Once a measure is authorised, what bounds it — and is the person ever told?

Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 100e — Verfahren bei Maßnahmen nach den §§ 100a bis 100c (German original text)

Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. This record carries the wave’s authorisation and duration findings for Germany. Supports § 100e(1): measures under § 100a “dürfen nur auf Antrag der Staatsanwaltschaft durch das Gericht angeordnet werden”; “Bei Gefahr im Verzug kann die Anordnung auch durch die Staatsanwaltschaft getroffen werden”; and “Soweit die Anordnung der Staatsanwaltschaft nicht binnen drei Werktagen von dem Gericht bestätigt wird, tritt sie außer Kraft.” The order is limited to a maximum of three months, extendable by not more than three months at a time „soweit die Voraussetzungen der Anordnung unter Berücksichtigung der gewonnenen Ermittlungsergebnisse fortbestehen“ — so far as the conditions of the order persist in the light of the investigation results obtained. Supports § 100e(2): measures under §§ 100b and 100c may be ordered only on application of the prosecution office BY THE CHAMBER OF THE LANDGERICHT named in § 74a(4) GVG; where there is danger in delay the presiding judge may order, lapsing unless the chamber confirms within three working days; the order is limited to a maximum of ONE month, extendable by not more than one month at a time; and once the duration has been extended to six months in total, further extensions are decided by the OBERLANDESGERICHT. Supports § 100e(3): the order is issued IN WRITING and its operative part must state, so far as possible, the name and address of the person against whom the measure is directed; the alleged offence; the type, extent, duration and end-point of the measure; the type of information to be collected and its significance for the proceedings; and, for § 100a measures, the number or other identifier of the connection or terminal device. Cited for the propositions that urgency reorders the sequence of authorisation rather than removing the authoriser, and that authorisation intensity is graduated to the intrusiveness of the power. LIMITATIONS: it describes procedure, not thresholds of suspicion, and supports no claim about any other country. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.

Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 101 — Verfahrensregelungen bei verdeckten Maßnahmen (German original text)

Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. This record carries the wave’s notification-and-review architecture. Supports § 101(1), that the following rules apply to covert measures under §§ 98a, 99, 100a to 100f, 100h, 100i, 110a and 163d to 163g unless otherwise provided. Supports § 101(2), that decisions and other documents concerning the most intrusive of those measures are kept at the prosecution office and placed on the file only once the conditions for notification under subsection (5) are met. Supports § 101(3): “Personenbezogene Daten, die durch Maßnahmen nach Absatz 1 erhoben wurden, sind entsprechend zu kennzeichnen. Nach einer Übermittlung an eine andere Stelle ist die Kennzeichnung durch diese aufrechtzuerhalten.” Supports § 101(4), which states an ITEMISED notification duty naming, measure by measure, who must be notified — for § 100a “die Beteiligten der überwachten Telekommunikation”; for § 100b “die Zielperson sowie die erheblich mitbetroffenen Personen”; for § 100c the accused against whom the measure was directed, other monitored persons, and persons who occupied or lived in the monitored dwelling at the time — and which requires the notification to point out the possibility of subsequent judicial protection under subsection (7) and the period provided for it; notification is withheld where overriding protectable interests of an affected person require. Supports § 101(7): the persons named in subsection (4) sentence 1 may apply to the competent court, EVEN AFTER THE MEASURE HAS ENDED and up to two weeks after their notification, for review of “die Rechtmäßigkeit der Maßnahme sowie der Art und Weise ihres Vollzugs”; immediate complaint lies against the decision; and where public charges have been preferred and the accused notified, the court seised of the case decides in the decision closing the proceedings. Cited for the rights-holder finding that German law names precise categories of affected person and does not use a citizenship term. LIMITATIONS: it establishes the procedural architecture and nothing about how any measure is carried out. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.

Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, arts. 588 bis a, 588 bis b y 588 bis e — disposiciones comunes a las medidas de investigación tecnológica

Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) · Legislation · 1882-09-14 · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The consolidated Spanish text of the Criminal Procedure Act, read directly from the BOE. The articles cited were INSERTED by article único.13 of Ley Orgánica 13/2015 of 5 October (BOE-A-2015-10725), published 06/10/2015 and IN FORCE FROM 06/12/2015 — the BOE records that provenance against each article and it is reproduced here because the chapter postdates the rest of the Act by 133 years. Supports art. 588 bis a (Principios rectores) in full: measures in the chapter may be ordered during the instruction of proceedings only with judicial authorisation “dictada con plena sujeción a los principios de especialidad, idoneidad, excepcionalidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad de la medida”; that especialidad requires the measure to relate to the investigation of a specific offence and that “No podrán autorizarse medidas de investigación tecnológica que tengan por objeto prevenir o descubrir delitos o despejar sospechas sin base objetiva”; that idoneidad defines the objective and subjective scope and the duration of the measure by reference to its usefulness; that under excepcionalidad and necesidad the measure may be ordered only where no other less burdensome and equally useful measures are available, or where the investigation would otherwise be gravely hindered; and that a measure is proportionate only where, taking all the circumstances into account, the sacrifice of the rights and interests affected is not greater than the benefit to the public interest and to third parties, the public interest being weighed by the gravity of the act, its social significance or the technological sphere in which it was produced, the strength of the existing indicia and the relevance of the result pursued. Supports art. 588 bis b: the judge may order the measures of his own motion or at the instance of the Ministerio Fiscal or the Policía Judicial, and where the Fiscal or the Policía Judicial applies, the petition must contain eight enumerated items including the identity of the person investigated “o de cualquier otro afectado por la medida”, the reasons justifying necessity under the guiding principles, the extension of the measure with specification of its content, the investigating unit that will carry it out, the form of execution, the duration sought and the obliged subject. Supports art. 588 bis e: the measures have the duration specified for each and may not exceed the time indispensable for clarifying the facts; extension is by auto motivado of the competent judge; and once the period expires without extension the measure “cesará a todos los efectos”. LIMITATIONS: only these three articles of the chapter were read. Articles 588 ter to 588 octies, which contain the individual measures, were NOT read, and no claim about any specific Spanish measure rests on this record. It describes no technique. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.

Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, ETS No. 185, Budapest, 23 November 2001), Articles 14–21 and Chapter III (Articles 23–35)

