Is who a person contacted treated the same as what they said?

Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, ETS No. 185, Budapest, 23 November 2001), Articles 14–21 and Chapter III (Articles 23–35)

Council of Europe; consulted in the official treaty database of the Government of the Netherlands (wetten.overheid.nl, BWBV0001839) · International organisation · 2001-11-23 · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. ACCESS NOTE: rm.coe.int and coe.int returned HTTP 403 to automated requests in this session, so the Convention was read from the official Dutch government treaty database, which publishes the authentic English text alongside the Dutch translation. The English text quoted below is the authentic one; English and French are the authentic languages. Supports Art. 14(1)–(2), that the procedural powers are established “for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings” and are applied to the offences established under Arts. 2–11, to other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system, and to “the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence”. Supports Art. 14(3)(a), that a Party restricting the Art. 20 power to specified offences must not restrict it more narrowly than the range to which it applies Art. 21. Supports Art. 15(1), that the powers are subject to conditions and safeguards under domestic law providing adequate protection of human rights, including rights under the 1950 European Convention and the 1966 Covenant, “and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality”. Supports Art. 15(2), that such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate, “include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure”. Supports Art. 16(1)–(3): expedited preservation of specified stored computer data “including traffic data”, in particular where it is particularly vulnerable to loss or modification; where effected by order to a person, an obligation to preserve and maintain integrity “for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of ninety days, to enable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure”, renewable; and an obligation on the custodian to keep the undertaking of the procedure confidential. Supports Art. 17, expedited preservation and PARTIAL disclosure of traffic data sufficient to identify the service providers and the path through which the communication was transmitted. Supports Art. 18(1)(a)–(b), the production order: a person in the territory to submit specified stored computer data in that person’s possession or control, and a service provider offering services in the territory to submit subscriber information. Supports Art. 18(3), which defines “subscriber information” as information held by a service provider relating to subscribers of its services “OTHER THAN TRAFFIC OR CONTENT DATA” and by which the type of service, the subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, and information on the site of installation of communication equipment can be established. Supports Art. 19(1)–(4): the power to search or similarly access a computer system or a computer-data storage medium; the power under 19(2) to EXTEND the search expeditiously to another system in the territory where the data sought is “lawfully accessible from or available to the initial system”; the power under 19(3) to seize or similarly secure, comprising the separate powers to “seize or similarly secure a computer system or part of it or a computer-data storage medium”, to “make and retain a copy of those computer data”, to “maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data”, and to “render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer system”; and the power under 19(4) to order any person with knowledge about the functioning of the system to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information. Supports Art. 20, real-time collection of TRAFFIC data, and Art. 21, interception of CONTENT data, the latter available only “in relation to a range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law”; both articles oblige a service provider to keep the execution confidential. Cited for the structural propositions that preservation is a distinct act from production, that traffic data and content data are distinct powers, that subscriber information is defined by exclusion from both, and that seizing, copying and accessing are separately enumerated. LIMITATIONS, and they are load-bearing: this is a TREATY. It obliges Parties to establish powers in domestic law; it is NOT evidence of what any particular Party has enacted, and no country claim on this platform rests on it. It describes no technique. STATUS: in force; the Convention has two additional protocols, of which the Second Additional Protocol on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence was located but NOT read for this wave. WAVE 23 ADDITION. That Protocol has now been read and is held separately as `coe-cybercrime-second-protocol`. Chapter III of the Convention, on international co-operation, was read from the same authentic English text, and it is a different subject from the domestic powers above. Supports Art. 23, that Parties co-operate “in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws”. Supports Art. 25(1)-(4), and in particular Art. 25(2), that “Each Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to carry out the obligations set forth in Articles 27 through 35” -- the Convention’s own statement that its co-operation articles are not self-executing -- and Art. 25(4), that except as specifically provided “mutual assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse co-operation”. Supports Art. 27(1), that the Article applies only “where there is no mutual assistance treaty or arrangement on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation in force between the requesting and requested Parties”, and Art. 27(2)(a)-(d), that each Party designates a central authority “responsible for sending and answering requests for mutual assistance, the execution of such requests or their transmission to the authorities competent for their execution”, that central authorities communicate directly with each other, and that the Secretary General keeps a register of them. Supports Art. 29(1)-(4): a Party may request another to preserve data “located within the territory of that other Party and in respect of which the requesting Party intends to submit a request for mutual assistance”; the request must state that intention (29(2)(f)); “For the purposes of responding to a request, dual criminality shall not be required as a condition to providing such preservation” (29(3)); and a Party that requires dual criminality for disclosure may reserve the right to refuse preservation where it has reasons to believe the condition cannot be fulfilled at the time of disclosure (29(4)). Supports Art. 30(1)-(2), expedited disclosure of a sufficient amount of preserved traffic data to identify a service provider in another State and the path through which the communication was transmitted, withholdable only for a political offence or where execution is likely to prejudice sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests. Supports Art. 31(1)-(3), mutual assistance to search, seize and disclose stored data “including data that has been preserved pursuant to Article 29”, responded to on an expedited basis where data is particularly vulnerable to loss. Supports Art. 32 IN FULL, and its narrowness is the point: “A Party may, without the authorisation of another Party: a) access publicly available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically; or b) access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system.” There is no third limb and no unilateral remote-access provision. Supports Art. 33(1)-(2), mutual assistance in the real-time collection of traffic data, governed by the conditions and procedures of domestic law and available at least for offences for which such collection would be available in a similar domestic case; and Art. 34, mutual assistance regarding the interception of content data “to the extent permitted under their applicable treaties and domestic laws”. Supports Art. 35(1)-(2), that each Party designates a point of contact available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to ensure immediate assistance -- facilitating or, if permitted by its domestic law and practice, directly carrying out technical advice, preservation under Arts. 29 and 30, and the collection of evidence, provision of legal information and locating of suspects -- and that where the point of contact is not part of the Party’s authority responsible for international mutual assistance, it must ensure co-ordination with that authority. LIMITATION ON CHAPTER III, restated because it is easy to lose: these are obligations on Parties to legislate and to co-operate. They are NOT evidence of what any Party has enacted. The Party list, signature dates and ratification counts were NOT RESEARCHED, because the Council of Europe Treaty Office returned HTTP 403 to three separate URL forms.

