Skip to main content
HELPERGEcosystem
JusticeCenterID

Investigations

Which institution is legally competent to investigate a particular crime?

Competence to investigate follows the offence, the level of government and sometimes the suspect — not simply the place. Two agencies can both be lawfully present at the same scene, and neither commands the other.

Fact-checkedSafety review clearedLast updated Last reviewed

In short

Police jurisdiction asks which force may act in a given place. Investigative jurisdiction asks a different question: which institution is legally competent to investigate a particular matter. The two answers come apart constantly, and the second is the one that determines who owns a case.

  • The offence — many systems assign competence by what is alleged rather than by where it happened.
  • The level of government — whether the offence is against national or sub-national law.
  • The suspect — several systems route cases involving officials to a different institution entirely.
  • The stage — competence can move once a matter passes to a prosecutor or a judge.

Why it exists

Competence rules exist because more than one body is usually capable of investigating and only one can be answerable for it. Without an allocation, two agencies working the same matter would each be able to assume the other was doing it, and neither could be held to the result.

AnalysisThey also exist because some cases should not be investigated by the obvious body. Where the suspect is a police officer, the institution best placed to investigate is often the one least able to be seen doing it independently.

How it works

Competence by offence and level — the United States
Most criminal investigation is done by state and local agencies — the Bureau of Justice Statistics counted 17,541 general-purpose state and local law-enforcement agencies — because most crime is a matter of state law. Federal investigative authority is tied to federal offences: the statutory basis for federal investigators authorises appointment "to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States", and preserves the investigative authority assigned by law to other agencies. Federal investigators work within enumerated competence, not across all crime.
Competence by offence within one country — Brazil
The polícia judiciária conducts the inquérito, and which force does so depends on the offence: the state Polícia Civil for ordinary crimes, the Polícia Federal for federal ones. The same act of investigating is allocated between two institutions by the character of what is alleged.
Competence by territory within one legal framework — Spain
Which police investigate depends on where the offence happens: the Mossos d’Esquadra and Ertzaintza in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the Policía Foral in Navarre, and the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía and Guardia Civil elsewhere. The criminal law and procedure they apply are the same national ones throughout.
Competence by suspect — Czechia and Norway
Some systems move a case out of the ordinary police entirely when the suspect is an official. Czechia’s General Inspection of Security Forces investigates crimes by officers of the police, the customs administration and the prison service. Norway’s Spesialenheten investigates criminal acts committed in the course of duty by employees of the police or the prosecuting authority. In both, competence follows who is suspected rather than what was done or where.

Competence can also be assigned by an office rather than by a rule. Kenya’s Constitution allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to direct the Inspector-General to investigate an allegation of criminal conduct, while providing that no one else may direct the Inspector-General about a particular investigation. That is a competence question answered by naming who may decide it.

Common misconceptions

Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.

  • Common belief: Investigative jurisdiction is the same as police jurisdiction.

    In practice: Police jurisdiction is about where a force may act. Investigative jurisdiction is about which institution owns a matter. A force can be lawfully present at a scene it has no competence to investigate.

  • Common belief: A national agency can take any serious case it wants.

    In practice: Federal and national investigative bodies generally work within enumerated competence. The United States ties federal investigative authority to federal offences and expressly preserves authority assigned by law to other agencies.

  • Common belief: Where jurisdictions overlap, the higher level is in charge.

    In practice: Levels of government are not ranks. Assistance between them is routine and a command relationship is not; in federal systems the levels answer to different authorities entirely.

  • Common belief: Competence is decided by where the crime happened.

    In practice: Place is one factor among several. Brazil allocates by offence, Czechia and Norway by who is suspected, and several systems shift competence when a matter reaches a prosecutor.

How this varies between jurisdictions

A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.

The most consequential variation is whether competence is exclusive or shared, because that determines what happens when two bodies could act.

Exclusive by suspect
Czechia and Norway remove offences by named categories of official from the ordinary police entirely.
Exclusive by offence
Brazil divides ordinary and federal crime between the Polícia Civil and the Polícia Federal.
Concurrent, with no hierarchy
The United States, where state, local and federal agencies may each hold competence over conduct that violates more than one body of law.
Territorial within a uniform legal framework
Spain, where the investigating force changes by autonomous community but the law and the judicial direction do not.

