Investigations
Is listening to a conversation the same legal act as obtaining messages already stored?
No system read here treats them as one power. The Convention gives each its own article; Germany conditions them differently in the same code; and Japan’s Code excludes interception altogether, routing it to a separate Act.
In short
A communication can be reached at two different moments: while it is passing between the parties, and afterwards, when a copy of it is sitting somewhere. The two look similar to a reader and are not the same act in any legal system examined for this page.
AnalysisThe difference is not primarily technical. Interception reaches a communication that has not happened yet, for a period into the future, against a person who does not know. Obtaining stored material reaches something that already exists, in a definite quantity, usually from a third party who holds it. Those are different intrusions and they attract different rules.
Why it exists
AnalysisThe reason systems separate them is that the future tense changes what an authorisation is doing. An order to obtain stored material is an order about a known quantity of existing data. An order to intercept is a licence to collect whatever occurs during a period — including communications with people who are not suspected of anything, about subjects that have nothing to do with the investigation, which have not happened yet and therefore cannot be described in advance.
How it works
The Convention on Cybercrime allocates them to different articles in different titles. Stored computer data is reached under Article 19, the power to search or similarly access a computer system or storage medium, and under Article 18, the power to order a person to submit specified stored computer data. Real-time collection is Title 5: Article 20 for traffic data, and Article 21 for content data — the latter available only "in relation to a range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law".
Germany places both inside its Code of Criminal Procedure and conditions them differently. Monitoring telecommunications under § 100a requires specific facts grounding suspicion of a serious offence from the § 100a(2) catalogue, that the offence weigh seriously also in the individual case, and that investigating by other means would be substantially more difficult or futile. Material already on a seized storage medium is reached instead through the examination regime of § 110, which has no offence catalogue at all and belongs to the prosecution office.
Japan makes the separation structural rather than conditional. Article 218(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the general power to conduct search, seizure or inspection upon a warrant issued by a judge. Article 222-2 then provides, in a single sentence, that "compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts" — the Code does not contain the interception power at all.
United States law puts the two in different statutory chapters, and the stored side is graded internally. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), a governmental entity may require disclosure of the contents of a communication in electronic storage for one hundred and eighty days or less "only pursuant to a warrant"; contents held longer may be required by the means available under § 2703(b), which permit a warrant without notice, or a subpoena or court order with prior notice to the subscriber or customer, with delayed notice available under § 2705.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: Interception and access to stored messages are the same power under a different name.
In practice: The Convention places them in different titles with different articles; Germany conditions interception on a serious-offence catalogue while reaching seized stored material through an examination regime with none; and Japan’s Code excludes interception entirely, directing it to other legislation.
Common belief: Whether a communication is "stored" or "in transit" decides which power applies.
In practice: Not in every system. The third sentence of Germany’s § 100a(1) permits communication content stored on the person’s own system to be monitored under the interception power where it could also have been monitored in transit in encrypted form. The boundary there is functional, not locational.
Common belief: Obtaining stored communications is the lesser intrusion, so it needs less.
In practice: Not uniformly. In the United States a warrant is required for contents in electronic storage for 180 days or less — a higher instrument than the court order or subpoena available for other categories in the same statute.
This page states the statutory routes and does not rank intrusions.
Common belief: Every legal system keeps interception in its criminal procedure code.
In practice: Japan’s Article 222-2 provides that compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts.
Common belief: Because interception is tightly conditioned, systems do not permit it.
In practice: Article 21 of the Convention obliges Parties to establish the power to intercept content data in relation to a range of serious offences determined by domestic law, and to compel a service provider within its existing technical capability to assist. The conditions are the terms on which it is permitted, not a refusal to permit it.
Common belief: A system that intercepts a person’s communications will tell them.
In practice: It depends on the provision. Germany imposes a notification duty on covert measures under § 101(4) and permits it to be withheld where overriding protectable interests require. The Convention instead obliges Parties to make service providers keep the execution of Articles 20 and 21 confidential — a duty on a different party, running the other way.
Notification and its deferral are the subject of a separate page on scope, duration and notification.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Four ways to keep the two apart, and they are not variations on one design.
