Investigations
What is the difference between a police investigation and a prosecutor-led investigation?
Systems differ on who owns an investigation, who performs it, and who may direct whom. These are three separate questions, and the answers do not track each other — the body doing the work is frequently not the body responsible for it.
In short
The phrase “prosecutor-led investigation” suggests prosecutors doing the investigating. That is rarely what it means. In almost every system where prosecutors lead, police officers still knock on the doors, take the statements and examine the material. What changes is who is legally responsible for the investigation, and who may lawfully tell whom what to do.
- Ownership: which office is legally responsible for the investigation.
- Execution: which personnel actually perform the investigative acts.
- Direction: whether one of those offices may lawfully instruct the other.
- Authorisation: who must approve the intrusive steps.
- Charging: who decides whether a prosecution follows.
Why it exists
Both designs answer the same worry from opposite directions. Investigation is a legal process that produces a case, and a case has to be built to a standard someone else will test. If prosecutors are involved only at the end, they inherit a record they had no hand in shaping. If they direct from the beginning, the office that will argue the case also shaped the evidence.
AnalysisNeither risk is imaginary and neither design eliminates both. Systems have chosen differently, and the choice is usually much older than any modern argument for it.
How it works
- Direction written into the definition — France
- Article 12 of the Code de procédure pénale does not say that prosecutors may direct investigations. It says the police judiciaire is exercised "sous la direction du procureur de la République" by designated officers, officials and agents. Direction is part of what the function is. The Ministry of Justice describes the procureur as directing the investigation and having the necessary acts performed, and as deciding what happens next — closing the case, using an alternative to prosecution, sending it to court, or referring it to an investigating judge.
- Responsibility with the prosecution, duty on the police — Germany
- Section 160(1) of the Strafprozessordnung obliges the Staatsanwaltschaft to investigate once it learns of a suspected offence. Section 163(1) separately obliges the police to investigate offences and take measures that permit no delay. Two duties in one code: the prosecution carries legal responsibility and the charging decision, the Land police carry out the great bulk of the work.
- Direction from inside the judiciary — Italy
- Article 109 of the Constitution provides that judicial authorities may directly avail themselves of the judicial police, and Article 17 of Law 121/1981 provides that judicial-police functions are carried out under the dependence and direction of the judicial authority. Because the Italian prosecutor is a magistrate, direction of the investigation sits inside the independent judiciary rather than in the executive.
- Investigation and charging in different hands — Ireland
- An Garda Síochána investigates and assembles the evidence; the Director of Public Prosecutions decides whether a serious case is prosecuted on indictment. The investigating officer does not make the charging decision for indictable matters. The sources establish that separation. They do not establish a power in the Director to direct ordinary Garda investigations, and none is claimed here.
- A bounded direction power — Kenya
- Kenya’s Constitution allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to direct the Inspector-General to investigate an allegation of criminal conduct, and separately provides that no person may direct the Inspector-General about a particular investigation. The exception and the rule appear in the same constitution. The result is a police-led system with exactly one office able to require a specific investigation.
- Both may investigate — Japan
- The prefectural police investigate as judicial police officials, and a public prosecutor may, when necessary, investigate an offence himself. The prosecutor alone institutes the prosecution.
Brazil shows a further variant, in which the prosecutor’s relationship to the police is not confined to a single case. The Ministério Público holds the public criminal action exclusively, may requisition investigative measures and the opening of an inquérito, and exercises external control over police activity. That is direction over a case and oversight of an institution, held by the same office.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: Prosecutor-led means prosecutors do the investigating.
In practice: In Germany the prosecution carries the legal responsibility and Land police do the great bulk of the work. Ownership and execution are different facts, and conflating them overstates what prosecutors do everywhere.
Common belief: Police-led systems have no prosecutorial involvement until charge.
In practice: Kenya’s Director of Public Prosecutions may constitutionally direct the Inspector-General to investigate an allegation. A system can be police-led and still give a prosecutor a specific statutory power over investigation.
Common belief: Prosecutorial direction makes investigations more objective.
In practice: No source on this page establishes that, and this site makes no such claim. Germany’s objectivity duty is written into the statute rather than derived from who directs; whether direction changes outcomes is an empirical question, not a structural one.
