Justice
What actually passes between the institutions in a justice system?
A case, a file and a person — and not the authority to decide. The handoffs are designed so that each body receives the work without inheriting the powers of the one before it, which is what makes the separations more than an org chart.
In short
A justice system is a set of institutions that pass work to one another. What passes is concrete: a case, the material gathered about it, and frequently a person. What does not pass is the authority to decide, and that is the design rather than an omission.
Why it exists
AnalysisSeparation of function is easy to state and easy to hollow out. If a body could investigate, decide to prosecute and adjudicate, dividing it into three departments would change nothing. What makes the separation real is that each institution receives the work under its own legal authority, applies its own test, and cannot exercise the powers of the one before it.
How it works
Start with the first transfer, and notice that in some systems there is not one. Section 160 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure places responsibility for investigating on the public prosecution office and requires it to ascertain exonerating as well as incriminating circumstances. Where the law is drafted that way, the prosecutor did not receive the investigation — the prosecutor is answerable for it.
The second transfer is the file, and it is the one that is regulated most explicitly. German law grants defence counsel access to the files and to officially held evidence, permits refusal where access would endanger an ongoing investigation, and then requires access anyway once defined stages are reached. That is a handoff with a condition and a deadline attached, rather than a matter of professional cooperation.
AnalysisThe third transfer is to adjudication, and here the design is that almost nothing transfers except the case itself. The court receives the matter and applies its own standard; it does not inherit the prosecutor’s view of it, and the prosecutor’s decision that a case should be brought establishes nothing about whether it is proved. This is why the presumption of innocence is not in tension with a charging decision — the two answer different questions.
The fourth transfer is to execution, and Brazil shows how many bodies can be involved. Article 61 of the Lei de Execução Penal lists the organs of penal execution, and they include the Juízo da Execução, the Ministério Público, the Conselho Penitenciário and the penitentiary departments. A sentence does not pass from a court to a prison; it passes into an arrangement with a court still inside it.
Running alongside all of these is a set of bodies that receive nothing and decide nothing about any case. Kenya’s Judicial Service Commission promotes and facilitates the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the administration of justice, appoints and disciplines judicial officers and staff, and advises on efficiency — none of which is deciding a case. The international minimum standards for detention require inspection by a body independent of the prison administration, for the same reason: examining how an institution used its powers is a different function from exercising them.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: Each institution hands the next one its conclusions.
In practice: It hands over the case and, subject to rules, the material. The next body applies its own test under its own authority. A prosecutor’s decision that a case should be brought establishes nothing about whether it is proved.
Common belief: The police investigation is always complete before a prosecutor is involved.
In practice: Section 160 of the German code places responsibility for investigating on the public prosecution office, including ascertaining exonerating circumstances. Where investigative responsibility sits is a question of law and it varies.
Common belief: Once a sentence is passed, the courts are finished with the case.
In practice: Brazil’s execution statute lists the Juízo da Execução among the organs of penal execution, alongside the prosecution service, a penitentiary council and the penitentiary departments.
Common belief: An oversight body can overturn a decision you disagree with.
In practice: Oversight examines how institutions used their powers. Changing an outcome is what appeal and review are for, and confusing the two sends a question to a body with no power to answer it.
Common belief: Institutions cooperating closely is a sign the system is working well.
In practice: The separations exist so that each body forms its own judgment. Close cooperation is necessary for the work to move at all, and it is also the direction in which the separations erode.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Three questions to ask about any handoff in any system.
- What passes — the case, the material, the person, or all three?
- What is withheld, on what condition, and when does the condition expire?
- What authority does the receiving body exercise, and whose test does it apply?
Rights and accountability
AnalysisThe handoffs are where a person’s rights are most exposed, because responsibility can appear to sit with whoever had the case last. Rules that name what must be disclosed, and when, are how a system stops a right from falling into a gap between two institutions.
They also determine where to direct a question. Which body holds a matter now, and which held it when something went wrong, are different questions with different answers — and for anything concerning conditions in a closed institution, the international standards treat independent inspection as the mechanism precisely because the people affected cannot readily be heard.
What we could not establish
- This page describes the structure of handoffs using provisions established elsewhere on this site. It describes no country’s process end to end and introduces no new evidence.
- How information actually moves between institutions — case-management systems, records, timeliness — was not researched and is not described.
Where to go next
Related: how a justice system works, there is no single path, and why justice systems need oversight.
Related topics
- Does every case follow the same route from report to outcome?
No, and the familiar route is wrong at almost every step. Most matters leave before a court, most sentences are not custodial, and in several systems the prosecutor is legally responsible for the investigation rather than receiving a finished file.
- Why do justice systems need oversight?
Justice institutions hold coercive powers, often operate out of public view, and make decisions that are hard to reverse. This guide explains the oversight mechanisms built to detect and correct errors, and their limits.
- What is justice?
Justice is the principle that people should be treated according to rules that apply equally to everyone, decided by bodies that are authorised, constrained, and answerable. This guide explains what that means institutionally.
Where this connects
Institutions: Prosecution service, Correctional service.