18 U.S.C. § 2703 — Required disclosure of customer communications or records (Stored Communications Act)

Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. ACCESS NOTE, stated because it affects the tier of this record: the official hosts were attempted first and were unreachable in this session — uscode.house.gov timed out without response and govinfo.gov returned HTTP 502 — so the text was read from the Legal Information Institute, which reproduces the United States Code verbatim rather than summarising it. It is cited for statutory wording only, and every proposition below is a quotation or a close paraphrase of one. Supports § 2703(a): a governmental entity may require disclosure of the CONTENTS of a wire or electronic communication in electronic storage for one hundred and eighty days or less “only pursuant to a warrant”; contents held more than one hundred and eighty days may be required by the means available under subsection (b). Supports § 2703(b)(1): contents held by a remote computing service may be required WITHOUT required notice to the subscriber or customer on a warrant, or WITH prior notice where the entity uses an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena or obtains a § 2703(d) court order, with delayed notice available under § 2705. Supports § 2703(c)(1), that a governmental entity may require disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (NOT INCLUDING THE CONTENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS)” only by warrant, § 2703(d) order, subscriber consent, a narrow written request confined to telemarketing-fraud investigations, or under paragraph (2). Supports § 2703(c)(2), which lists the six items a provider shall disclose on an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena: name; address; local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; length of service including start date and types of service utilised; telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and means and source of payment. Supports § 2703(c)(3), that a governmental entity receiving records under subsection (c) “is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer”. Supports § 2703(d), that a court order shall issue “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” the material sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”, and that a court may quash or modify on a provider’s prompt motion where the records are unusually voluminous or compliance would cause an undue burden. Cited for the proposition that one statute can allocate three different authorising instruments to three different categories of digital material. LIMITATIONS: this record supports the wording of § 2703 and nothing else. It establishes no United States constitutional doctrine, no case law, and nothing about the Wiretap Act, which was not read. STATUS: current codified text as reproduced at the verification date. WAVE 23 ADDITION. Section 2703(h) was read from the same source under the same access note. Supports § 2703(h)(1)(A), defining a “qualifying foreign government” as one “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has entered into force under section 2523” and whose laws provide electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers “substantive and procedural opportunities similar to those provided under paragraphs (2) and (5)”. Supports § 2703(h)(2)(A), that a provider -- “including a foreign electronic communication service or remote computing service” -- being required to disclose the contents of a communication may file a motion to modify or quash the legal process where it reasonably believes (i) that the customer or subscriber “is not a United States person and does not reside in the United States” and (ii) that the required disclosure “would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government”, such a motion to be filed not later than 14 days after service. Cited for the proposition that the same body of legislation which removes the data’s location as an answer also provides a route for a provider to raise a conflict of legal obligations. LIMITATION: which governments qualify turns on executive agreements under § 2523, and that coverage was NOT RESEARCHED. No list of qualifying foreign governments is stated anywhere on this platform.