Common belief: The relationship between police and prosecutors is adversarial.
In practice: In every system described here the two are parts of one process with a shared statutory purpose. Where the law allocates direction, it is allocating responsibility, not settling a contest.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Placing the systems on the three axes separately shows how little they move together.
- Owned by police, executed by police
- Ireland, New Zealand, and the ordinary case in the United States.
- Owned by the prosecution, executed by police
- Germany, where the police duty is statutory rather than delegated; France and Italy, where direction is part of the definition of the function.
- Owned by police, with a statutory prosecutorial direction power
- Kenya.
- Shared ownership
- Japan, where both police and prosecutor may investigate.
- Police inquiry, exclusive prosecutorial action
- Brazil, where the polícia judiciária conducts the inquérito and the Ministério Público alone brings the action.
Rights and accountability
AnalysisFor a reader, the practical value of the distinction is that it tells you which office to look at when asking who was answerable. In Germany that is the prosecution even though police did the work. In Ireland it is the Gardaí even though the Director of Public Prosecutions decided the charge.
What we could not establish
- No arrangement on this page is presented as better than another. Whether prosecutorial direction improves investigations is an empirical question this page does not answer and no source here addresses.
- Whether Ireland’s Director of Public Prosecutions may direct an ordinary Garda investigation was not established, and is not claimed. The Irish sources establish the separation of investigation from the charging decision, not a direction power.
Where to go next
Related: who investigates crime, judicial police, and from investigation to prosecution.
Related topics
- Who is legally responsible for investigating a crime?
“The police” is an incomplete answer almost everywhere. Legal responsibility for an investigation may rest with police, with a prosecutor, or with a judge — and the body that performs the work is often not the body that owns it.
- How does a criminal investigation become a prosecution?
The familiar picture is a relay: police investigate, then hand a file to a prosecutor who decides. That describes some systems. In others the prosecutor was legally responsible from the first day, and there is no handover to describe.
- What does “judicial police” mean, and is it a police force?
One term, at least three different things. In France it is a legal function exercised by designated personnel; in Brazil an institutional role held by named forces; in Italy personnel drawn from other forces who fall under judicial direction. It almost never means police employed by the judiciary.
Where this connects
Institutions: Prosecution service, National police, Gendarmerie.
Sources
Article 12 du Code de procédure pénale
République française (Légifrance) · Legislation · 1958-04-08 · link verified 2026-07-24
Supports the exact wording that the police judiciaire is exercised 'sous la direction du procureur de la République' by the officers, officials and agents designated in that title. Légifrance records the provision as in force from 8 April 1958 and as scheduled for repeal by Ordonnance n° 2025-1091 of 19 November 2025 with effect from 1 January 2029; any citation must state that it is current law carrying a scheduled end date. Does NOT support any claim about which bodies those designated officers belong to, nor about investigative practice.
Ministère de la justice (France) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24
Supports: the definition of the parquet / ministère public; the 'magistrature debout' description and the siège/parquet distinction; the hierarchy from procureur général to procureur de la République; that parquet magistrates act 'sous l'autorité du ministre de la Justice' and receive 'des instructions générales du ministre de la Justice mais en aucun cas dans les dossiers judiciaires'; that they do not benefit from the guarantee of inamovibilité; and the prosecutor's direction of investigation and discretion over case outcomes. An official self-description of the formal rule. It does NOT establish that the rule is observed in practice, and cannot settle the contested question of prosecutorial independence in either direction.
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 160 — Pflicht zur Sachverhaltsaufklärung (German original text)
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24
Authoritative German text. Supports § 160(1): once the Staatsanwaltschaft learns of a suspected offence it must investigate the facts in order to decide whether to bring a public charge; and § 160(2): it must investigate exculpatory as well as incriminating circumstances and secure evidence. Supports the allocation of investigative responsibility and the objectivity duty. Does NOT support any description of investigative technique, thresholds, or practice.
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24
Authoritative German text. Supports § 163(1): the authorities and officials of the police service must investigate offences and take all measures that permit no delay in order to prevent the matter being obscured. Supports that the police hold their own statutory first-access investigative duty alongside the prosecution's direction. Does NOT support operational detail of any kind.
Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948) — official English translation
Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-26
The Constitutional Court's own official English translation (October 2023 edition), fetched as a PDF and text-extracted (confirmed by the research and verification passes; the Senate's English PDF was bot-walled, so this Court edition was substituted). Supports Art. 101 (justice administered in the name of the people; the judiciary subject only to the law), Art. 104 (the judiciary an independent branch; the High Council of the Judiciary/CSM), Art. 107 (the public prosecutor's guarantees), Art. 109 ("judicial authorities may directly avail themselves of the judicial police"), Art. 112 ("the public prosecutor shall have the obligation to initiate criminal proceedings" — mandatory prosecution), Art. 103 (the Council of State and administrative justice), Art. 116 (the five special-autonomy regions, with additional devolution over "justice" limited to the organizational requirements of the Justice of the Peace), Art. 117(2) — subparagraphs (l) "jurisdiction and procedural law; civil and criminal law; administrative justice", (h) "public order and security, save for local administrative police", (d) defence — establishing that all four justice functions are EXCLUSIVE State competence, and Arts. 134–135 (the Constitutional Court).
Law No. 121 of 1 April 1981 (new organisation of the public-security administration)
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri — Ufficio Studi (official government text) · Legislation · 1981-04-01 · link verified 2026-07-26
The official government text of Law 121/1981, fetched as a PDF and text-extracted, verified verbatim in both passes. Art. 16 lists the police forces: the Polizia di Stato plus "a) l'Arma dei carabinieri, quale forza armata in servizio permanente di pubblica sicurezza; b) il Corpo della guardia di finanza", and (Art. 16(2)) the custodial and forestry corps. Art. 17 provides that judicial-police functions "sono svolte alla dipendenza e sotto la direzione dell'autorità giudiziaria" (are carried out under the dependence and direction of the judicial authority). Establishes the multiple national police forces and that criminal investigation is directed by the prosecuting magistracy.
Houses of the Oireachtas (Irish Statute Book) · Legislation · 2005 · link verified 2026-07-25
Official content obtained by search retrieval of the Irish Statute Book (WAF-blocked to direct fetch); corroborated by An Garda Síochána's own history page. Supports: that An Garda Síochána is the national police service governed by the Garda Síochána Act 2005; that its statutory function is to provide policing and security services to the State; and its origin (the Civic Guard was formed in 1922 and renamed An Garda Síochána in 1923). Supports the unitary national character of the force; it does not support any operational detail. Stated as sourced facts.
About Us — Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Ireland) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-25
Read directly. Supports: that the Office of the DPP was established under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974; that the Director is 'independent in the performance of her functions'; that the DPP's principal duty is to direct and supervise public prosecutions on indictment and to give general direction and advice to An Garda Síochána on summary cases; and the division of roles — An Garda Síochána investigates, the DPP decides whether to prosecute. Supports the statutory prosecution structure and the DPP's stated independence; it does not, by itself, establish how independence operates in any individual case.
Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法), English translation
Ministry of Justice (Japanese Law Translation database) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-25
Cited from the official Japanese Law Translation database (reference only; original Japanese text has legal effect). Supports, at the structural level: that police officials act as judicial police officials investigating offences (Article 189); that public prosecutors may themselves investigate offences (Article 191); and that prosecution is instituted by a public prosecutor (Article 247), who holds the discretion whether to prosecute. Supports the allocation of investigative and charging responsibility; the English is not authoritative and no operational detail is drawn from it. WAVE 22 ADDITION. Read again from the same Japanese Law Translation page, this time from the database's own XML export of the Code (s23Aa001310201en2.0_h18A36.xml), fetched with the law page as referrer. TEMPORAL LIMITATION, stated because it is load-bearing for this wave: the version identifier indicates a translation reflecting amendments to 2006, so it MAY LAG later amendments, and only structural propositions present in that version are drawn from it. Supports Art. 197(1): with regard to investigation, “such examination as is necessary to achieve its objective may be conducted; provided, however, that compulsory dispositions shall not be applied unless special provisions have been established in this Code.” Supports Art. 218(1), that a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for investigation of an offense, conduct search, seizure or inspection UPON A WARRANT ISSUED BY A JUDGE, and Art. 218(3), that the warrant is issued upon their request. Supports Art. 219(1), that the warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offense, THE ARTICLES TO BE SEIZED or the place, body or articles to be searched, the place or articles to be inspected, the valid period, and a statement that the search, seizure or inspection shall not be commenced after the lapse of that period and that the warrant shall then be returned to the court. Supports Art. 222-2 in full: “Compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts.” Cited for three propositions: that a national code can state as a general rule that a compulsory measure requires a specific statutory provision; that the warrant instrument itself distinguishes what may be seized from what may be searched; and that a system may place the interception power OUTSIDE its general procedure code. The Act to which Art. 222-2 refers was NOT read, and this record supports no claim about its content. The English is a reference translation and the Japanese text has legal effect.
