet magistrates act 'sous l'autorité du ministre de la Justice' and receive 'des instructions générales du ministre de la Justice mais en aucun cas dans les dossiers judiciaires'; that they do not benefit from the guarantee of inamovibilité; and the prosecutor's direction of investigation and discretion over case outcomes. An official self-description of the formal rule. It does NOT establish that the rule is observed in practice, and cannot settle the contested question of prosecutorial independence in either direction.

  21. Article 12 du Code de procédure pénale

    République française (Légifrance) · Legislation · 1958-04-08 · link verified 2026-07-24

    Supports the exact wording that the police judiciaire is exercised 'sous la direction du procureur de la République' by the officers, officials and agents designated in that title. Légifrance records the provision as in force from 8 April 1958 and as scheduled for repeal by Ordonnance n° 2025-1091 of 19 November 2025 with effect from 1 January 2029; any citation must state that it is current law carrying a scheduled end date. Does NOT support any claim about which bodies those designated officers belong to, nor about investigative practice.

  22. Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 (texte intégral en vigueur)

    Conseil constitutionnel · Legislation · 1958-10-04 · link verified 2026-08-10

    Authentic consolidated text published by the Conseil constitutionnel. Supports: Article 1 (indivisible Republic; decentralised organisation); Article 64 (President as guarantor of the independence of the judicial authority, assisted by the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature); Article 66 (judicial authority as guardian of individual liberty); Article 72 (categories of territorial collectivity); Article 72-3 (the ten named overseas territories); Articles 73 and 74 (the two overseas regimes); the title of Title VIII ('De l'autorité judiciaire') and of Title XIII (transitional provisions on New Caledonia). Re-verified on 10 August 2026 for Wave 6, which additionally establishes from the same text: Article 65, that the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature comprises a formation for magistrats du siège and one for magistrats du parquet, that the siège formation 'statue comme conseil de discipline des magistrats du siège' and that the parquet formation 'donne son avis sur les sanctions disciplinaires qui les concernent'; and Article 71-1, that 'Le Défenseur des droits veille au respect des droits et libertés par les administrations de l'Etat, les collectivités territoriales, les établissements publics, ainsi que par tout organisme investi d'une mission de service public', that he may be seized by any person believing themselves harmed and may act d'office, that he is appointed by the President of the Republic for a non-renewable mandate of six years incompatible with membership of the Government or Parliament, and that he reports on his activity to the President of the Republic and to Parliament. Does NOT support any claim about how these provisions are applied in practice, nor about the internal organisation of any institution. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authentic consolidated text (version to the constitutional revision of 8 March 2024). Supports Article 61, review BEFORE promulgation: organic laws before promulgation, the propositions de loi mentioned in Article 11 before being submitted to referendum, and the rules of the parliamentary assemblies before their entry into application "doivent être soumis au Conseil constitutionnel qui se prononce sur leur conformité à la Constitution"; that for the same purposes ordinary laws "peuvent être déférées au Conseil constitutionnel, avant leur promulgation" by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, or sixty deputies or sixty senators; that the Council must rule within one month, reduced to eight days at the Government's request in urgency; and that referral suspends the time limit for promulgation. Supports Article 61-1, review AFTER promulgation on referral: "Lorsque, à l'occasion d'une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu'une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d'État ou de la Cour de cassation qui se prononce dans un délai déterminé" — the question reaches the Council only through one of the two apex courts, which acts as a filter. Supports Article 62, the differing EFFECTS: a provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61 "ne peut être promulguée ni mise en application"; a provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61-1 "est abrogée à compter de la publication de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel ou d'une date ultérieure fixée par cette décision", with the Council determining the conditions and limits within which effects the provision has already produced may be called into question; and that the decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel "ne sont susceptibles d'aucun recours" and bind the public powers and all administrative and judicial authorities. Supports no claim about how often either route is used or about outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authentic consolidated text on the Conseil constitutionnel's site. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 36: “ARTICLE 36. L'état de siège est décrété en Conseil des ministres. Sa prorogation au-delà de douze jours ne peut être autorisée que par le Parlement.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 16, first two paragraphs: “Lorsque les institutions de la République, l'indépendance de la nation, l'intégrité de son territoire ou l'exécution de ses engagements internationaux sont menacées d'une manière grave et immédiate et que le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels est interrompu, le Président de la République prend les mesures exigées par ces circonstances, après consultation officielle du Premier ministre, des présidents des assemblées ainsi que du Conseil constitutionnel. Il en informe la nation par un message.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 16, final paragraph: “Après trente jours d'exercice des pouvoirs exceptionnels, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi par le Président de l'Assemblée nationale, le Président du Sénat, soixante députés ou soixante sénateurs, aux fins d'examiner si les conditions énoncées au premier alinéa demeurent réunies. Il se prononce dans les délais les plus brefs par un avis public. Il procède de plein droit à cet examen et se prononce dans les mêmes conditions au terme de soixante jours d'exercice des pouvoirs exceptionnels et à tout moment au-delà de cette durée.”. Supports Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 66: “ARTICLE 66. Nul ne peut être arbitrairement détenu. L'autorité judiciaire, gardienne de la liberté individuelle, assure le respect de ce principe dans les conditions prévues par la loi.”. Cited for the constitutional architecture of French exceptional powers and for the thirty-day review clock the 2008 revision built into Article 16. It records no use of Article 16, states nothing about the état d'urgence, which is statutory and cited separately, and supports no claim about any other country.

  23. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) § 141 (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports the single sentence 'Bei jedem Gericht soll eine Staatsanwaltschaft bestehen' — a public prosecution office shall exist at every court. Supports the structural pairing of prosecution offices to courts and nothing more; it does not say who staffs, funds or supervises them, and it does not describe any Land's arrangements. The page displays no Stand/version date, so currency rests on the publisher rather than a printed date.

  24. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz), English translation

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · 1949-05-23 · link verified 2026-07-24