Rights and accountability

AnalysisCompetence rules are an accountability mechanism before they are an administrative one. An identifiable institution owning a matter is what makes it possible to ask afterwards why something was or was not done, and to ask it of someone who cannot answer that it belonged to someone else.

AnalysisThe clearest examples are the ones that route cases away from the obvious investigator. Where a police officer is the suspect, systems that assign competence elsewhere are accepting a loss of familiarity with the material in exchange for an investigation whose independence does not have to be taken on trust.

What we could not establish

  • This page describes how competence is allocated. It does not describe how agencies resolve disputes about it in practice, which is largely a matter of protocol and negotiation rather than published rule.
  • Nothing here identifies a gap in coverage, and no arrangement is described in a way intended to show where competence is uncertain.

Where to go next

Related: police jurisdiction, who investigates crime, and federal investigative agencies.

Related topics

Where this connects

Institutions: Federal investigative agency, State police, Police investigative body.

Sources

  1. 28 U.S. Code § 533 (Investigative and other officials; appointment)

    Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Verbatim: the Attorney General may appoint officials '(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States'. The statutory basis for federal investigative authority (the FBI is established under this and related provisions). Supports that federal investigative authority is tied to crimes AGAINST THE UNITED STATES — i.e. federal offences — and preserves the investigative authority assigned by law to other agencies. Does NOT support any claim of general federal jurisdiction over all crime, nor any operational detail.

  2. Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2018 — Statistical Tables

    Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice · Government publication · 2018 · link verified 2026-07-24

    Reference date June 2018. Supports that 17,541 general-purpose state and local law-enforcement agencies performed law-enforcement functions in the United States, of which about 67% were local (municipal) police departments, 17% sheriffs' offices, and 15% primary state, tribal, special-jurisdiction agencies, constables and marshals, together employing about 1,214,000 full-time personnel. Supports the FRAGMENTATION of US policing across thousands of separately governed agencies. Does NOT support any per-state figure or any claim about a specific agency.

  3. Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

    Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the enacted constitutional text) · Legislation · 1791-12-15 · link verified 2026-07-24

    Verbatim text: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' Supports the reserved-powers structure of US federalism — that the states, not the federal government, hold residual authority. Cornell LII reproduces the enacted text; the constitutional text itself is authoritative. Does NOT support any claim about how a particular power is allocated in practice.

  4. What We Do — Duties and Operations, U.S. Marshals Service

    United States Marshals Service (usmarshals.gov) · Government publication · link verified 2026-07-24

    The agency's own description. Supports that the U.S. Marshals Service is the enforcement arm of the federal courts, and that its duties include protecting the federal judiciary, apprehending federal fugitives (with the broadest arrest authority among federal law-enforcement agencies), housing and transporting federal prisoners, managing seized assets and operating the Witness Security Program; and that it ASSISTS state and local agencies with fugitives rather than commanding them. Supports the federal judicial-enforcement role only; not operational detail.

  5. Competências da Polícia Federal

    Polícia Federal — gov.br (Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública) · Institutional (self-description) · link verified 2026-07-25

    The Polícia Federal's own page, read in full. Supports that the PF is a Union body that exercises, 'com exclusividade, as funções de polícia judiciária da União', carries out 'polícia marítima, aeroportuária e de fronteiras', and works to 'reprimir o tráfico ilícito de entorpecentes e drogas afins, o contrabando e o descaminho' — reproducing Art. 144 §1. Establishes the PF's federal remit (federal crimes, borders, drugs); does not cover the state forces.

  6. Código de Processo Penal — Decreto-Lei nº 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941

    Presidência da República — Casa Civil (Planalto) · Legislation · 1941-10-03 · link verified 2026-07-25

    The authoritative Portuguese text, read in full. Supports the structure of criminal investigation: the polícia judiciária 'será exercida pelas autoridades policiais' and has the purpose of 'a apuração das infrações penais e da sua autoria' (Art. 4), and the inquérito policial 'acompanhará a denúncia ou queixa, sempre que servir de base a uma ou outra' (Art. 12) — the police investigation feeds, but is distinct from, the charging instrument. Does not itself establish the constitutional police/MP structure (Art. 144 / 129). Portuguese authoritative.