Council of Europe; consulted in the official treaty database of the Government of the Netherlands (wetten.overheid.nl, BWBV0001839) · International organisation · 2001-11-23 · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. ACCESS NOTE: rm.coe.int and coe.int returned HTTP 403 to automated requests in this session, so the Convention was read from the official Dutch government treaty database, which publishes the authentic English text alongside the Dutch translation. The English text quoted below is the authentic one; English and French are the authentic languages. Supports Art. 14(1)–(2), that the procedural powers are established “for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings” and are applied to the offences established under Arts. 2–11, to other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system, and to “the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence”. Supports Art. 14(3)(a), that a Party restricting the Art. 20 power to specified offences must not restrict it more narrowly than the range to which it applies Art. 21. Supports Art. 15(1), that the powers are subject to conditions and safeguards under domestic law providing adequate protection of human rights, including rights under the 1950 European Convention and the 1966 Covenant, “and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality”. Supports Art. 15(2), that such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate, “include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure”. Supports Art. 16(1)–(3): expedited preservation of specified stored computer data “including traffic data”, in particular where it is particularly vulnerable to loss or modification; where effected by order to a person, an obligation to preserve and maintain integrity “for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of ninety days, to enable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure”, renewable; and an obligation on the custodian to keep the undertaking of the procedure confidential. Supports Art. 17, expedited preservation and PARTIAL disclosure of traffic data sufficient to identify the service providers and the path through which the communication was transmitted. Supports Art. 18(1)(a)–(b), the production order: a person in the territory to submit specified stored computer data in that person’s possession or control, and a service provider offering services in the territory to submit subscriber information. Supports Art. 18(3), which defines “subscriber information” as information held by a service provider relating to subscribers of its services “OTHER THAN TRAFFIC OR CONTENT DATA” and by which the type of service, the subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, and information on the site of installation of communication equipment can be established. Supports Art. 19(1)–(4): the power to search or similarly access a computer system or a computer-data storage medium; the power under 19(2) to EXTEND the search expeditiously to another system in the territory where the data sought is “lawfully accessible from or available to the initial system”; the power under 19(3) to seize or similarly secure, comprising the separate powers to “seize or similarly secure a computer system or part of it or a computer-data storage medium”, to “make and retain a copy of those computer data”, to “maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data”, and to “render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer system”; and the power under 19(4) to order any person with knowledge about the functioning of the system to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information. Supports Art. 20, real-time collection of TRAFFIC data, and Art. 21, interception of CONTENT data, the latter available only “in relation to a range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law”; both articles oblige a service provider to keep the execution confidential. Cited for the structural propositions that preservation is a distinct act from production, that traffic data and content data are distinct powers, that subscriber information is defined by exclusion from both, and that seizing, copying and accessing are separately enumerated. LIMITATIONS, and they are load-bearing: this is a TREATY. It obliges Parties to establish powers in domestic law; it is NOT evidence of what any particular Party has enacted, and no country claim on this platform rests on it. It describes no technique. STATUS: in force; the Convention has two additional protocols, of which the Second Additional Protocol on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence was located but NOT read for this wave. WAVE 23 ADDITION. That Protocol has now been read and is held separately as `coe-cybercrime-second-protocol`. Chapter III of the Convention, on international co-operation, was read from the same authentic English text, and it is a different subject from the domestic powers above. Supports Art. 23, that Parties co-operate “in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws”. Supports Art. 25(1)-(4), and in particular Art. 25(2), that “Each Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to carry out the obligations set forth in Articles 27 through 35” -- the Convention’s own statement that its co-operation articles are not self-executing -- and Art. 25(4), that except as specifically provided “mutual assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse co-operation”. Supports Art. 27(1), that the Article applies only “where there is no mutual assistance treaty or arrangement on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation in force between the requesting and requested Parties”, and Art. 27(2)(a)-(d), that each Party designates a central authority “responsible for sending and answering requests for mutual assistance, the execution of such requests or their transmission to the authorities competent for their execution”, that central authorities communicate directly with each other, and that the Secretary General keeps a register of them. Supports Art. 29(1)-(4): a Party may request another to preserve data “located within the territory of that other Party and in respect of which the requesting Party intends to submit a request for mutual assistance”; the request must state that intention (29(2)(f)); “For the purposes of responding to a request, dual criminality shall not be required as a condition to providing such preservation” (29(3)); and a Party that requires dual criminality for disclosure may reserve the right to refuse preservation where it has reasons to believe the condition cannot be fulfilled at the time of disclosure (29(4)). Supports Art. 30(1)-(2), expedited disclosure of a sufficient amount of preserved traffic data to identify a service provider in another State and the path through which the communication was transmitted, withholdable only for a political offence or where execution is likely to prejudice sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests. Supports Art. 31(1)-(3), mutual assistance to search, seize and disclose stored data “including data that has been preserved pursuant to Article 29”, responded to on an expedited basis where data is particularly vulnerable to loss. Supports Art. 32 IN FULL, and its narrowness is the point: “A Party may, without the authorisation of another Party: a) access publicly available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically; or b) access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system.” There is no third limb and no unilateral remote-access provision. Supports Art. 33(1)-(2), mutual assistance in the real-time collection of traffic data, governed by the conditions and procedures of domestic law and available at least for offences for which such collection would be available in a similar domestic case; and Art. 34, mutual assistance regarding the interception of content data “to the extent permitted under their applicable treaties and domestic laws”. Supports Art. 35(1)-(2), that each Party designates a point of contact available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to ensure immediate assistance -- facilitating or, if permitted by its domestic law and practice, directly carrying out technical advice, preservation under Arts. 29 and 30, and the collection of evidence, provision of legal information and locating of suspects -- and that where the point of contact is not part of the Party’s authority responsible for international mutual assistance, it must ensure co-ordination with that authority. LIMITATION ON CHAPTER III, restated because it is easy to lose: these are obligations on Parties to legislate and to co-operate. They are NOT evidence of what any Party has enacted. The Party list, signature dates and ratification counts were NOT RESEARCHED, because the Council of Europe Treaty Office returned HTTP 403 to three separate URL forms.