    Translation by Professors Christian Tomuschat, David P. Currie, Donald P. Kommers and Raymond Kerr in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag; offered subject to stated conditions of use. The page states the text reflects amendments up to 22 March 2025. THE GERMAN TEXT IS AUTHORITATIVE and the translation may lag later amendments. Supports: Art. 20(1) federal state; Art. 30 (exercise of state powers is a matter for the Länder except as otherwise provided); Art. 70 (Länder legislate unless the Basic Law confers power on the Federation; exclusive vs concurrent); Art. 73(1) no. 10 (cooperation in criminal police matters; establishment of a Federal Criminal Police Office); Art. 74(1) no. 1 (concurrent legislation over criminal law and court organisation and procedure, EXCEPT the law on pre-trial detention); Art. 83 (Länder execute federal laws in their own right); Art. 87(1) (federal law may establish Federal Border Police authorities and central police offices); Art. 92 (judicial power vested in the Federal Constitutional Court, federal courts and the courts of the Länder); Art. 95(1) (the five federal supreme courts); Art. 96 (further federal courts); Art. 97 (judicial independence); Art. 35 (mutual legal and administrative assistance). Does NOT support any claim about how a particular Land organises its institutions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official English translation page. NOTE ON NUMBERING, verified rather than assumed: in the current text the COMPOSITION of the Federal Constitutional Court is Article 93 and its JURISDICTION is Article 94 — the reverse of the allocation these two articles carried historically and of the numbering most secondary sources still cite. Supports Art. 93(5): a federal law regulates the organisation and procedure of the Court, and "the law may require that all other legal remedies be exhausted before a constitutional complaint may be filed and may provide for a separate proceeding to determine whether the complaint will be accepted for decision". Supports Art. 94(1) no. 2, ABSTRACT review: the Court rules "in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning the formal or substantive compatibility of federal law or Land law with this Basic Law or the compatibility of Land law with other federal law on application of the Federal Government, of a Land government or of one fourth of the Members of the Bundestag". Supports Art. 94(1) no. 4a, the INDIVIDUAL constitutional complaint: the Court rules "on constitutional complaints, which may be filed by any person alleging that one of his basic rights or one of his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or under Article 33, 38, 101, 103 or 104 has been infringed by public authority". Supports Art. 94(1) no. 4b and 4c (municipal complaints and complaints by associations about non-recognition as political parties), and Art. 94(4), that decisions of the Court bind the constitutional organs. Supports Art. 100(1), CONCRETE review: "If a court concludes that a law on whose validity its decision depends is unconstitutional, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be obtained from the Land court with jurisdiction over constitutional disputes where the constitution of a Land is held to be violated or from the Federal Constitutional Court where this Basic Law is held to be violated" — that is, the ordinary court must refer and may not itself disapply the statute. Supports Art. 100(3), that a Land constitutional court proposing to derogate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court must obtain a decision from it. The German text remains authoritative and the translation may lag later amendments. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official English translation page and cross-checked against the German original at gesetze-im-internet.de, article by article. The Grundgesetz carries THREE distinct emergency regimes, and conflating them is the commonest error about it. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 35(1), (2) sentence 2: “(1) Alle Behörden des Bundes und der Länder leisten sich gegenseitig Rechts- und Amtshilfe. (2) [...] Zur Hilfe bei einer Naturkatastrophe oder bei einem besonders schweren Unglücksfall kann ein Land Polizeikräfte anderer Länder, Kräfte und Einrichtungen anderer Verwaltungen sowie des Bundesgrenzschutzes und der Streitkräfte anfordern.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 35(3): “(3) Gefährdet die Naturkatastrophe oder der Unglücksfall das Gebiet mehr als eines Landes, so kann die Bundesregierung, soweit es zur wirksamen Bekämpfung erforderlich ist, den Landesregierungen die Weisung erteilen, Polizeikräfte anderen Ländern zur Verfügung zu stellen, sowie Einheiten des Bundesgrenzschutzes und der Streitkräfte zur Unterstützung der Polizeikräfte einsetzen. Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung nach Satz 1 sind jederzeit auf Verlangen des Bundesrates, im übrigen unverzüglich nach Beseitigung der Gefahr aufzuheben.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 91(2): “(2) Ist das Land, in dem die Gefahr droht, nicht selbst zur Bekämpfung der Gefahr bereit oder in der Lage, so kann die Bundesregierung die Polizei in diesem Lande und die Polizeikräfte anderer Länder ihren Weisungen unterstellen sowie Einheiten des Bundesgrenzschutzes einsetzen. Die Anordnung ist nach Beseitigung der Gefahr, im übrigen jederzeit auf Verlangen des Bundesrates aufzuheben.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 87a(2), (4): “(2) Außer zur Verteidigung dürfen die Streitkräfte nur eingesetzt werden, soweit dieses Grundgesetz es ausdrücklich zuläßt. [...] (4) Zur Abwehr einer drohenden Gefahr für den Bestand oder die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung des Bundes oder eines Landes kann die Bundesregierung, wenn die Voraussetzungen des Artikels 91 Abs. 2 vorliegen und die Polizeikräfte sowie der Bundesgrenzschutz nicht ausreichen, Streitkräfte zur Unterstützung der Polizei und des Bundesgrenzschutzes beim Schutze von zivilen Objekten und bei der Bekämpfung organisierter und militärisch bewaffneter Aufständischer einsetzen. Der Einsatz von Streitkräften ist einzustellen, wenn der Bundestag oder der Bundesrat es verlangen.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115a(1): “(1) Die Feststellung, daß das Bundesgebiet mit Waffengewalt angegriffen wird oder ein solcher Angriff unmittelbar droht (Verteidigungsfall), trifft der Bundestag mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates. Die Feststellung erfolgt auf Antrag der Bundesregierung und bedarf einer Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln der abgegebenen Stimmen, mindestens der Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Bundestages.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115a(2), (3), (4): “(2) Erfordert die Lage unabweisbar ein sofortiges Handeln und stehen einem rechtzeitigen Zusammentritt des Bundestages unüberwindliche Hindernisse entgegen oder ist er nicht beschlußfähig, so trifft der Gemeinsame Ausschuß diese Feststellung mit einer Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln der abgegebenen Stimmen, mindestens der Mehrheit seiner Mitglieder. [...] (4) Wird das Bundesgebiet mit Waffengewalt angegriffen und sind die zuständigen Bundesorgane außerstande, sofort die Feststellung nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 zu treffen, so gilt diese Feststellung als getroffen und als zu dem Zeitpunkt verkündet, in dem der Angriff begonnen hat.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115g: “Die verfassungsmäßige Stellung und die Erfüllung der verfassungsmäßigen Aufgaben des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes und seiner Richter dürfen nicht beeinträchtigt werden. Das Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht darf durch ein Gesetz des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses nur insoweit geändert werden, als dies auch nach Auffassung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes zur Aufrechterhaltung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Gerichtes erforderlich ist. Bis zum Erlaß eines solchen Gesetzes kann das Bundesverfassungsgericht die zur Erhaltung der Arbeitsfähigkeit des Gerichtes erforderlichen Maßnahmen treffen.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115l(1), (2): “(1) Der Bundestag kann jederzeit mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates Gesetze des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses aufheben. [...] (2) Der Bundestag kann mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates jederzeit durch einen vom Bundespräsidenten zu verkündenden Beschluß den Verteidigungsfall für beendet erklären. Der Bundesrat kann verlangen, daß der Bundestag hierüber beschließt. Der Verteidigungsfall ist unverzüglich für beendet zu erklären, wenn die Voraussetzungen für seine Feststellung nicht mehr gegeben sind.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 101: “(1) Ausnahmegerichte sind unzulässig. Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden. (2) Gerichte für besondere Sachgebiete können nur durch Gesetz errichtet werden.”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 19(2) and Art. 79(3): “In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden. [Art. 19(2)] — Eine Änderung dieses Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig. [Art. 79(3)]”. Supports Grundgesetz Art. 115c(1), (3): “(1) Der Bund hat für den Verteidigungsfall das Recht der konkurrierenden Gesetzgebung auch auf den Sachgebieten, die zur Gesetzgebungszuständigkeit der Länder gehören. Diese Gesetze bedürfen der Zustimmung des Bundesrates. [...] (3) Soweit es zur Abwehr eines gegenwärtigen oder unmittelbar drohenden Angriffs erforderlich ist, kann für den Verteidigungsfall durch Bundesgesetz mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates die Verwaltung und das Finanzwesen des Bundes und der Länder abweichend von den Abschnitten VIII, VIIIa und X geregelt werden, wobei die Lebensfähigkeit der Länder, Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände, insbesondere auch in finanzieller Hinsicht, zu wahren ist.”. These provisions support the STRUCTURE of German emergency law and nothing about its application. They record no instance of any regime being invoked, state no measure taken under one, and support no claim about any Land's own disaster-protection law or about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read again from the same official English translation page and checked article by article against the authoritative German original at gesetze-im-internet.de/gg. Supports the LIMITATION architecture: Art. 19(1)-(2), “(1) Soweit nach diesem Grundgesetz ein Grundrecht durch Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes eingeschränkt werden kann, muß das Gesetz allgemein und nicht nur für den Einzelfall gelten. Außerdem muß das Gesetz das Grundrecht unter Angabe des Artikels nennen. (2) In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden.”, and Art. 19(3)-(4) (basic rights apply to domestic legal persons so far as their nature permits; recourse to the courts where rights are violated by public authority, with the second sentence of Art. 10(2) expressly unaffected). Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER finding, verified in the German text rather than the translation because the finding is about a word: Art. 8(1) “Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, sich ohne Anmeldung oder Erlaubnis friedlich und ohne Waffen zu versammeln”; Art. 9(1) “Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, Vereine und Gesellschaften zu bilden”; Art. 11(1) “Alle Deutschen genießen Freizügigkeit im ganzen Bundesgebiet”; Art. 12(1) “Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, Beruf, Arbeitsplatz und Ausbildungsstätte frei zu wählen” — against Art. 2(1) “Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit”, Art. 3(1) “Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich”, and the two provisions that name no holder at all: Art. 10(1) “Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis sind unverletzlich” and Art. 13(1) “Die Wohnung ist unverletzlich”. Supports Art. 1(3), that the basic rights bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. Supports Art. 2(2), that everyone has the right to life and physical integrity, that freedom of the person is inviolable, and that these rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law. Supports the HOME provision in full: Art. 13(2) “Durchsuchungen dürfen nur durch den Richter, bei Gefahr im Verzuge auch durch die in den Gesetzen vorgesehenen anderen Organe angeordnet und nur in der dort vorgeschriebenen Form durchgeführt werden”; Art. 13(3), acoustic surveillance of a home on judicial order where particular facts justify suspicion of an especially serious crime specifically defined by law and alternative methods would be disproportionately difficult or unproductive, for a limited time, ordered by a panel of three judges (a single judge where time is of the essence); Art. 13(4), technical surveillance to avert acute dangers only on judicial order, with a subsequent judicial decision without delay where time was of the essence; Art. 13(5); Art. 13(6), annual reporting to the Bundestag and parliamentary oversight by an elected panel, with comparable oversight in the Länder; and Art. 13(7). Supports the COMMUNICATIONS provision: Art. 10(2), that restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law and that where the restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may provide that the person affected shall not be informed and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by review by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature. Supports Art. 103(1) (“Vor Gericht hat jedermann Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör”) and Art. 104(1)-(4), including Art. 104(2) “Die Polizei darf aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit niemanden länger als bis zum Ende des Tages nach dem Ergreifen in eigenem Gewahrsam halten” and Art. 104(3), that a person provisionally detained on suspicion of an offence is brought before a judge no later than the day following arrest, who informs, examines, and either issues a written reasoned arrest warrant or orders release. VERIFIED NEGATIVE, and it is stated as a fact about the text and not about German law: the Grundgesetz contains no privilege against self-incrimination and no right to silence. An exhaustive search of the authoritative German text for “Selbstbelastung”, “schweigen”, “Aussage zu verweigern” and “Geständnis” returns zero occurrences, as does a search of the English translation for “incriminat”, “silent”, “silence”, “confession” and “witness against”. This record therefore does NOT support any claim that the principle is absent from German law — it supports only that it is absent from this constitutional text. The German text remains authoritative and the translation may lag later amendments.