- Different articles in different titles, with content interception the narrower power — Council of Europe, Convention Arts. 18 and 19 against Arts. 20 and 21, read with Art. 14(3)(a).
- The same code, different conditions: a serious-offence catalogue and a subsidiarity test for interception, an examination regime with neither for seized storage — Germany, StPO §§ 100a and 110.
- A functional boundary rather than a locational one — Germany, § 100a(1) third sentence.
- The interception power placed outside the procedure code entirely — Japan, CCP Art. 222-2.
- Different statutory chapters, with the stored side graded by age of the material and by whether notice is given — United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and (b).
Rights and accountability
AnalysisThe constitutional half of this question is answered elsewhere in the corpus and is not repeated here: which interest a system protects when it protects communications, and whether a judge must authorise interference with it, is answered at intercepting communications. What this page adds is the statutory layer beneath — that the constitutional protection is implemented by more than one power, and that the powers are not interchangeable.
What we could not establish
- The United States Wiretap Act was not read for this wave; only the stored-communications provisions were. Nothing here states the American standard for real-time interception.
- The Japanese Act to which Article 222-2 refers was not read. That the Code excludes interception is a fact about the Code and says nothing about the content of the separate Act.
- Nothing here describes any interception method, any technology, or anything about how a communication is transmitted, secured or obtained. That is a deliberate limit on the research.
Where to go next
Related: intercepting communications, content and communications data, and who authorises a digital investigative measure.
Related topics
- Is who a person contacted treated the same as what they said?
No. Two instruments define the line in their own text — the Convention defines subscriber information as data "other than traffic or content data", and United States law excludes contents from the pen-register and subscriber-record definitions — and the three categories carry different conditions.
- Who decides that an investigator may take a digital investigative step?
Not always a judge, and not always the same judge. One German power needs a single court, another a three-judge panel with a higher court taking over after six months; United States law allocates three different instruments to three categories; and the Convention requires "judicial or other independent supervision".
- Is reading someone’s letters or listening to their calls treated like searching their home?
Not in the same way, and two neighbouring systems answer in opposite directions. The Netherlands requires a judge for communications but not for the home; Germany requires a judge for the home and, for some communications cases, replaces court recourse with parliamentary review.
- If data has been "preserved", has anyone read it?
No. Preservation freezes material so that it still exists later; production hands it over. The Convention caps preservation at ninety days precisely because its purpose is to enable authorities to seek disclosure afterwards, by a separate power.
Sources
Council of Europe; consulted in the official treaty database of the Government of the Netherlands (wetten.overheid.nl, BWBV0001839) · International organisation · 2001-11-23 · link verified 2026-09-05
WAVE 22 ADDITION. ACCESS NOTE: rm.coe.int and coe.int returned HTTP 403 to automated requests in this session, so the Convention was read from the official Dutch government treaty database, which publishes the authentic English text alongside the Dutch translation. The English text quoted below is the authentic one; English and French are the authentic languages. Supports Art. 14(1)–(2), that the procedural powers are established “for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings” and are applied to the offences established under Arts. 2–11, to other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system, and to “the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence”. Supports Art. 14(3)(a), that a Party restricting the Art. 20 power to specified offences must not restrict it more narrowly than the range to which it applies Art. 21. Supports Art. 15(1), that the powers are subject to conditions and safeguards under domestic law providing adequate protection of human rights, including rights under the 1950 European Convention and the 1966 Covenant, “and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality”. Supports Art. 15(2), that such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate, “include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure”. Supports Art. 16(1)–(3): expedited preservation of specified stored computer data “including traffic data”, in particular where it is particularly vulnerable to loss or modification; where effected by order to a person, an obligation to preserve and maintain integrity “for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of ninety days, to enable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure”, renewable; and an obligation on the custodian to keep the undertaking of the procedure confidential. Supports Art. 17, expedited preservation and PARTIAL disclosure of traffic data sufficient to identify the service providers and the path through which the communication was transmitted. Supports Art. 18(1)(a)–(b), the production order: a person in the territory to submit specified stored computer data in that person’s possession or control, and a service provider offering services in the territory to submit subscriber information. Supports Art. 18(3), which defines “subscriber information” as information held by a service provider relating to subscribers of its services “OTHER THAN TRAFFIC OR CONTENT DATA” and by which the type of service, the subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, and information on the site of installation