  7. Ley Orgánica 2/1986, de 13 de marzo, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad

    Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe.es), BOE-A-1986-6859 · Legislation · 1986-03-13 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The organic law of the security forces, read in full for the relevant articles. Supports the THREE tiers of security forces: the Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado (national), the police of the Autonomous Communities, and the local police. Names the two national forces (art. 9): 'a) El Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, que es un Instituto Armado de naturaleza civil, dependiente del Ministro del Interior. b) La Guardia Civil, que es un Instituto Armado de naturaleza militar...' — so the Guardia Civil is a militarily-organised force, not merely rural police. Provides the framework within which the Autonomous Communities that so provide in their Statutes create their own police forces.

  8. Constitución Española de 1978

    Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe.es), BOE-A-1978-31229 · Legislation · 1978-12-29 · link verified 2026-07-26

    The authoritative Castilian text, read in full. Supports: art. 2 (the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation and the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions); art. 137 (the State organised into municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities); art. 145.1 ('En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas' — federation is constitutionally forbidden, so Spain is a decentralised UNITARY state); art. 148 (competences the Communities MAY assume) and art. 149.1 (the State's EXCLUSIVE competences), including art. 149.1.6 ('Legislación mercantil, penal y penitenciaria; legislación procesal' — criminal, penitentiary and procedural LEGISLATION is exclusively the State's), art. 149.1.5 (Administration of Justice), and art. 149.1.29 (public security, 'sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de creación de policías por las Comunidades Autónomas' — the basis for autonomous police); art. 104 (security forces under the Government); art. 117.5 ('El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales' — judicial unity); art. 122 (the Consejo General del Poder Judicial as the judiciary's governing body); art. 123 (the Tribunal Supremo, 'con jurisdicción en toda España, es el órgano jurisdiccional superior en todos los órdenes'); art. 124 (the Ministerio Fiscal, national, acting under unidad de actuación y dependencia jerárquica); art. 152.1 (a Tribunal Superior de Justicia culminating the judicial organisation in each community, without prejudice to the Supreme Court); and arts. 24-25 (due-process and penal principles). WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same authoritative Castilian text. Supports art. 53.1, that the rights and liberties recognised in Chapter Two bind all public powers and may be regulated only by law respecting their essential content, protected in accordance with art. 161.1.a); and art. 53.2 in terms: "Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional" — protection is sought first before the ORDINARY courts by a preferential and summary procedure, and where appropriate thereafter by amparo before the Constitutional Court. Supports art. 54, that an organic law regulates the Defensor del Pueblo as high commissioner of the Cortes Generales for the defence of the rights in that Title, who may supervise the activity of the Administration and reports to the Cortes. Cited for the SEQUENCE — ordinary courts first, constitutional court where appropriate — and not for any claim about admissibility criteria or outcomes. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same authoritative Castilian text on the BOE. Spain writes the emergency architecture into the constitution itself in more detail than almost any system in this wave. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(1): “1. Una ley orgánica regulará los estados de alarma, de excepción y de sitio, y las competencias y limitaciones correspondientes.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(2), (3) and (4): “2. El estado de alarma será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros por un plazo máximo de quince días, dando cuenta al Congreso de los Diputados, reunido inmediatamente al efecto y sin cuya autorización no podrá ser prorrogado dicho plazo. El decreto determinará el ámbito territorial a que se extienden los efectos de la declaración. 3. El estado de excepción será declarado por el Gobierno mediante decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros, previa autorización del Congreso de los Diputados. La autorización y proclamación del estado de excepción deberá determinar expresamente los efectos del mismo, el ámbito territorial a que se extiende y su duración, que no podrá exceder de treinta días, prorrogables por otro plazo igual, con los mismos requisitos. 4. El estado de sitio será declarado por la mayoría absoluta del Congreso de los Diputados, a propuesta exclusiva del Gobierno. El Congreso determinará su ámbito territorial, duración y condiciones.