  25. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) § 147 (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports that the right of supervision and direction (Aufsicht und Leitung) belongs to: (1) the Federal Minister of Justice regarding the Generalbundesanwalt and the Bundesanwälte; (2) the Landesjustizverwaltung regarding all prosecution officials of the Land concerned; (3) the senior official of the prosecution office at the Oberlandesgerichte and Landgerichte regarding all prosecution officials in their district. Supports the EXISTENCE and ALLOCATION of that formal power only. It does not establish how often, or whether, the power is exercised, and it cannot settle the contested question of prosecutorial independence in either direction. The page displays no Stand/version date.

  26. Types of legal professions — Greece (European e-Justice Portal)

    European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

    The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on Greece's legal professions, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports that "public prosecutor's offices (eisangelíes) belong to the 'judicial branch' of government and participate in the administration of justice" and that "public prosecutors (eisangeleís) enjoy operational and personal independence"; that a prosecutor's duties include initiating criminal proceedings, supervising investigations, carrying out preliminary investigations, and supervising the law-enforcement authorities; and that "the Ministry of Justice is responsible for public prosecutors' general conditions of service" (service conditions only, not the direction of prosecutorial decisions).

  27. Constitution of Greece (1975, as amended through 2008) — English translation

    Comparative Constitutions Project (Constitute) · Legislation · 1975-06-11 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Comparative Constitutions Project (Constitute) English translation of the Greek Constitution (in force 11 June 1975, as amended through 2008), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted; load-bearing articles confirmed verbatim (Art. 93§4 and Art. 105 re-confirmed by hand at authoring time). This is an UNOFFICIAL translation — the Hellenic Parliament's own official English PDF returned HTTP 403 — so it is cross-checked against the current EU e-Justice portal, and the Greek text is authoritative. Supports Art. 26 (separation of powers); Art. 87–88 (judicial and prosecutorial independence, life appointment of magistrates by presidential decree); Art. 93§4 ("The courts shall be bound not to apply a statute whose content is contrary to the Constitution" — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 94–95 (the administrative courts and the Council of State as Supreme Administrative Court); Art. 96–97 (criminal, jury and military courts); Art. 98 (the Court of Audit, whose judgments are not subject to the Supreme Administrative Court — a co-equal apex); Art. 100 (the Special Highest Court — a conflict-resolving court, not a standing constitutional court); Art. 101–102 (unitary decentralisation); Art. 103§9 (the Ombudsman as an independent authority); and Art. 105 (Mount Athos as a self-governed part of the Greek State, with the State exclusively responsible for public order and security).

  28. The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024)

    Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department) · Legislation · 1950-01-26 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The official Constitution of India PDF (Ministry of Law and Justice, "As on 1st May, 2024"), fetched and text-extracted; the Seventh Schedule entries and the cited articles were re-confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports the federal division of legislative power under the Seventh Schedule (Article 246): List II (State List) Entry 1 "Public order", Entry 2 "Police (including railway and village police)", Entry 4 "Prisons, reformatories, Borstal institutions… and persons detained therein" — so police, public order and prisons are exclusive STATE subjects; List III (Concurrent List) Entry 1 "Criminal law…", Entry 2 "Criminal procedure…", Entry 11A "Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts" — so the criminal codes and subordinate-court organisation are concurrent (national); and List I (Union List) Entry 8 "Central Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation". Also supports Article 50 (separation of the judiciary from the executive), Article 124 (the Supreme Court of India), Article 141 (Supreme Court law binding on all courts), Article 214 ("There shall be a High Court for each State"), and Article 235 (High Court control over district and subordinate courts).

  29. Law No. 11 of 2021 amending the Law on the Prosecution Service (Kejaksaan), Pasal 2

    Pemerintah Republik Indonesia (via the official legal-database hosts) · Legislation · 2021 · link verified 2026-07-27

    Law No. 11 of 2021 (amending Law No. 16 of 2004 on the Prosecution Service), Pasal 2, confirmed verbatim. Supports that the Prosecution Service (Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia) is "a government institution exercising state power in the field of prosecution … independently, free from the influence of governmental power and other powers" — that is, functionally independent in prosecutorial decisions but institutionally within the executive branch, headed by the Attorney-General (Jaksa Agung).

  30. About Us — Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

    Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Ireland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-25

    Read directly. Supports: that the Office of the DPP was established under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974; that the Director is 'independent in the performance of her functions'; that the DPP's principal duty is to direct and supervise public prosecutions on indictment and to give general direction and advice to An Garda Síochána on summary cases; and the division of roles — An Garda Síochána investigates, the DPP decides whether to prosecute. Supports the statutory prosecution structure and the DPP's stated independence; it does not, by itself, establish how independence operates in any individual case.

  31. Types of legal professions — Italy (European e-Justice Portal)

    European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

    The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on Italy's legal professions, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports that Italian magistrates (magistrati) include both adjudicating judges (giudici) and prosecutors (pubblici ministeri); that "the Constitution … enshrines the principles of the independence and autonomy of the public prosecution service"; and the mandatory-prosecution rule of Art. 112. Establishes that the prosecution sits within the independent judiciary, not the executive.