18 U.S.C. § 2703 — Required disclosure of customer communications or records (Stored Communications Act)

Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. ACCESS NOTE, stated because it affects the tier of this record: the official hosts were attempted first and were unreachable in this session — uscode.house.gov timed out without response and govinfo.gov returned HTTP 502 — so the text was read from the Legal Information Institute, which reproduces the United States Code verbatim rather than summarising it. It is cited for statutory wording only, and every proposition below is a quotation or a close paraphrase of one. Supports § 2703(a): a governmental entity may require disclosure of the CONTENTS of a wire or electronic communication in electronic storage for one hundred and eighty days or less “only pursuant to a warrant”; contents held more than one hundred and eighty days may be required by the means available under subsection (b). Supports § 2703(b)(1): contents held by a remote computing service may be required WITHOUT required notice to the subscriber or customer on a warrant, or WITH prior notice where the entity uses an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena or obtains a § 2703(d) court order, with delayed notice available under § 2705. Supports § 2703(c)(1), that a governmental entity may require disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (NOT INCLUDING THE CONTENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS)” only by warrant, § 2703(d) order, subscriber consent, a narrow written request confined to telemarketing-fraud investigations, or under paragraph (2). Supports § 2703(c)(2), which lists the six items a provider shall disclose on an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena: name; address; local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; length of service including start date and types of service utilised; telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and means and source of payment. Supports § 2703(c)(3), that a governmental entity receiving records under subsection (c) “is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer”. Supports § 2703(d), that a court order shall issue “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” the material sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”, and that a court may quash or modify on a provider’s prompt motion where the records are unusually voluminous or compliance would cause an undue burden. Cited for the proposition that one statute can allocate three different authorising instruments to three different categories of digital material. LIMITATIONS: this record supports the wording of § 2703 and nothing else. It establishes no United States constitutional doctrine, no case law, and nothing about the Wiretap Act, which was not read. STATUS: current codified text as reproduced at the verification date. WAVE 23 ADDITION. Section 2703(h) was read from the same source under the same access note. Supports § 2703(h)(1)(A), defining a “qualifying foreign government” as one “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has entered into force under section 2523” and whose laws provide electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers “substantive and procedural opportunities similar to those provided under paragraphs (2) and (5)”. Supports § 2703(h)(2)(A), that a provider -- “including a foreign electronic communication service or remote computing service” -- being required to disclose the contents of a communication may file a motion to modify or quash the legal process where it reasonably believes (i) that the customer or subscriber “is not a United States person and does not reside in the United States” and (ii) that the required disclosure “would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government”, such a motion to be filed not later than 14 days after service. Cited for the proposition that the same body of legislation which removes the data’s location as an answer also provides a route for a provider to raise a conflict of legal obligations. LIMITATION: which governments qualify turns on executive agreements under § 2523, and that coverage was NOT RESEARCHED. No list of qualifying foreign governments is stated anywhere on this platform.

Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法), English translation

Ministry of Justice (Japanese Law Translation database) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-25

Cited from the official Japanese Law Translation database (reference only; original Japanese text has legal effect). Supports, at the structural level: that police officials act as judicial police officials investigating offences (Article 189); that public prosecutors may themselves investigate offences (Article 191); and that prosecution is instituted by a public prosecutor (Article 247), who holds the discretion whether to prosecute. Supports the allocation of investigative and charging responsibility; the English is not authoritative and no operational detail is drawn from it. WAVE 22 ADDITION. Read again from the same Japanese Law Translation page, this time from the database's own XML export of the Code (s23Aa001310201en2.0_h18A36.xml), fetched with the law page as referrer. TEMPORAL LIMITATION, stated because it is load-bearing for this wave: the version identifier indicates a translation reflecting amendments to 2006, so it MAY LAG later amendments, and only structural propositions present in that version are drawn from it. Supports Art. 197(1): with regard to investigation, “such examination as is necessary to achieve its objective may be conducted; provided, however, that compulsory dispositions shall not be applied unless special provisions have been established in this Code.” Supports Art. 218(1), that a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for investigation of an offense, conduct search, seizure or inspection UPON A WARRANT ISSUED BY A JUDGE, and Art. 218(3), that the warrant is issued upon their request. Supports Art. 219(1), that the warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offense, THE ARTICLES TO BE SEIZED or the place, body or articles to be searched, the place or articles to be inspected, the valid period, and a statement that the search, seizure or inspection shall not be commenced after the lapse of that period and that the warrant shall then be returned to the court. Supports Art. 222-2 in full: “Compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts.” Cited for three propositions: that a national code can state as a general rule that a compulsory measure requires a specific statutory provision; that the warrant instrument itself distinguishes what may be seized from what may be searched; and that a system may place the interception power OUTSIDE its general procedure code. The Act to which Art. 222-2 refers was NOT read, and this record supports no claim about its content. The English is a reference translation and the Japanese text has legal effect.