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 55(1): “1. Los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 17, 18, apartados 2 y 3, artículos 19, 20, apartados 1, a) y d), y 5, artículos 21, 28, apartado 2, y artículo 37, apartado 2, podrán ser suspendidos cuando se acuerde la declaración del estado de excepción o de sitio en los términos previstos en la Constitución. Se exceptúa de lo establecido anteriormente el apartado 3 del artículo 17 para el supuesto de declaración de estado de excepción.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 116(5); cf. Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 1.Cuatro ("La declaración de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio no interrumpe el normal funcionamiento de los poderes constitucionales del Estado."): “5. No podrá procederse a la disolución del Congreso mientras estén declarados algunos de los estados comprendidos en el presente artículo, quedando automáticamente convocadas las Cámaras si no estuvieren en período de sesiones. Su funcionamiento, así como el de los demás poderes constitucionales del Estado, no podrán interrumpirse durante la vigencia de estos estados. Disuelto el Congreso o expirado su mandato, si se produjere alguna de las situaciones que dan lugar a cualquiera de dichos estados, las competencias del Congreso serán asumidas por su Diputación Permanente.”. Supports Constitución Española de 1978, Art. 117(5)-(6); Ley Orgánica 4/1981 Art. 35 ("En la declaración del estado de sitio el Congreso de los Diputados podrá determinar los delitos que durante su vigencia quedan sometidos a la Jurisdicción Militar."): “5. El principio de unidad jurisdiccional es la base de la organización y funcionamiento de los Tribunales. La ley regulará el ejercicio de la jurisdicción militar en el ámbito estrictamente castrense y en los supuestos de estado de sitio, de acuerdo con los principios de la Constitución. 6. Se prohíben los Tribunales de excepción.”. Cited for the three graded regimes, the closed list of suspendable rights and the express bar on suspension under the estado de alarma, the institutional-continuity guarantee, and the confinement of military jurisdiction. It records no declaration and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same BOE consolidated text, article by article. Supports Art. 17(1)-(4): “1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad. Nadie puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de lo establecido en este artículo y en los casos y en la forma previstos en la ley. 2. La detención preventiva no podrá durar más del tiempo estrictamente necesario para la realización de las averiguaciones tendentes al esclarecimiento de los hechos, y, en todo caso, en el plazo máximo de setenta y dos horas, el detenido deberá ser puesto en libertad o a disposición de la autoridad judicial. 3. Toda persona detenida debe ser informada de forma inmediata, y de modo que le sea comprensible, de sus derechos y de las razones de su detención, no pudiendo ser obligada a declarar. Se garantiza la asistencia de abogado al detenido en las diligencias policiales y judiciales, en los términos que la ley establezca. 4. La ley regulará un procedimiento de «habeas corpus» [...]” Supports Art. 18(1)-(4): “1. Se garantiza el derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen. 2. El domicilio es inviolable. Ninguna entrada o registro podrá hacerse en él sin consentimiento del titular o resolución judicial, salvo en caso de flagrante delito. 3. Se garantiza el secreto de las comunicaciones y, en especial, de las postales, telegráficas y telefónicas, salvo resolución judicial. 4. La ley limitará el uso de la informática para garantizar el honor y la intimidad personal y familiar de los ciudadanos y el pleno ejercicio de sus derechos.” Supports Art. 19, and specifically its rights-holder wording: “Los españoles tienen derecho a elegir libremente su residencia y a circular por el territorio nacional” — against Art. 17(1)'s “Toda persona”. Supports Art. 24(1)-(2), including the right to effective judicial protection without indefensión, and the rights “al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción de inocencia”. Supports Art. 24(1) verbatim, including the phrase quoted on the equality-of-arms page: “1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión.” Supports Art. 53(1) AND 53(2): “1. Los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Capítulo segundo del presente Título vinculan a todos los poderes públicos. Sólo por ley, que en todo caso deberá respetar su contenido esencial, podrá regularse el ejercicio de tales derechos y libertades, que se tutelarán de acuerdo con lo previsto en el artículo 161, 1, a). 2. Cualquier ciudadano podrá recabar la tutela de las libertades y derechos reconocidos en el artículo 14 y la Sección primera del Capítulo segundo ante los Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y sumariedad y, en su caso, a través del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional.” Constitutional text only — no decision of the Tribunal Constitucional, no provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, nothing about any other country.