  32. Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948) — official English translation

    Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Constitutional Court's own official English translation (October 2023 edition), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by the research and verification passes; the Senate's English PDF was bot-walled, so this Court edition was substituted). Supports Art. 101 (justice administered in the name of the people; the judiciary subject only to the law), Art. 104 (the judiciary an independent branch; the High Council of the Judiciary/CSM), Art. 107 (the public prosecutor's guarantees), Art. 109 ("judicial authorities may directly avail themselves of the judicial police"), Art. 112 ("the public prosecutor shall have the obligation to initiate criminal proceedings" — mandatory prosecution), Art. 103 (the Council of State and administrative justice), Art. 116 (the five special-autonomy regions, with additional devolution over "justice" limited to the organizational requirements of the Justice of the Peace), Art. 117(2) — subparagraphs (l) "jurisdiction and procedural law; civil and criminal law; administrative justice", (h) "public order and security, save for local administrative police", (d) defence — establishing that all four justice functions are EXCLUSIVE State competence, and Arts. 134–135 (the Constitutional Court).

  33. History and Organization of Public Prosecutors' Offices

    Ministry of Justice of Japan (moj.go.jp) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-25

    The Ministry of Justice's own English account, read directly. Supports: that there are four types of Public Prosecutors' Offices — the Supreme Public Prosecutors' Office, high public prosecutors' offices, district public prosecutors' offices and local public prosecutors' offices — located corresponding to their respective courts; and that prosecutors' offices are attached to the courts but are not part of them. Supports the prosecution structure and its correspondence to the court hierarchy. It does NOT here establish the Minister of Justice's power of direction over prosecutors: the Public Prosecutor's Office Act is marked 'not yet translated' on the official database, so that relationship is left unstated rather than asserted from an unread source.

  34. Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法), English translation

    Ministry of Justice (Japanese Law Translation database) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-25

    Cited from the official Japanese Law Translation database (reference only; original Japanese text has legal effect). Supports, at the structural level: that police officials act as judicial police officials investigating offences (Article 189); that public prosecutors may themselves investigate offences (Article 191); and that prosecution is instituted by a public prosecutor (Article 247), who holds the discretion whether to prosecute. Supports the allocation of investigative and charging responsibility; the English is not authoritative and no operational detail is drawn from it. WAVE 22 ADDITION. Read again from the same Japanese Law Translation page, this time from the database's own XML export of the Code (s23Aa001310201en2.0_h18A36.xml), fetched with the law page as referrer. TEMPORAL LIMITATION, stated because it is load-bearing for this wave: the version identifier indicates a translation reflecting amendments to 2006, so it MAY LAG later amendments, and only structural propositions present in that version are drawn from it. Supports Art. 197(1): with regard to investigation, “such examination as is necessary to achieve its objective may be conducted; provided, however, that compulsory dispositions shall not be applied unless special provisions have been established in this Code.” Supports Art. 218(1), that a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for investigation of an offense, conduct search, seizure or inspection UPON A WARRANT ISSUED BY A JUDGE, and Art. 218(3), that the warrant is issued upon their request. Supports Art. 219(1), that the warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offense, THE ARTICLES TO BE SEIZED or the place, body or articles to be searched, the place or articles to be inspected, the valid period, and a statement that the search, seizure or inspection shall not be commenced after the lapse of that period and that the warrant shall then be returned to the court. Supports Art. 222-2 in full: “Compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts.” Cited for three propositions: that a national code can state as a general rule that a compulsory measure requires a specific statutory provision; that the warrant instrument itself distinguishes what may be seized from what may be searched; and that a system may place the interception power OUTSIDE its general procedure code. The Act to which Art. 222-2 refers was NOT read, and this record supports no claim about its content. The English is a reference translation and the Japanese text has legal effect.

  35. Constitution of Kenya, 2010

    National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  36. Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Kenya)

    Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Kenya) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, retrieved and confirmed. Corroborates that the ODPP is the independent national prosecuting office established by Article 157 of the Constitution, de-linked from the Attorney-General, which decides on and conducts criminal prosecutions. Cited only for the existence and mandate of the office, in support of the constitutional text. WAVE 12 ADDITION, read directly from the consolidated text: Art. 10 makes the national values and principles of governance — including the rule of law, human dignity, equity, social justice, equality, human rights and non-discrimination — binding on all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of them applies or interprets the Constitution, enacts, applies or interprets any law, or makes or implements public policy decisions. Art. 48: The State shall ensure access to justice for all persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede access to justice. Art. 50(1): every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body; Art. 50(2) lists the fair-trial rights of an accused person, beginning with the presumption of innocence. Art. 159(1)-(2): judicial authority is derived from the people and vests in the courts and tribunals; in exercising it they are guided by principles including that justice shall be done to all irrespective of status, that justice shall not be delayed, that alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution shall be promoted, and that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. WAVE 14 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 48 in full — “The State shall ensure access to justice for all persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede access to justice”; Art. 50(1) the right of every person to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body; Art. 50(2)(g) to choose, and be represented by, an advocate, and to be informed of this right promptly; Art. 50(2)(h) to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; Art. 50(2)(m) to have the assistance of an interpreter without payment if the accused person cannot understand the language used at the trial; Art. 50(3) that where the Article requires information to be given to a person, it shall be given in a language that the person understands; Art. 50(5)(b) the right to a copy of the record of proceedings within a reasonable period after they are concluded, “in return for a reasonable fee as prescribed by law”; Art. 50(7) that in the interest of justice a court may allow an intermediary to assist a complainant or an accused person to communicate with the court; Art. 50(9) that Parliament shall enact legislation providing for the protection, rights and welfare of victims of offences; Art. 172(1) that the Judicial Service Commission shall promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent administration of justice, and shall recommend persons for appointment as judges (a), review and make recommendations on conditions of service of judges and judicial officers other than their remuneration and of the staff of the Judiciary (b), appoint, receive complaints against, investigate and remove from office or otherwise discipline registrars, magistrates, other judicial officers and other staff of the Judiciary (c), prepare and implement programmes for continuing education and training of judges and judicial officers (d), and advise the national government on improving the efficiency of the administration of justice (e); and Art. 173 establishing the Judiciary Fund, administered by the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary, used for administrative expenses of the Judiciary, with the Chief Registrar preparing annual estimates for approval by the National Assembly and the expenditure of the Judiciary being a charge on the Consolidated Fund paid directly into the Fund.

  37. Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (1917, current text)

    Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación / official constitutional text · Legislation · 1917-02-05 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (1917), confirmed against the Supreme Court's per-article texts and a current-text mirror in two independent passes (the consolidated official PDF at diputados.gob.mx was unreachable). Supports Art. 17 (federal and local laws shall guarantee the independence of the courts); Art. 40 (a representative, democratic, secular and federal Republic of free and sovereign States and Mexico City); Art. 124 (residual powers reserved to the States or Mexico City); Art. 73-XXI (Congress legislates federal crimes and organized crime, and enacts a single national code of criminal procedure, sentence execution and juvenile justice governing both the federal and the common order); Art. 94 (the Supreme Court of nine Ministers, plus a judicial-administration body and a Judicial Discipline Tribunal); Art. 102-A (the Public Prosecution of the Federation is organised as an autonomous public body, the Fiscalía General de la República); Art. 21 (public security is a shared function of the Federation, the states and the municipalities; the investigation of crimes corresponds to the Public Prosecutor with the police under its conduct and command); Art. 18 (the penitentiary system, organised for social reinsertion); Art. 96 and Art. 116-III (judges elected by direct citizen vote — see the 2024 reform); and Art. 102-B (the human-rights commissions and their non-binding recommendations).