of communication equipment can be established. Supports Art. 19(1)–(4): the power to search or similarly access a computer system or a computer-data storage medium; the power under 19(2) to EXTEND the search expeditiously to another system in the territory where the data sought is “lawfully accessible from or available to the initial system”; the power under 19(3) to seize or similarly secure, comprising the separate powers to “seize or similarly secure a computer system or part of it or a computer-data storage medium”, to “make and retain a copy of those computer data”, to “maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data”, and to “render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer system”; and the power under 19(4) to order any person with knowledge about the functioning of the system to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information. Supports Art. 20, real-time collection of TRAFFIC data, and Art. 21, interception of CONTENT data, the latter available only “in relation to a range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law”; both articles oblige a service provider to keep the execution confidential. Cited for the structural propositions that preservation is a distinct act from production, that traffic data and content data are distinct powers, that subscriber information is defined by exclusion from both, and that seizing, copying and accessing are separately enumerated. LIMITATIONS, and they are load-bearing: this is a TREATY. It obliges Parties to establish powers in domestic law; it is NOT evidence of what any particular Party has enacted, and no country claim on this platform rests on it. It describes no technique. STATUS: in force; the Convention has two additional protocols, of which the Second Additional Protocol on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence was located but NOT read for this wave. WAVE 23 ADDITION. That Protocol has now been read and is held separately as `coe-cybercrime-second-protocol`. Chapter III of the Convention, on international co-operation, was read from the same authentic English text, and it is a different subject from the domestic powers above. Supports Art. 23, that Parties co-operate “in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws”. Supports Art. 25(1)-(4), and in particular Art. 25(2), that “Each Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to carry out the obligations set forth in Articles 27 through 35” -- the Convention’s own statement that its co-operation articles are not self-executing -- and Art. 25(4), that except as specifically provided “mutual assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse co-operation”. Supports Art. 27(1), that the Article applies only “where there is no mutual assistance treaty or arrangement on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation in force between the requesting and requested Parties”, and Art. 27(2)(a)-(d), that each Party designates a central authority “responsible for sending and answering requests for mutual assistance, the execution of such requests or their transmission to the authorities competent for their execution”, that central authorities communicate directly with each other, and that the Secretary General keeps a register of them. Supports Art. 29(1)-(4): a Party may request another to preserve data “located within the territory of that other Party and in respect of which the requesting Party intends to submit a request for mutual assistance”; the request must state that intention (29(2)(f)); “For the purposes of responding to a request, dual criminality shall not be required as a condition to providing such preservation” (29(3)); and a Party that requires dual criminality for disclosure may reserve the right to refuse preservation where it has reasons to believe the condition cannot be fulfilled at the time of disclosure (29(4)). Supports Art. 30(1)-(2), expedited disclosure of a sufficient amount of preserved traffic data to identify a service provider in another State and the path through which the communication was transmitted, withholdable only for a political offence or where execution is likely to prejudice sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests. Supports Art. 31(1)-(3), mutual assistance to search, seize and disclose stored data “including data that has been preserved pursuant to Article 29”, responded to on an expedited basis where data is particularly vulnerable to loss. Supports Art. 32 IN FULL, and its narrowness is the point: “A Party may, without the authorisation of another Party: a) access publicly available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically; or b) access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system.” There is no third limb and no unilateral remote-access provision. Supports Art. 33(1)-(2), mutual assistance in the real-time collection of traffic data, governed by the conditions and procedures of domestic law and available at least for offences for which such collection would be available in a similar domestic case; and Art. 34, mutual assistance regarding the interception of content data “to the extent permitted under their applicable treaties and domestic laws”. Supports Art. 35(1)-(2), that each Party designates a point of contact available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to ensure immediate assistance -- facilitating or, if permitted by its domestic law and practice, directly carrying out technical advice, preservation under Arts. 29 and 30, and the collection of evidence, provision of legal information and locating of suspects -- and that where the point of contact is not part of the Party’s authority responsible for international mutual assistance, it must ensure co-ordination with that authority. LIMITATION ON CHAPTER III, restated because it is easy to lose: these are obligations on Parties to legislate and to co-operate. They are NOT evidence of what any Party has enacted. The Party list, signature dates and ratification counts were NOT RESEARCHED, because the Council of Europe Treaty Office returned HTTP 403 to three separate URL forms.
