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Justice

Does every case follow the same route from report to outcome?

No, and the familiar route is wrong at almost every step. Most matters leave before a court, most sentences are not custodial, and in several systems the prosecutor is legally responsible for the investigation rather than receiving a finished file.

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In short

Accounts of criminal justice usually describe a line: an offence is reported, police investigate, a prosecutor charges, a jury decides, a prison follows. It is a serviceable picture of one branch of one kind of case in some systems. As a description of how justice systems work, almost every link in it is wrong somewhere.

Why it exists

AnalysisThe linear picture is not merely incomplete. It teaches a reader to expect a court where there will be none, to treat an outcome without a conviction as a failure, and to assume that institutions in other countries do the same jobs under different names. Each of those is a specific error with consequences for how a person reads news about a case.

How it works

Take the steps in order. First, that police investigate and then hand a file to a prosecutor. Section 160 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure places responsibility for investigating on the public prosecution office, which must ascertain not only incriminating but also exonerating circumstances. The prosecutor is not the recipient of an investigation there; the prosecutor is legally responsible for it.

AnalysisSecond, that a charge follows an investigation. It frequently does not. A matter may close without a suspect, close without sufficient evidence, be discontinued on a basis the law provides, be diverted, or be dealt with by an administrative penalty. Whether the prosecutor even has the choice differs: some systems make prosecution a duty subject to statutory exceptions, others a discretion structured by tests.

AnalysisThird, that a court means a jury. Juries do not exist in most systems described on this site, and where they do they sit in a minority of cases. Professional judges, lay judges and mixed panels all appear among functioning systems, which is why "trial" is a word covering unlike things.

Fourth, that conviction means custody. German law directs that on a custodial sentence of not more than one year the court suspends execution on probation where the statutory expectation is made out, and permits suspension up to two years where special circumstances are present. A custodial term can be imposed and never executed.

Fifth, that the criminal route is the route. Kenya’s Article 159(2) directs that in exercising judicial authority the courts shall be guided by principles including that alternative forms of dispute resolution — reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms — shall be promoted. England and Wales excludes acting as a mediator from "legal activity" altogether under the Legal Services Act, placing it outside the regulated category rather than inside it.

AnalysisSixth, that the process ends. Appeal, review and retrial send decided matters back to courts, and in systems with an execution court, decisions taken during a sentence are judicial too. The shape is not a line with an end but a graph with loops, and the loops are the mechanisms by which a legal order corrects itself.

Common misconceptions

Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.

  • Common belief: A case that ends without a charge is a case the system failed on.

    In practice: Ending is one of the outcomes the arrangement provides for. A system that charged everything reported would be applying no standard at the point where a standard matters most.

  • Common belief: The prosecutor receives the police investigation and decides what to do with it.

    In practice: In Germany the public prosecution office is responsible for investigating and must ascertain exonerating as well as incriminating circumstances. Where investigative responsibility sits is a question of law, and it is answered differently.

  • Common belief: A criminal conviction means a prison sentence.

    In practice: German law requires suspension of execution on a custodial sentence of not more than one year where the statutory expectation is made out, and permits it up to two years on special circumstances. A term can be fixed and never carried out.

  • Common belief: Courts are where disputes go.

    In practice: Kenya’s constitution directs courts to promote reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution as guiding principles of judicial authority. Adjudication is one route among several that a system may provide.

  • Common belief: Once a court has decided, the case is over.

    In practice: Appeal, review and retrial return matters to courts, and where an execution court exists, decisions taken while a sentence runs are judicial. The loops are how a legal order corrects itself.

How this varies between jurisdictions

A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.

Six points where the familiar line breaks, and where this site sets out the evidence.

  • Who investigates, and under whose legal responsibility — Germany, StPO § 160.
  • Whether charging is a duty or a discretion, and what test applies.
  • What a court is: professional judges, lay judges, mixed panels, juries.
  • Whether a custodial term is executed at all — Germany, StGB § 56.
  • Whether the matter belongs in a criminal court — Kenya, Art. 159(2).
  • Whether the decision is final, or returns on appeal, review or during execution.

Rights and accountability

AnalysisThe branches matter to a reader because they determine which safeguards apply. A matter resolved by an administrative penalty has not passed through the protections that attach to a criminal trial, and a person diverted from prosecution has not been convicted of anything. Knowing which route a matter took is how you know what standard it was held to.