  38. Public Prosecution Service — tasks and organisation

    Openbaar Ministerie (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Public Prosecution Service's own English site, read directly. Supports: the OM's tasks — "supervising the police in the investigation of criminal offences, prosecuting criminal offences and bringing suspected offenders before the courts"; that "the Public Prosecution Service and the courts together make up the judiciary"; and that the OM is governed nationally by the Board of Prosecutors General (College van procureurs-generaal). It establishes that the OM sits within the judiciary rather than being independent of the executive; the Minister's political responsibility is established by the e-Justice source.

  39. Types of legal professions — Netherlands (European e-Justice Portal)

    European Commission (European e-Justice Portal) · International organisation · link verified 2026-07-26

    The European Commission's e-Justice portal page on the Netherlands, read directly. Supports: "The public prosecutor is in charge of investigations"; that at national level the OM is governed by the Board of Prosecutors General in The Hague; and that "political responsibility for the OM lies with the Minister for Justice", who together with the Board decides priorities for investigation and prosecution. An intergovernmental (EU) source describing the Netherlands; it establishes the prosecutor-led investigation and the OM's subordination to ministerial political responsibility.

  40. Crown Law Office (Te Tari Ture o te Karauna) — about us

    Crown Law Office (New Zealand) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Crown Law Office's own site, read directly. Supports that the Attorney-General (a Minister, the senior Law Officer) and the Solicitor-General (the junior Law Officer and chief executive of Crown Law) superintend the prosecution process, that Crown Law's Public Prosecutions Unit oversees Crown and non-Crown prosecutions, and that serious ("Crown") prosecutions are conducted by Crown Solicitors — private-practice lawyers holding the Crown warrant in each main centre. Establishes that New Zealand has a Law-Officer prosecution model rather than a standalone Director of Public Prosecutions. (The verbatim "apolitical"/prosecutor-independence wording appears in the Solicitor-General's Prosecution Guidelines, not on this page.)

  41. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

    National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria (official text host) · Legislation · 1999 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended, the copy carrying amendments through 2011), downloaded as the full official PDF (775,326 bytes, 137 pages) and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports: s 4 and the Second Schedule (the division of legislative power — the Exclusive Legislative List for the Federation, the Concurrent List for both, and residual matters for the States under s 4(7)); Exclusive List item 45 and s 214(1) ("There shall be a police force for Nigeria … no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof" — a single national police); Exclusive List item 48 ("Prisons" — federal corrections); s 6(5) (the superior courts of record — the federal Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Federal High Court and FCT High Court, and the State High Courts, Sharia Courts of Appeal and Customary Courts of Appeal); s 230/233/235 (the Supreme Court as apex, its decisions final); s 237 (the Court of Appeal); s 275/280 (State Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal, headed by a Grand Kadi); s 150/174 (the Attorney-General of the Federation, a Minister and Chief Law Officer, with power to institute, take over or discontinue federal prosecutions) and s 195/211 (each State Attorney-General with the mirror power for state offences); s 215 (the Inspector-General commanding the Nigeria Police Force, with the President's lawful-directions power); s 153 and the Third Schedule (the National Judicial Council, the Police Service Commission and the Nigeria Police Council); and s 81(3)/292 (judicial funding through the NJC and security of tenure). Establishes that Nigeria is a federation in which police and prisons are federal, while courts, prosecution and (residually) criminal law operate at both the federal and state levels.

  42. About the PPS — Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland

    Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

    SCOPE: the PPS's own account of itself. The service's about page, read directly. Supports that the PPS is the principal prosecuting authority in Northern Ireland; that it makes prosecution decisions in cases investigated by the police there and considers cases investigated by other statutory authorities such as HM Revenue and Customs; that it is led by the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland; that the Deputy Director has the same powers as the Director but exercises them subject to the Director's direction and control; and that both posts are public appointments made by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. The current office-holders are named on the page and are NOT republished here.

  43. The Prosecution Authority in Norway (official overview)

    Government of Norway (Ministry of Justice and Public Security file store, regjeringen.no) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    An official government-hosted overview of the Norwegian prosecution, fetched as a PDF; the independence and structure principles were independently corroborated in the verification pass (Norwegian Bar Association and other sources). Supports the three-level structure — the Director of Public Prosecutions (Riksadvokaten), the regional Public Prosecutors (statsadvokatene), and the prosecution authority embedded inside the police (police lawyers holding prosecutorial powers) — and the independence principle: the prosecuting authority makes its own independent decisions, and only the King in Council (not the Minister of Justice) may give it general instructions; the DPP is appointed by the King in Council and directs both the prosecutors and the police districts. NOTE: this is a pre-2019 document that states the outdated figure of 27 police districts; the district count is now 12 (see no-stortinget-reform) and only the independence/structure principles are relied on from it.

  44. Law of 28 January 2016 — Law on the Prosecutor's Office (Prawo o prokuraturze), consolidated

    Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (ISAP / ELI legal-acts service) · Legislation · 2016-01-28 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The consolidated Law on the Prosecutor's Office (Dz.U. 2016 poz. 177), fetched from the Sejm's official ELI service and confirmed verbatim. Supports Art. 1 § 2 — "Prokurator Generalny jest naczelnym organem prokuratury. Urząd Prokuratora Generalnego sprawuje Minister Sprawiedliwości" (the Prosecutor-General is the supreme organ of the prosecution; the office of Prosecutor-General is held by the Minister of Justice) — establishing that the head of the prosecution service is, by statute, the Minister of Justice (a personal union), and that the Prosecutor-General directs the prosecution and is the superior of the prosecutors, assisted by the National Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy). The 1997 Constitution contains no dedicated provision establishing the prosecution; its basis is statutory.

  45. Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (1976, 7th revision 2005) — official English translation

    Assembleia da República (Parliament of Portugal) · Legislation · 1976 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Assembly of the Republic's official English translation of the Constitution (seventh revision, Constitutional Law 1/2005), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted, confirmed verbatim in both passes (the Portuguese text was also fetched). Supports Art. 6 ("the state is unitary"; the Azores and Madeira as autonomous regions), Art. 23 (the Ombudsman / Provedor de Justiça), Art. 164(u) and 165(1)(c)+(p) (the security-forces regime, criminal law, and the organisation of the courts and the Public Prosecution Service reserved to Parliament — and, via Art. 227(1)(b), excluded from regional legislation), Art. 202–204 (the courts as organs of sovereignty, independent, with diffuse constitutional review), Art. 209 (the categories of courts: Supreme Court of Justice, Supreme Administrative Court, Court of Auditors), Art. 217–218 (the High Council for the Judiciary), Art. 219–220 (the Public Prosecution Service — "its own statute and autonomy" — and the Prosecutor General's Office), Art. 221–222 (the Constitutional Court, thirteen judges), and Art. 272(4) ("each such force shall have a sole organisational structure for the whole of Portuguese territory").

  46. About COPFS — Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service

    Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (Scotland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-09-18

    SCOPE: COPFS's own account of its remit. The service's about page, read directly. Supports that it describes itself as “Scotland's prosecution service and death investigation authority”; that death investigations are conducted by COPFS on behalf of the Lord Advocate and cover all sudden, suspicious, accidental and unexplained deaths; and that it has a role in investigating criminal allegations against on-duty police officers. The combination of prosecution, death investigation and police-conduct investigation in one service is what this source establishes; it establishes nothing about how any of them is conducted.

  47. Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Singapore), s 11

    Singapore Statutes Online — Attorney-General's Chambers · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Criminal Procedure Code 2010, section 11, on Singapore Statutes Online. Supports s 11(1) — "The Attorney-General is the Public Prosecutor and has the control and direction of criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code or any other written law" — and s 11(3) (Deputy and Assistant Public Prosecutors act under the Attorney-General's general or special authority). Establishes the statutory designation of the Attorney-General as Public Prosecutor.