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 100a — Telekommunikationsüberwachung (German original text)
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05
WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 100a(1) sentence 1: telecommunications may be monitored and recorded even without the knowledge of those concerned where (1) specific facts ground the suspicion that someone has committed, attempted where the attempt is punishable, or prepared through an offence a SCHWERE STRAFTAT designated in subsection (2); (2) the offence weighs seriously ALSO IN THE INDIVIDUAL CASE; and (3) investigating the facts or determining the accused’s whereabouts by other means would be substantially more difficult or futile. Supports § 100a(1) sentence 2, that the monitoring may also be effected by intervening with technical means in information-technology systems used by the person concerned where this is necessary to enable monitoring and recording in particular in unencrypted form. Supports § 100a(1) sentence 3, that content and circumstances of communication STORED on the person’s information-technology system may be monitored and recorded where they could also have been monitored and recorded during the ongoing transmission process in the public telecommunications network in encrypted form — i.e. the category boundary is drawn by reference to what the interception power would have reached in transit. Supports that § 100a(2) contains a closed catalogue of qualifying offences. LIMITATIONS: this record establishes the CONDITIONS of the power, not who orders it (§ 100e) and not what follows it (§ 101). It describes no interception method, no technical means, and nothing about how any communication is protected or examined. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05
WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. This is the provision on which the wave’s seizure/examination finding rests. Supports § 110(1): “Die Durchsicht der Papiere des von der Durchsuchung Betroffenen steht der Staatsanwaltschaft und auf deren Anordnung ihren Ermittlungspersonen (§ 152 des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes) zu.” — the examination belongs to the public prosecution office and, on its order, its investigators. Supports § 110(2): other officials are entitled to examine found papers only where the holder consents; failing that they must place the papers they consider it necessary to examine in an envelope, sealed with the official seal IN THE PRESENCE OF THE HOLDER, and deliver them to the prosecution office. Supports § 110(3): “Nach Maßgabe der Absätze 1 und 2 ist auch die Durchsicht von elektronischen Speichermedien bei dem von der Durchsuchung Betroffenen zulässig. Diese Durchsicht darf auch auf hiervon räumlich getrennte Speichermedien erstreckt werden, soweit auf sie von dem elektronischen Speichermedium aus zugegriffen werden kann, wenn andernfalls der Verlust der gesuchten Daten zu befürchten ist. Daten, die für die Untersuchung von Bedeutung sein können, dürfen gesichert werden.” Supports § 110(4), applying §§ 95a and 98(2) correspondingly where papers are taken away for examination or data provisionally secured. Cited for three propositions: that examining electronic storage media is a distinct legal act from seizing the medium; that in German law it is allocated to a different authority from the one that may hold the item; and that an authorised examination may be EXTENDED to spatially separated storage media accessible from the device, on a stated condition. LIMITATIONS: it describes no examination technique, no tool, and nothing about how any protection on a device operates; the page displays no Stand date. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.
Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法), English translation
Ministry of Justice (Japanese Law Translation database) · Legislation · 1948 · link verified 2026-07-25
Cited from the official Japanese Law Translation database (reference only; original Japanese text has legal effect). Supports, at the structural level: that police officials act as judicial police officials investigating offences (Article 189); that public prosecutors may themselves investigate offences (Article 191); and that prosecution is instituted by a public prosecutor (Article 247), who holds the discretion whether to prosecute. Supports the allocation of investigative and charging responsibility; the English is not authoritative and no operational detail is drawn from it. WAVE 22 ADDITION. Read again from the same Japanese Law Translation page, this time from the database's own XML export of the Code (s23Aa001310201en2.0_h18A36.xml), fetched with the law page as referrer. TEMPORAL LIMITATION, stated because it is load-bearing for this wave: the version identifier indicates a translation reflecting amendments to 2006, so it MAY LAG later amendments, and only structural propositions present in that version are drawn from it. Supports Art. 197(1): with regard to investigation, “such examination as is necessary to achieve its objective may be conducted; provided, however, that compulsory dispositions shall not be applied unless special provisions have been established in this Code.” Supports Art. 218(1), that a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may, if necessary for investigation of an offense, conduct search, seizure or inspection UPON A WARRANT ISSUED BY A JUDGE, and Art. 218(3), that the warrant is issued upon their request. Supports Art. 219(1), that the warrant shall contain the name of the suspect or accused, the charged offense, THE ARTICLES TO BE SEIZED or the place, body or articles to be searched, the place or articles to be inspected, the valid period, and a statement that the search, seizure or inspection shall not be commenced after the lapse of that period and that the warrant shall then be returned to the court. Supports Art. 222-2 in full: “Compulsory measures for the interception of electronic communications without the consent of either party shall be executed based upon other acts.” Cited for three propositions: that a national code can state as a general rule that a compulsory measure requires a specific statutory provision; that the warrant instrument itself distinguishes what may be seized from what may be searched; and that a system may place the interception power OUTSIDE its general procedure code. The Act to which Art. 222-2 refers was NOT read, and this record supports no claim about its content. The English is a reference translation and the Japanese text has legal effect.
Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05
WAVE 22 ADDITION. ACCESS NOTE, stated because it affects the tier of this record: the official hosts were attempted first and were unreachable in this session — uscode.house.gov timed out without response and govinfo.gov returned HTTP 502 — so the text was read from the Legal Information Institute, which reproduces the United States Code verbatim rather than summarising it. It is cited for statutory wording only, and every proposition below is a quotation or a close paraphrase of one. Supports § 2703(a): a governmental entity may require disclosure of the CONTENTS of a wire or electronic communication in electronic storage for one hundred and eighty days or less “only pursuant to a warrant”; contents held more than one hundred and eighty days may be required by the means available under subsection (b). Supports § 2703(b)(1): contents held by a remote computing service may be required WITHOUT required notice to the subscriber or customer on a warrant, or WITH prior notice where the entity uses an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena or obtains a § 2703(d) court order, with delayed notice available under § 2705. Supports § 2703(c)(1), that a governmental entity may require disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (NOT INCLUDING THE CONTENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS)” only by warrant, § 2703(d) order, subscriber consent, a narrow written request confined to telemarketing-fraud investigations, or under paragraph (2). Supports § 2703(c)(2), which lists the six items a provider shall disclose on an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena: name; address; local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; length of service including start date and types of service utilised; telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and means and source of payment. Supports § 2703(c)(3), that a governmental entity receiving records under subsection (c) “is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer”. Supports § 2703(d), that a court order shall issue “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” the material sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”, and that a court may quash or modify on a provider’s prompt motion where the records are unusually voluminous or compliance would cause an undue burden. Cited for the proposition that one statute can allocate three different authorising instruments to three different categories of digital material. LIMITATIONS: this record supports the wording of § 2703 and nothing else. It establishes no United States constitutional doctrine, no case law, and nothing about the Wiretap Act, which was not read. STATUS: current codified text as reproduced at the verification date. WAVE 23 ADDITION. Section 2703(h) was read from the same source under the same access note. Supports § 2703(h)(1)(A), defining a “qualifying foreign government” as one “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has entered into force under section 2523” and whose laws provide electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers “substantive and procedural opportunities similar to those provided under paragraphs (2) and (5)”. Supports § 2703(h)(2)(A), that a provider -- “including a foreign electronic communication service or remote computing service” -- being required to disclose the contents of a communication may file a motion to modify or quash the legal process where it reasonably believes (i) that the customer or subscriber “is not a United States person and does not reside in the United States” and (ii) that the required disclosure “would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government”, such a motion to be filed not later than 14 days after service. Cited for the proposition that the same body of legislation which removes the data’s location as an answer also provides a route for a provider to raise a conflict of legal obligations. LIMITATION: which governments qualify turns on executive agreements under § 2523, and that coverage was NOT RESEARCHED. No list of qualifying foreign governments is stated anywhere on this platform.