Sources
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 160 — Pflicht zur Sachverhaltsaufklärung (German original text)
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24
Authoritative German text. Supports § 160(1): once the Staatsanwaltschaft learns of a suspected offence it must investigate the facts in order to decide whether to bring a public charge; and § 160(2): it must investigate exculpatory as well as incriminating circumstances and secure evidence. Supports the allocation of investigative responsibility and the objectivity duty. Does NOT support any description of investigative technique, thresholds, or practice.
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26
The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 147(1): defence counsel is entitled to inspect the files that are before the court, or that would be submitted to it on the preferment of charges, and to view officially held items of evidence. § 147(2): where the conclusion of the investigation is not yet noted in the files, inspection of the files or parts of them may be REFUSED so far as this may endanger the purpose of the investigation — and where those conditions apply and the accused is in remand detention, or it has been applied for on provisional arrest, the information essential for assessing the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty must be made accessible in a suitable manner, access to the files being granted as a rule ("in der Regel ist insoweit Akteneinsicht zu gewähren"). Cited for the right, its limit, and the limit on that limit. It supports no claim about how access operates in practice, and none about any other country.
Lei nº 7.210, de 11 de julho de 1984 (Lei de Execução Penal)
Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1984-07-11 · link verified 2026-07-25
The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. Supports the corrections framework: penal execution 'tem por objetivo efetivar as disposições de sentença ou decisão criminal e proporcionar condições para a harmônica integração social do condenado' (Art. 1); the órgãos da execução penal include the Juízo da Execução, the Ministério Público, the Conselho Penitenciário and the Departamentos Penitenciários (Art. 61); the Departamento Penitenciário Nacional is 'subordinado ao Ministério da Justiça' as the federal executive body (Art. 71); and the 'Departamento Penitenciário local, ou órgão similar, tem por finalidade supervisionar e coordenar os estabelecimentos penais da Unidade da Federação a que pertencer' (Art. 74) — i.e. each state runs its own prisons. Portuguese authoritative. Does not by itself carry the DEPEN→SENAPPEN renaming (2023) or any statistic.
National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime · International organisation · 2015 · link verified 2026-07-23
Supports the internationally agreed minimum standards for the treatment of people in detention, including the requirement of independent inspection of prisons. Standards, not a description of conditions in any particular prison system. WAVE 17 ADDITION, read from the primary UNODC PDF, text-extracted locally. Supports Rule 83(1): "There shall be a twofold system for regular inspections of prisons and penal services: (a) Internal or administrative inspections conducted by the central prison administration; (b) External inspections conducted by a body independent of the prison administration, which may include competent international or regional bodies"; and Rule 83(2): that in both cases the objective is to ensure prisons are managed in accordance with existing laws, regulations, policies and procedures, with a view to bringing about the objectives of penal and corrections services, and that the rights of prisoners are protected. Supports Rule 84(1): inspectors shall have authority to access all information on the numbers of prisoners and places and locations of detention and all information relevant to the treatment of prisoners including their records and conditions of detention; "to freely choose which prisons to visit, including by making unannounced visits at their own initiative, and which prisoners to interview"; to conduct private and fully confidential interviews with prisoners and prison staff; and to make recommendations to the prison administration and other competent authorities. Supports Rule 84(2): external inspection teams shall be composed of qualified and experienced inspectors appointed by a competent authority and shall encompass health-care professionals, with due regard to balanced gender representation. Supports Rule 85(1): every inspection shall be followed by a written report to the competent authority, with due consideration given to making external inspection reports publicly available excluding personal data unless the prisoner has given explicit consent; and Rule 85(2): the administration or other competent authorities shall indicate within a reasonable time whether they will implement the recommendations. Supports Rule 54: on admission every prisoner shall be promptly provided with written information about the prison law and regulations, their rights including authorized methods of seeking information and access to legal advice and procedures for making requests or complaints, their obligations including applicable disciplinary sanctions, and all other matters necessary to adapt to prison life; and Rule 55: that this information shall be available in the most commonly used languages, with interpretation assistance where the prisoner understands none of them, conveyed orally to an illiterate prisoner, and provided appropriately to prisoners with sensory disabilities. Supports Rule 56: every prisoner shall have the opportunity each day to make requests or complaints to the prison director or an authorized staff member; that it shall be possible to make them to the inspector of prisons during inspections, with the opportunity to talk to the inspector "freely and in full confidentiality, without the director or other members of the staff being present"; that every prisoner shall be allowed to make a request or complaint regarding their treatment "without censorship as to substance" to the central prison administration and to the judicial or other competent authorities including those vested with reviewing or remedial power; and that these rights extend to the prisoner's legal adviser and, failing that, to a family member or other person with knowledge of the case. Supports Rule 57: every request or complaint shall be promptly dealt with and replied to without delay, and if rejected or unduly delayed the complainant shall be entitled to bring it before a judicial or other authority; that safeguards shall ensure requests can be made safely and confidentially where requested, and that a complainant "must not be exposed to any risk of retaliation, intimidation or other negative consequences"; and that allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment shall be dealt with immediately and result in a prompt and impartial investigation by an independent national authority. Supports Rule 87: that before the completion of the sentence it is desirable that the necessary steps be taken to ensure for the prisoner a gradual return to life in society.