  48. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Revised Edition)

    Singapore Statutes Online — Attorney-General's Chambers · Legislation · 1965 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore on the official Singapore Statutes Online (2020 Revised Edition, latest amendment Act 31 of 2024, validity date 9 December 2024), read directly; Articles 35, 94 and 98 re-confirmed verbatim (Art. 35(8) re-confirmed by hand at authoring time). Supports Art. 93 (judicial power vested in a single Supreme Court and subordinate courts — a unitary judiciary); Art. 94 (the Supreme Court consists of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, the latter with an Appellate Division and a General Division, from the 2019/2021 restructuring); Art. 98 (judicial tenure and removal only by a tribunal of Supreme Court judges — independence); and Art. 35 — the Attorney-General is appointed from persons qualified as a Supreme Court judge (35(1)), removable only via a judicial tribunal (35(6)), has the duty to advise the Government (35(7)), and has the power "exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence" (35(8)).

  49. Attorney-General's Chambers (Singapore) — the Public Prosecutor: overview of functions

    Attorney-General's Chambers (Singapore) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Attorney-General's Chambers' own site, read directly. Supports that the Attorney-General, as Public Prosecutor (Constitution Art. 35(8); Criminal Procedure Code s 11), has control over all criminal proceedings, and that the AGC Crime Division works by evaluating the evidence secured by law-enforcement agencies to assess whether an offence is disclosed and then conducting prosecutions in the State Courts and the High Court. Establishes the police-investigate / prosecutor-decides-and-conducts division of labour.

  50. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

    Government of South Africa (gov.za) · Legislation · 1996 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (in force 4 February 1997), fetched from the official gov.za chapters and schedules and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes. Supports s 1(c) and s 2 (constitutional supremacy — "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid"); s 165 (judicial authority vested in independent courts); s 166 (the courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Magistrates' Courts); s 167(3) (the Constitutional Court is "the highest court of the Republic", the apex for all matters since the Seventeenth Amendment); s 178 (the Judicial Service Commission); s 179 (a "single national prosecuting authority", headed by the National Director appointed by the President, exercising its functions without fear, favour or prejudice, with the Justice Minister exercising "final responsibility"); s 181 (the Chapter 9 institutions — the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and others); s 205–207 (a single national police service, the Minister determining national policing policy, the National Commissioner controlling the service, provinces limited to oversight); and Schedules 4 and 5 (which contain no provincial competence over courts, prosecution, prisons or criminal law, only police "to the extent that Chapter 11 confers"). Establishes constitutional supremacy and that all four justice functions are national. WAVE 12 ADDITION, read from the clean digital text published by the Department of Justice at justice.gov.za and corroborated against the gov.za chapter pages: s 9(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; s 33(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, s 33(2) written reasons where rights have been adversely affected, s 33(3) national legislation providing for review by a court or independent and impartial tribunal; s 34 Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum; s 35(2)(b) the right of a detained person to choose and consult a legal practitioner, s 35(2)(c) the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, s 35(2)(d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a court, and s 35(2)(e) to conditions of detention consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment. ACCESS NOTE: the scanned gazette PDF at gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf is an OCR with visible corruption and was rejected as a source; nothing is quoted from it. WAVE 14 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(3)(f) the right of every accused person to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; s 35(3)(k) “to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language”; and s 35(4) that whenever the section requires information to be given to a person, that information must be given in a language that the person understands. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same Department of Justice chapter text: s 35(5) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." As with the Kenyan provision, exclusion is conditional on the effect of admission rather than automatic on the violation. Also read directly from the same chapter text, the whole of s 35(2)(d) and its chapeau: "Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right u2014 u2026 (d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released". Three features of that provision are cited on this platform and each is in the text itself: that the right extends to sentenced prisoners, that the challenge is made in person before a court, and that release is the stated remedy. The provision states no procedure for bringing such a challenge and no time limit, and this record supports no claim about either. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Department of Justice chapter text. Section 37 is the most fully specified emergency clause in this wave, and its detail is the finding. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(1): “37. (1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when— (a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(2)(b): “The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(3): “(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(4): “(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and (b) the legislation— (i) is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to states of emergency; (ii) conforms to subsection (5); and (iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after being enacted.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(5) and the Table of Non-Derogable Rights: “(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise— (a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act; (b) any derogation from this section; or (c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table. Table of Non-Derogable Rights [1 Section number | 2 Section title | 3 Extent to which the right is protected] 9 | Equality | With respect to unfair discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language. 10 | Human Dignity | Entirely 11 | Life | Entirely 12 | Freedom and Security of the person | With respect to subsections (1)(d) and (e) and (2)(c). 13 | Slavery, servitude and forced labour | With respect to slavery and servitude 28 | Children | With respect to: – subsection (1)(d) and (e); – the rights in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of subsection (1)(g); and – subsection 1(i) in respect of children of 15 years and younger. 35 | Arrested, detained and accused persons | With respect to: – subsections (1)(a), (b) and (c) and (2)(d); – the rights in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3), excluding paragraph (d) – subsection (4); and – subsection (5) with respect to the exclusion of evidence if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.37(6)-(8): “(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed: (a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained. (b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the person being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained. (c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a medical practitioner. (d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal representative. (e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. ... (7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person. (8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under international humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.36: “36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”. Supports Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s.201; cf. ss.198(d), 199(6): “201. (1) A member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence. (2) Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence force— (a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in defence of the Republic; or (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation. (3) When the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of— (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force; (b) any place where the force is being employed; (c) the number of people involved; and (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed. (4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.”. Cited for prospective-only effect, the twenty-one-day limit and the escalating extension majorities, validity review by any competent court, the strictly-required test, the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, the absolute bar on indemnifying unlawful acts, and the conditions on detention without trial. It records no state of emergency ever declared under this Constitution and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) read from the South African Government's own published text at gov.za. Supports s. 12(1)-(2) (freedom and security of the person, including not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, not to be detained without trial, freedom from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, and not to be tortured or treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; and bodily and psychological integrity, including security in and control over one's body and freedom from medical or scientific experiments without informed consent). Supports s. 14 verbatim: “Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Note what this provision does NOT contain, which the page relying on it states: no warrant requirement and no authorisation rule of any kind. Supports s. 35(1) (rights of arrested persons, including (a) to remain silent; (b) to be informed promptly of the right to remain silent AND of the consequences of not remaining silent; (c) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 48 hours after arrest, or the end of the first court day after the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a non-court day; (e) and (f)). Supports s. 35(2) (rights of detained persons, including prompt information of the reason, choice of and consultation with a legal practitioner and prompt information of that right, state-assigned counsel where substantial injustice would otherwise result, and the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and be released if it is unlawful). Supports s. 35(3) (fair-trial rights, including (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; (b) adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) a public trial before an ordinary court; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence; (j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; (k) to be tried in a language the accused understands or to have the proceedings interpreted). Supports s. 36(1)-(2), the general limitation clause: rights may be limited “only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”, and that except as provided in s. 36(1) or elsewhere in the Constitution, no law may limit any entrenched right. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that ss. 12, 14 and 35 are worded “Everyone” while political rights under s. 19 are for “every citizen”. Constitutional text only: no Constitutional Court decision, no statute, and nothing about any other country.