  9. Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 163 — Aufgaben der Polizei im Ermittlungsverfahren (German original text)

    Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-07-24

    Authoritative German text. Supports § 163(1): the authorities and officials of the police service must investigate offences and take all measures that permit no delay in order to prevent the matter being obscured. Supports that the police hold their own statutory first-access investigative duty alongside the prosecution's direction. Does NOT support operational detail of any kind.

  10. Zákon č. 341/2011 Sb., o Generální inspekci bezpečnostních sborů — konsolidované znění

    Parlament České republiky, consolidated text via Zákony pro lidi · Legislation · 2011-11-06 · link verified 2026-08-25

    The consolidated Czech Act on the General Inspection of Security Forces, version in force from 1 January 2026, read directly. Supports: that the inspection is established as an "ozbrojený bezpečnostní sbor" — an armed security force (§ 1(1)); that its director is appointed and removed by the prime minister on the government’s proposal after discussion in the Chamber of Deputies’ security committee, and is answerable to the prime minister (§ 1(2)); that it is an organisational unit of the state whose income and expenditure form a separate chapter of the state budget (§ 1(4)); that its task is to search out, detect and investigate facts indicating a crime by an officer of the Police of the Czech Republic, the Customs Administration or the Prison Service, by its own members, and by state employees of those bodies where the offence relates to their work (§ 2(1)-(2)); that it conducts reliability tests (§ 2(3)); that it monitors unlawful activity and proposes preventive measures and methodological recommendations (§ 2(4)-(5)); that it may restrict personal liberty and use coercive means (§§ 10-11, 23-27); and that the Act provides no complaint procedure, only a duty to accept an alert and reply within 30 days, which for officers of other forces is confined to conduct amounting to a CRIMINAL offence while for its own members it extends to administrative and disciplinary offences. It does not give the inspection any disciplinary power over the forces it investigates, and it does not give it prosecuting authority: the státní zástupce decides the prosecution question, and offences by the inspection’s own members are investigated by the státní zástupce. The transitional provisions (§§ 68-70) additionally support that the inspection took over the staff, property and unfinished proceedings of the Inspekce Policie České republiky, which sat within the Ministry of the Interior — establishing the predecessor relationship.

  11. Påtaleinstruksen (FOR-1985-06-28-1679), kapittel 34 — Saker som etterforskes av Spesialenheten for politisaker

    Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet (Norway), via Lovdata · Legislation · 1985-06-28 · link verified 2026-08-25

    The consolidated Norwegian prosecution instruction, chapter 34, in the version in force from 15 August 2025, read in full. Supports: that investigation of criminal acts committed in the course of duty by an employee of the police or the prosecuting authority is carried out and led by a separate central body, Spesialenheten for politisaker, which is a "riksdekkende etterforskings- og påtalemyndighet" (§ 34-1); that persons in the unit may not simultaneously be employed in the police or prosecuting authority, with a two-year quarantine for those appointed to office, and that the Ministry of Justice holds overall administrative responsibility (§ 34-1); that the Chief decides the prosecution question except where it belongs to the riksadvokaten, and conducts the case in court where the unit indicts (§ 34-3); that the Chief MUST reject cases outside the unit’s competence, "for eksempel fordi det anmeldte forhold ikke er straffbart" (§ 34-5); that investigation shall be opened even without suspicion of an offence where a person dies or is seriously injured as a result of police or prosecuting-authority duty or while in their care (§ 34-6); that the Chief shall send a case to the relevant politimester where it should be assessed administratively (§ 34-7); and that the riksadvokaten may order the unit to open, carry out and stop an investigation (§ 34-9). It does not establish complaint handling, discipline, or inspection, none of which the chapter provides for.

  12. Constitution of Kenya, 2010

    National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27

    The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.