National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988
Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1988-10-05 · link verified 2026-07-25
The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. THE backbone of the Brazil pages. Supports: the federation of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 'todos autônomos' (Art. 18; Art. 1); separation of powers (Art. 2); the criminal-justice guarantees of Art. 5 — devido processo legal (LIV), contraditório e ampla defesa (LV), presumption of innocence 'ninguém será considerado culpado até o trânsito em julgado de sentença penal condenatória' (LVII), and habeas corpus (LXVIII); that penal and procedural law are the EXCLUSIVE (privativa) competence of the Union (Art. 22, I) while direito penitenciário is CONCURRENT (Art. 24, I) and the States hold the reserved/residual competences (Art. 25 §1); public security through the six órgãos of Art. 144 (I polícia federal; II rodoviária federal; III ferroviária federal; IV polícias civis; V polícias militares e corpos de bombeiros militares; VI polícias penais, added by EC 104/2019), with the polícias civis 'dirigidas por delegados de polícia de carreira' exercising 'as funções de polícia judiciária e a apuração de infrações penais, exceto as militares' (§4), the polícias militares holding 'a polícia ostensiva e a preservação da ordem pública' (§5), and both subordinate to the Governors (§6); the Judiciary organs of Art. 92 (STF, CNJ, STJ, TST, TRFs/Juízes Federais, and the labour, electoral, military and state courts), the STF as guardian of the Constitution (Art. 102), the CNJ (Art. 103-B) and state justice (Art. 125); the Ministério Público as 'instituição permanente, essencial à função jurisdicional do Estado' defending 'a ordem jurídica, o regime democrático e os interesses sociais e individuais indisponíveis', with autonomy and the principles of unidade, indivisibilidade e independência funcional (Art. 127), its structure MPU (MPF/MPT/MPM/MPDFT) + MPE (Art. 128), its functions including promoting 'privativamente, a ação penal pública' (Art. 129 I) and the inquérito civil / ação civil pública for interesses difusos e coletivos (Art. 129 III), and the CNMP (Art. 130-A); and that the Union organizes and maintains the Judiciary, Ministério Público and police of the Federal District (Art. 21, XIII–XIV). The Portuguese text alone has legal effect. WAVE 12 ADDITION, further clauses of Art. 5 read directly from the same Planalto text: XXXV a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito; XXXVI the law shall not impair a vested right, a perfect juridical act or res judicata; XXXVII não haverá juízo ou tribunal de exceção; XXXIX não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal; XL a lei penal não retroagirá, salvo para beneficiar o réu; LVI evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process; LXXV the State shall indemnify a person convicted by judicial error and one held beyond the term fixed in the sentence; LXXVIII reasonable duration of proceedings and the means guaranteeing the speed of their handling, in the judicial and administrative spheres. WAVE 14 ADDITION, further provisions read directly from the same Planalto text: Art. 5º LXXIV “o Estado prestará assistência jurídica integral e gratuita aos que comprovarem insuficiência de recursos”; Art. 5º LXXVI that civil birth registration and the death certificate are free, in the form of the law, for the recognisedly poor; Art. 5º LXXVII that actions of habeas corpus and habeas data are free, as are, in the form of the law, the acts necessary to the exercise of citizenship; Art. 103-B § 4º that the Conselho Nacional de Justiça has competence for “o controle da atuação administrativa e financeira do Poder Judiciário e do cumprimento dos deveres funcionais dos juízes”, including safeguarding the autonomy of the Judiciary and issuing regulatory acts (I), reviewing the legality of administrative acts of members or organs of the Judiciary and annulling, revising or setting a period for compliance (II), and receiving complaints against members or organs of the Judiciary including its auxiliary services and delegated notarial and registry services, taking over disciplinary proceedings in course and ordering removal, availability or retirement and applying other administrative sanctions (III); Art. 133 “O advogado é indispensável à administração da justiça, sendo inviolável por seus atos e manifestações no exercício da profissão, nos limites da lei”; and Art. 134 in its current wording, that the Defensoria Pública is a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, incumbent on it, as an expression and instrument of the democratic regime, fundamentally to provide legal guidance, the promotion of human rights and the defence, in all degrees, judicial and extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights of the needy. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same Planalto text. Brazil states its emergency architecture as a closed system: two regimes, an exhaustive list of measures for each, and an express preservation of liability afterwards. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136, caput: “Art. 136. O Presidente da República pode, ouvidos o Conselho da República e o Conselho de Defesa Nacional, decretar estado de defesa para preservar ou prontamente restabelecer, em locais restritos e determinados, a ordem pública ou a paz social ameaçadas por grave e iminente instabilidade institucional ou atingidas por calamidades de grandes proporções na natureza.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 § 2º, added after adversarial review found this platform quoting it from a record that did not carry it, and re-verified against the Planalto text: “§ 2º O tempo de duração do estado de defesa não será superior a trinta dias, podendo ser prorrogado uma vez, por igual período, se persistirem as razões que justificaram a sua decretação.” Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §1º, I–II: “I - restrições aos direitos de: a) reunião, ainda que exercida no seio das associações; b) sigilo de correspondência; c) sigilo de comunicação telegráfica e telefônica; II - ocupação e uso temporário de bens e serviços públicos, na hipótese de calamidade pública, respondendo a União pelos danos e custos decorrentes.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §3º, I–IV: “§ 3º Na vigência do estado de defesa: I - a prisão por crime contra o Estado, determinada pelo executor da medida, será por este comunicada imediatamente ao juiz competente, que a relaxará, se não for legal, facultado ao preso requerer exame de corpo de delito à autoridade policial; II - a comunicação será acompanhada de declaração, pela autoridade, do estado físico e mental do detido no momento de sua autuação; III - a prisão ou detenção de qualquer pessoa não poderá ser superior a dez dias, salvo quando autorizada pelo Poder Judiciário; IV - é vedada a incomunicabilidade do preso.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 136 §§4º–7º: “§ 4º Decretado o estado de defesa ou sua prorrogação, o Presidente da República, dentro de vinte e quatro horas, submeterá o ato com a respectiva justificação ao Congresso Nacional, que decidirá por maioria absoluta. § 5º Se o Congresso Nacional estiver em recesso, será convocado, extraordinariamente, no prazo de cinco dias. § 6º O Congresso Nacional apreciará o decreto dentro de dez dias contados de seu recebimento, devendo continuar funcionando enquanto vigorar o estado de defesa. § 7º Rejeitado o decreto, cessa imediatamente o estado de defesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 138, caput: “Art. 138. O decreto do estado de sítio indicará sua duração, as normas necessárias a sua execução e as garantias constitucionais que ficarão suspensas, e, depois de publicado, o Presidente da República designará o executor das medidas específicas e as áreas abrangidas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 139: “Art. 139. Na vigência do estado de sítio decretado com fundamento no art. 137, I, só poderão ser tomadas contra as pessoas as seguintes medidas: I - obrigação de permanência em localidade determinada; II - detenção em edifício não destinado a acusados ou condenados por crimes comuns; III - restrições relativas à inviolabilidade da correspondência, ao sigilo das comunicações, à prestação de informações e à liberdade de imprensa, radiodifusão e televisão, na forma da lei; IV - suspensão da liberdade de reunião; V - busca e apreensão em domicílio; VI - intervenção nas empresas de serviços públicos; VII - requisição de bens. Parágrafo único. Não se inclui nas restrições do inciso III a difusão de pronunciamentos de parlamentares efetuados em suas Casas Legislativas, desde que liberada pela respectiva Mesa.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 141 and parágrafo único: “Art. 141. Cessado o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, cessarão também seus efeitos, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade pelos ilícitos cometidos por seus executores ou agentes. Parágrafo único. Logo que cesse o estado de defesa ou o estado de sítio, as medidas aplicadas em sua vigência serão relatadas pelo Presidente da República, em mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, com especificação e justificação das providências adotadas, com relação nominal dos atingidos e indicação das restrições aplicadas.