  51. National Prosecuting Authority (South Africa) — the Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC)

    National Prosecuting Authority (South Africa) · Government publication · 2024-08-19 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The National Prosecuting Authority's account of the Investigating Directorate Against Corruption, confirmed in two passes (NPA Amendment Act 10 of 2024, commenced 19 August 2024). Supports that the temporary Investigating Directorate was converted into a permanent Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC) inside the NPA, with its own investigators for serious corruption. Cited, by attribution, for the enacted change; commentary on whether IDAC is sufficiently independent is contested and attributed to its sources, not stated as fact.

  52. Supreme Prosecutors' Office of the Republic of Korea — official site (English)

    Supreme Prosecutors' Office (검찰청, Republic of Korea) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Prosecution Service's own English site, read directly. Supports that the Prosecutor General (검찰총장, Geomchal Chongjang) "handles all affairs and directs all staff members of the Prosecutors' Offices", and the structure of "1 Supreme Prosecutors' Office, 6 High Prosecutors' Offices, 18 District Prosecutors' Offices and 42 Branch Prosecutors' Offices". The placement of the service under the Ministry of Justice is established from the Government Organization Act / Prosecutors' Office Act (this page does not itself state it).

  53. Korea Herald — Cabinet approves bill to dismantle the Prosecution Service by October 2026

    The Korea Herald · Journalism · 2025-09-30 · link verified 2026-07-27

    Korea Herald reporting, read directly and independently re-fetched in verification, on the enacted 2025 restructuring of the prosecution. Cited, by attribution and with dates, that the Cabinet approved on 30 September 2025 an amendment to the Government Organization Act splitting the Prosecution Service's powers into an investigative agency under the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and a separate indictment office within the Ministry of Justice; that the Supreme Prosecutors' Office would be abolished on 1 October 2026 after a one-year grace period, with the new agencies beginning the following day; and that this ends the service "some 78 years after its establishment". Used to record the reform neutrally as enacted-but-not-yet-effective; the primary gazette and implementing statutes were not fetchable (the Library of Congress Global Legal Monitor page was bot-walled).

  54. Constitución Española de 1978

    Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe.es), BOE-A-1978-31229 · Legislation · 1978-12-29 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The authoritative Castilian text, read in full. Supports: art. 2 (the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation and the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions); art. 137 (the State organised into municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities); art. 145.1 ('En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas' — federation is constitutionally forbidden, so Spain is a decentralised UNITARY state); art. 148 (competences the Communities MAY assume) and art. 149.1 (the State's EXCLUSIVE competences), including art. 149.1.6 ('Legislación mercantil, penal y penitenciaria; legislación procesal' — criminal, penitentiary and procedural LEGISLATION is exclusively the State's), art. 149.1.5 (Administration of Justice), and art. 149.1.29 (public security, 'sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de creación de policías por las Comunidades Autónomas' — the basis for autonomous police); art. 104 (security forces under the Government); art. 117.5 ('El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales' — judicial unity); art. 122 (the Consejo General del Poder Judicial as the judiciary's governing body); art. 123 (the Tribunal Supremo, 'con jurisdicción en toda España, es el órgano jurisdiccional superior en todos los órdenes'); art. 124 (the Ministerio Fiscal, national, acting under unidad de actuación y dependencia jerárquica); art. 152.1 (a Tribunal Superior de Justicia culminating the judicial organisation in each community, without prejudice to the Supreme Court); and arts. 24-25 (due-process and penal principles). WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authoritative Castilian text. Supports art. 53.1, that the rights and liberties recognised in Chapter Two bind all public powers and may be regulated only by law respecting their essential content, protected in accordance with art. 161.1.a); and art. 53.2 in terms: "Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional" — protection is sought first before the ORDINARY courts by a preferential and summary procedure, and where appropriate thereafter by amparo before the Constitutional Court. Supports art. 54, that an organic law regulates the Defensor del Pueblo as high commissioner of the Cortes Generales for the defence of the rights in that Title, who may supervise the activity of the Administration and reports to the Cortes. Cited for the SEQUENCE — ordinary courts first, constitutional court where appropriate — and not for any claim about admissibility criteria or outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authoritative Castilian text on the BOE. Spain writes the emergency architecture into the constitution itself in more detail than almost any system in this wave. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(1): “1. Una ley orgánica regulará los estados de alarma, de excepción y de sitio, y las competencias y limitaciones correspondientes.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(2), (3) and (4): “2. El estado de alarma será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros por un plazo máximo de quince días, dando cuenta al Congreso de los Diputados, reunido inmediatamente al efecto y sin cuya autorización no podrá ser prorrogado dicho plazo. El decreto determinará el ámbito territorial a que se extienden los efectos de la declaración. 3. El estado de excepción será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, previa autorización del Congreso de los Diputados. La autorización y proclamación del estado de excepción deberá determinar expresamente los efectos del mismo, el ámbito territorial a que se extiende y su duración, que no podrá exceder de treinta días, prorrogables por otro plazo igual, con los mismos requisitos. 4. El estado de sitio será declarado por la mayoría absoluta del Congreso de los Diputados, a propuesta exclusiva del Gobierno. El Congreso determinará su ámbito territorial, duración y condiciones.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 55(1): “1. Los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 17, 18, apartados 2 y 3, artículos 19, 20, apartados 1, a) y d), y 5, artículos 21, 28, apartado 2, y artículo 37, apartado 2, podrán ser suspendidos cuando se acuerde la declaración del estado de excepción o de sitio en los términos previstos en la Constitución. Se exceptúa de lo establecido anteriormente el apartado 3 del artículo 17 para el supuesto de declaración de estado de excepción.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(5); cf. Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 1.Cuatro ("La declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio no interrumpe el normal funcionamiento de los poderes constitucionales del Estado."): “5. No podrá procederse a la disolución del Congreso mientras estén declarados algunos de los estados comprendidos en el presente artículo, quedando automáticamente convocadas las Cámaras si no estuvieren en período de sesiones. Su funcionamiento, así como el de los demás poderes constitucionales del Estado, no podrán interrumpirse durante la vigencia de estos estados. Disuelto el Congreso o expirado su mandato, si se produjere alguna de las situaciones que dan lugar a cualquiera de dichos estados, las competencias del Congreso serán asumidas por su Diputación Permanente.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 117(5)-(6); Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 35 ("En la declaración del estado de sitio el Congreso de los Diputados podrá determinar los delitos que durante su vigencia quedan sometidos a la Jurisdicción Militar."): “5. El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales. La ley regulará el ejercicio de la jurisdicción militar en el ámbito estrictamente castrense y en los supuestos de estado de sitio, de acuerdo con los principios de la Constitución. 6. Se prohíben los Tribunales de excepción.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, the closed list of suspendable rights and the express bar on suspension under the estado de alarma, the institutional-continuity guarantee, and the confinement of military jurisdiction. It records no declaration and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same BOE consolidated text, article by article. Supports Art. 17(1)-(4): “1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad. Nadie puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de lo establecido en este artículo y en los casos y en la forma previstos en la ley. 2. La detención preventiva no podrá durar más del tiempo estrictamente necesario para la realización de las averiguaciones tendentes al esclarecimiento de los hechos, y, en todo caso, en el plazo máximo de setenta y dos horas, el detenido deberá ser puesto en libertad o a disposición de la autoridad judicial. 3. Toda persona detenida debe ser informada de forma inmediata, y de modo que le sea comprensible, de sus derechos y de las razones de su detención, no pudiendo ser obligada a declarar. Se garantiza la asistencia de abogado al detenido en las diligencias policiales y judiciales, en los términos que la ley establezca. 4. La ley regulará un procedimiento de «habeas corpus» [...]” Supports Art. 18(1)-(4): “1. Se garantiza el derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen. 2. El domicilio es inviolable. Ninguna entrada o registro podrá hacerse en él sin consentimiento del titular o resolución judicial, salvo en caso de flagrante delito. 3. Se garantiza el secreto de las comunicaciones y, en especial, de las postales, telegráficas y telefónicas, salvo resolución judicial. 4. La ley limitará el uso de la informática para garantizar el honor y la intimidad personal y familiar de los ciudadanos y el pleno ejercicio de sus derechos.” Supports Art. 19, and specifically its rights-holder wording: “Los españoles tienen derecho a elegir libremente su residencia y a circular por el territorio nacional” — against Art. 17(1)'s “Toda persona”. Supports Art. 24(1)-(2), including the right to effective judicial protection without indefensión, and the rights “al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción de inocencia”. Supports Art. 24(1) verbatim, including the phrase quoted on the equality-of-arms page: “1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión.” Supports Art. 53(1) AND 53(2): “1. Los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Capítulo segundo del presente Título vinculan a todos los poderes públicos. Sólo por ley, que en todo caso deberá respetar su contenido esencial, podrá regularse el ejercicio de tales derechos y libertades, que se tutelarán de acuerdo con lo previsto en el artículo 161, 1, a). 2. Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional.” Constitutional text only — no decision of the Tribunal Constitucional, no provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, nothing about any other country.