18 U.S.C. § 3127 — Definitions for chapter (pen registers and trap and trace devices)

Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (reproducing the United States Code) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The same access note applies as for us-18usc-2703-stored-communications: the official hosts were attempted and unreachable in this session, and the text was read from the Legal Information Institute’s verbatim reproduction of the United States Code. Supports § 3127(3), the statutory definition: the term “pen register” means “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication”, and excludes devices or processes used by a provider or customer for billing or for cost accounting in the ordinary course of business. Cited for one proposition only: that United States law states the content / non-content boundary as a matter of statutory definition rather than leaving it to be inferred. LIMITATIONS: this record supports the DEFINITION. It establishes nothing about the standard for obtaining such an order, nothing about how any such device or process operates, and nothing about any other country. STATUS: current codified text as reproduced at the verification date.

Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 100g — Erhebung von Verkehrsdaten (German original text)

Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 100g(1): where specific facts ground the suspicion that someone has committed (1) an offence of significant weight also in the individual case, in particular one designated in § 100a(2), or (2) an offence committed by means of telecommunications, Verkehrsdaten may be collected so far as necessary to investigate the facts and provided the collection stands in an appropriate relationship to the significance of the matter; in case (2) the measure is permissible only where investigating the facts by other means would be futile. Supports the LOCATION-DATA distinction, which is stated inside this subsection: “Die Erhebung gespeicherter (retrograder) Standortdaten ist nach diesem Absatz nur unter den Voraussetzungen des Absatzes 2 zulässig. Im Übrigen ist die Erhebung von Standortdaten nur für künftig anfallende Verkehrsdaten oder in Echtzeit und nur im Fall des Satzes 1 Nummer 1 zulässig, soweit sie für die Erforschung des Sachverhalts oder die Ermittlung des Aufenthaltsortes des Beschuldigten erforderlich ist.” — stored (retrograde) location data only on the stricter subsection (2) conditions; otherwise location data only prospectively or in real time. Supports that § 100g(2) applies a narrower, especially-serious-offence condition. Cited for the proposition that traffic data is a distinct category from content with its own threshold, and that at least one system splits location data by whether it is historical or prospective. LIMITATIONS: the definitions of Verkehrsdaten are in the instruments this section cross-refers to and were not read; nothing here describes how any such data is generated, held or obtained in practice. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.

Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 100j — Bestandsdatenauskunft (German original text)

Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 100j(1) sentence 1: so far as necessary to investigate the facts or to determine the whereabouts of an accused, information may be requested about Bestandsdaten from those who commercially provide or participate in providing telecommunications services, and about the corresponding category from those who commercially hold ready or mediate access to digital services. Supports the GRADUATION inside the same subsection: where the request concerns data by which access to terminal devices, or to storage facilities used in or physically separate from them, is PROTECTED, the information may be requested only where the statutory conditions for using those data are met, and — for the digital-services limb — only for the prosecution of an especially serious offence within the meaning of the listed § 100b(2) categories. Cited for the proposition that subscriber-type information sits at the least-protected end of the ladder for ordinary purposes while access-credential data is pulled up to the level of the most intrusive power in the same code. LIMITATIONS: the definitions of Bestandsdaten sit in the telecommunications and digital-services statutes this section cross-refers to and were not read; this record establishes no claim about what any provider holds, and describes nothing about how access protections work. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.

Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 100a — Telekommunikationsüberwachung (German original text)

Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-09-05

WAVE 22 ADDITION. The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 100a(1) sentence 1: telecommunications may be monitored and recorded even without the knowledge of those concerned where (1) specific facts ground the suspicion that someone has committed, attempted where the attempt is punishable, or prepared through an offence a SCHWERE STRAFTAT designated in subsection (2); (2) the offence weighs seriously ALSO IN THE INDIVIDUAL CASE; and (3) investigating the facts or determining the accused’s whereabouts by other means would be substantially more difficult or futile. Supports § 100a(1) sentence 2, that the monitoring may also be effected by intervening with technical means in information-technology systems used by the person concerned where this is necessary to enable monitoring and recording in particular in unencrypted form. Supports § 100a(1) sentence 3, that content and circumstances of communication STORED on the person’s information-technology system may be monitored and recorded where they could also have been monitored and recorded during the ongoing transmission process in the public telecommunications network in encrypted form — i.e. the category boundary is drawn by reference to what the interception power would have reached in transit. Supports that § 100a(2) contains a closed catalogue of qualifying offences. LIMITATIONS: this record establishes the CONDITIONS of the power, not who orders it (§ 100e) and not what follows it (§ 101). It describes no interception method, no technical means, and nothing about how any communication is protected or examined. STATUS: current consolidated text at the verification date.