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 60 §§1º and 4º: “§ 1º A Constituição não poderá ser emendada na vigência de intervenção federal, de estado de defesa ou de estado de sítio. […] § 4º Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: I - a forma federativa de Estado; II - o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico; III - a separação dos Poderes; IV - os direitos e garantias individuais.”. Supports Constituição de 1988, Art. 142, caput and §1º: “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem. § 1º Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.”. Cited for the closed lists of permitted measures, the immediate judicial communication of an arrest, the congressional role, the express preservation of liability for unlawful acts after the regime ends, and the bar on amending the Constitution while one is in force. It records no declaration of either regime and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Article 5 read incisum by incisum from the same Planalto consolidated text. Supports the caput, and specifically its rights-holder scope: “Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes”. Supports Art. 5º X: “são invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação”. Supports Art. 5º XI: “a casa é asilo inviolável do indivíduo, ninguém nela podendo penetrar sem consentimento do morador, salvo em caso de flagrante delito ou desastre, ou para prestar socorro, ou, durante o dia, por determinação judicial” — note that judicial authorisation is textually confined to daytime, which is the narrowest such qualifier found in this wave. Supports Art. 5º XII: “é inviolável o sigilo da correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal” — the exception reaches the LAST-NAMED category only, requires a judicial order, and is confined to criminal investigation or criminal procedural instruction. Supports Art. 5º LIV (“ninguém será privado da liberdade ou de seus bens sem o devido processo legal”), LV (contraditório and ampla defesa in judicial and administrative proceedings), LVI (“são inadmissíveis, no processo, as provas obtidas por meios ilícitos”) and LVII. Supports Art. 5º LXI: “ninguém será preso senão em flagrante delito ou por ordem escrita e fundamentada de autoridade judiciária competente, salvo nos casos de transgressão militar ou crime propriamente militar, definidos em lei”. Supports LXII (arrest and place of custody communicated immediately to the competent judge and to the family or a person indicated). Supports LXIII: “o preso será informado de seus direitos, entre os quais o de permanecer calado, sendo-lhe assegurada a assistência da família e de advogado” — a constitutional notification duty coupled with a silence right, and worded for “o preso”. Supports LXIV, LXV (“a prisão ilegal será imediatamente relaxada pela autoridade judiciária”) and LXVI. Supports § 1º (“As normas definidoras dos direitos e garantias fundamentais têm aplicação imediata”), § 2º (rights expressed in the Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and principles it adopts, or from international treaties to which Brazil is party) and § 3º (“Os tratados e convenções internacionais sobre direitos humanos que forem aprovados, em cada Casa do Congresso Nacional, em dois turnos, por três quintos dos votos dos respectivos membros, serão equivalentes às emendas constitucionais”, added by Emenda Constitucional nº 45 de 2004). VERIFIED NEGATIVE: Article 5 contains no general limitation clause of the Canadian, South African, Kenyan or Swiss kind; limits appear inside individual incisos. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, no statute, nothing about any other country.
Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (CPPF) — accusatory system (Law 27.482)
Ministerio Público Fiscal / InfoLEG (Argentina) · Legislation · 2019-01-07 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (originally Law 27.063, reformed and renamed by Law 27.482, published in the Official Gazette on 7 January 2019), confirmed in two independent passes via the Public Prosecution Service and InfoLEG. Supports that the federal criminal process moved from an inquisitorial to an accusatory/adversarial system in which the Public Prosecution Service (Ministerio Público Fiscal) directs the criminal investigation, with the police acting as auxiliaries; and that the system is being implemented in phases across the federal jurisdictions.