  55. The role of a prosecutor

    Åklagarmyndigheten (Swedish Prosecution Authority) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Prosecution Authority's own English page, read directly and re-confirmed. Supports: that "Sweden's prosecutors are independent when they make decisions such as whether to file a prosecution or place someone under arrest"; that "the Swedish Government has no powers to intervene in a public authority's decisions in specific matters relating to the application of the law", which it attributes to the Instrument of Government; the prosecutor's three tasks ("to lead investigations, to bring prosecutions, and to appear in court"); the duty of objectivity; and the direction of the police ("a prosecutor leads investigations and decides which inquiries the police should make"). Establishes the case-insulated independence of the prosecution and prosecutor-led investigation.

  56. The Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen, SFS 1974:152), 2023 English edition

    Sveriges riksdag (Parliament of Sweden) · Legislation · 1974 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The Instrument of Government, the central one of Sweden's four fundamental laws, fetched as the riksdagen.se official English-edition PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by me and in the verification pass). Supports: Ch. 1 Art. 3 (the four fundamental laws — the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression); Ch. 1 Art. 8 (courts for the administration of justice, administrative authorities for public administration); Ch. 11 Art. 1 (two branches — general courts up to the Supreme Court, and general administrative courts up to the Supreme Administrative Court); Ch. 11 Art. 3 (judicial independence); Ch. 11 Art. 14 (every court reviews whether a provision conflicts with fundamental law — diffuse constitutional review, no constitutional court); Ch. 12 Art. 1 (administrative authorities come under the Government unless under the Riksdag); Ch. 12 Art. 2 — the defining provision — "No public authority, including the Riksdag … may determine how an administrative authority shall decide in a particular case relating to the exercise of public authority vis-à-vis an individual … or relating to the application of law" (the prohibition on ministerstyre); and Ch. 13 Art. 6 (the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, elected by the Riksdag). The authoritative text is Swedish. WAVE 20 ADDITION. PROVENANCE, stated precisely because this record's url and title are the English edition: every Swedish passage quoted below was read at the Riksdag's consolidated Svensk författningssamling text of kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform. The English-edition PDF at this record's url carries no Swedish wording, and the Swedish is the text with legal effect. Chapter 15 is the whole of Sweden's constitutional emergency provision, and its scope is the finding. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 1 § (Lag 2010:1408): “Kommer riket i krig eller krigsfara ska regeringen eller talmannen kalla riksdagen till sammanträde. Den som utfärdar kallelsen kan besluta att riksdagen ska sammanträda någon annanstans än i Stockholm.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 2 § första och andra styckena (Lag 2010:1408): “Är riket i krig eller krigsfara, ska en inom riksdagen utsedd krigsdelegation träda i riksdagens ställe, om förhållandena kräver det. Om riket är i krig, meddelas beslut att krigsdelegationen ska träda i riksdagens ställe av Utrikesnämndens ledamöter enligt närmare bestämmelser i riksdagsordningen. Innan beslut meddelas ska samråd ske med statsministern, om det är möjligt. Hindras nämndens ledamöter av krigsförhållandena att sammanträda, meddelas beslutet av regeringen. Om riket är i krigsfara, meddelas beslutet av Utrikesnämndens ledamöter i förening med statsministern. För ett sådant beslut krävs att statsministern och sex av nämndens ledamöter röstar för det.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 3 § (Lag 2010:1408): “Medan krigsdelegationen är i riksdagens ställe utövar den riksdagens befogenheter. Den får dock inte fatta beslut som avses i 11 § första stycket första meningen eller andra eller fjärde stycket. Krigsdelegationen beslutar själv om formerna för sin verksamhet.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 2 § tredje stycket (Lag 2010:1408): “Krigsdelegationen och regeringen kan i samråd eller var för sig besluta att riksdagen ska återta sina befogenheter. Beslutet ska fattas så snart förhållandena medger det.”. Supports Regeringsformen 2 kap. 11 § första stycket: “Domstol får inte inrättas för en redan begången gärning och inte heller för en viss tvist eller i övrigt för ett visst mål.”. Supports Regeringsformen 15 kap. 11 §: “Är riket i krig, får val till riksdagen hållas endast efter beslut av riksdagen. Är riket i krigsfara, när ordinarie val ska hållas, kan riksdagen besluta att skjuta upp valet.”. Cited for the War Delegation mechanism, its carve-outs and the constitutional duty to hand power back as soon as conditions permit, and for the prohibition on constituting a court for a particular case. Chapter 15 addresses WAR and DANGER OF WAR; this record establishes nothing about a peacetime state of emergency, and Sweden's peacetime arrangements rest on ordinary statute cited separately. It supports no claim about any other country.

  57. Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (StPO / CPP / CPP) of 5 October 2007 (SR 312.0)

    Swiss Confederation — Fedlex (fedlex.admin.ch) · Legislation · 2007-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The unified federal Criminal Procedure Code (equally authentic in German, French and Italian; English is a reference translation). In force since 1 January 2011, it replaced the former 26 separate cantonal codes of criminal procedure. Supports art. 1 (it governs prosecution and adjudication by the federal AND cantonal criminal-justice authorities of offences under federal law) and art. 22 (the cantonal criminal authorities prosecute and judge federal criminal offences, subject to the legal exceptions) — the basis for prosecution being cantonal by default. Its enactment on the basis of Constitution art. 123 para 1 illustrates federal law, cantonal administration.

  58. Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

    Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the enacted constitutional text) · Legislation · 1791-12-15 · link verified 2026-07-24

    Verbatim text: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' Supports the reserved-powers structure of US federalism — that the states, not the federal government, hold residual authority. Cornell LII reproduces the enacted text; the constitutional text itself is authoritative. Does NOT support any claim about how a particular power is allocated in practice.

  59. Prosecution (National Census of State Court Prosecutors)

    Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24

    Supports that the chief state-court prosecutor is 'also referred to as the district attorney, county attorney, commonwealth attorney, or state's attorney', represents the state in criminal cases, serves in the executive branch of state government, is 'answerable to the public as an elected or appointed public official', and is afforded broad charging discretion. Supports that local prosecution titles and selection methods VARY and are not uniformly 'district attorney'. Does NOT support a figure for how many are elected versus appointed.

  60. 28 U.S. Code §§ 541 and 547 (United States attorneys: appointment and duties)

    Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Verbatim: § 541 — 'The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a United States attorney for each judicial district', for a four-year term, subject to removal by the President. § 547 — each U.S. attorney shall 'prosecute for all offenses against the United States' within the district. Supports that federal prosecutors are Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, one per federal judicial district, prosecuting FEDERAL offences only. Does NOT support any claim about state or local prosecutors, who are separately organised.