AnalysisIt also disciplines comparison. Two systems that appear to reach different outcomes may be routing the same conduct through different parts of their arrangements, and a comparison that assumed a single path would attribute to severity what is actually a difference in classification.

What we could not establish

  • This page assembles findings established elsewhere on this site, each from primary text. It introduces no new evidence and describes no system in full.
  • The exceptions listed are examples of branching, not a taxonomy of every route a case may take. Systems contain routes that this corpus has not researched.

Where to go next

Related: how a justice system works, how justice institutions work together, and what is due process.

  • What actually passes between the institutions in a justice system?

    A case, a file and a person — and not the authority to decide. The handoffs are designed so that each body receives the work without inheriting the powers of the one before it, which is what makes the separations more than an org chart.

  • What is justice?

    Justice is the principle that people should be treated according to rules that apply equally to everyone, decided by bodies that are authorised, constrained, and answerable. This guide explains what that means institutionally.

  • What is due process?

    Due process is the requirement that the state follow fair, established procedures before it takes action against a person. This guide explains what it typically includes and how it differs between systems.

Sources

  1. Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 160 — Pflicht zur Sachverhaltsaufklärung (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports § 160(1): once the Staatsanwaltschaft learns of a suspected offence it must investigate the facts in order to decide whether to bring a public charge; and § 160(2): it must investigate exculpatory as well as incriminating circumstances and secure evidence. Supports the allocation of investigative responsibility and the objectivity duty. Does NOT support any description of investigative technique, thresholds, or practice.

  2. Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) § 56 — Strafaussetzung (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26

    The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 56(1): on a conviction to a custodial sentence of not more than one year the court suspends execution of the sentence on probation ("setzt … die Vollstreckung der Strafe zur Bewährung aus") where it is to be expected that the convicted person will let the conviction itself serve as a warning and will commit no further offences even without the influence of imprisonment, having regard in particular to the personality of the convicted person, their prior life, the circumstances of the act, conduct after the act, their circumstances of life, and the effects to be expected from suspension. And § 56(2): the court may suspend a higher custodial sentence not exceeding two years where, on an overall appraisal of the act and the personality of the convicted person, special circumstances are present, with the convicted person's efforts to make good the damage caused expressly among the considerations. Cited for the existence and structure of suspended sentences in German law. It establishes no practice, no frequency, and nothing about any other system.

  3. Table 35-10-0154-01 — Average counts of adults in provincial and territorial correctional programs

    Statistics Canada (www150.statcan.gc.ca) · Government publication · 2025 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The official Statistics Canada data cube (English; French equally authoritative), read from the primary CSV download. Supports the corrections restricted claim: for fiscal year 2023/2024, the Provinces-and-Territories average daily count of adults in custody ('actual-in') was 25,349.8 — remand 19,334.5, sentenced 5,895.1, other 120.2. These are PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL counts only (they EXCLUDE federal custody, i.e. sentences of two years or more administered by Correctional Service Canada) and are average daily counts over the fiscal year, not a single-day snapshot. Supports no federal figure and no cross-country comparison.

  4. Constitution of Kenya, 2010

    National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.

  5. Legal Services Act 2007 (2007 c. 29), sections 12 and 13 — reserved legal activities and entitlement to carry them on

    The National Archives (legislation.gov.uk) · Legislation · 2007 · link verified 2026-08-26

    The official revised text of both sections, read directly (s. 13 at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/section/13). Supports s. 12(1): "reserved legal activity" means the exercise of a right of audience; the conduct of litigation; reserved instrument activities; probate activities; notarial activities; and the administration of oaths — six named activities, with Schedule 2 making provision about what constitutes each. Supports s. 12(3): "legal activity" means an activity that is a reserved legal activity as originally enacted, and any other activity consisting of the provision of legal advice or assistance in connection with the application of the law or any form of resolution of legal disputes, or the provision of representation in connection with any such matter. Supports s. 12(4): "legal activity" does not include any activity of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, including acting as a mediator. Supports s. 13(1): whether a person is entitled to carry on a reserved legal activity is to be determined solely in accordance with the provisions of the Act; and s. 13(2): a person is entitled where they are an authorised person, or an exempt person, in relation to that activity. Both provisions are extent-marked "E+W". This is the law of ENGLAND AND WALES; it supports nothing about Scotland or Northern Ireland, which have separate arrangements, and nothing about any other country. It supports no claim about which bodies authorise, about qualification routes, or about the professional titles used.