Justice
Where does the victim of a crime stand in a criminal case?
Not as a party, in most systems — a public prosecution is brought by the state, not on the victim’s behalf. Some systems then create a route back in, and German law lets specified victims join the prosecution as an accessory prosecutor.
In short
In a criminal case the parties are the prosecution and the accused. The person harmed by the offence is, in most systems, neither — they are a witness to the case, and the case is not theirs. That is a structural fact about public prosecution rather than an oversight, and understanding it is what makes the mechanisms some systems build on top of it intelligible.
Why it exists
AnalysisPublic prosecution exists precisely so that the response to crime does not depend on the resources, persistence or wishes of the person harmed. That is a genuine protection: it means a case can proceed where the victim cannot pursue it, and it removes the pressure that would otherwise fall on them to. The cost of the arrangement is that the person with the strongest interest in the outcome has no standing in the proceedings about it.
How it works
Germany builds a route in and defines it carefully. Section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out who may join a public prosecution already brought, as a Nebenkläger — an accessory prosecutor. Subsection (1) lists offence groups whose victims may join, among them offences against sexual self-determination, attempted murder and manslaughter, bodily-injury offences including ill-treatment in office, and offences of trafficking, deprivation of liberty and coercion.
Two further categories follow. Subsection (2) extends the same power to persons whose children, parents, siblings, spouses or life partners were killed by an unlawful act, and to persons who brought about the raising of the public charge by an application for judicial decision. Subsection (3) allows joinder by a person injured by another unlawful act where this appears necessary for the protection of their interests for special reasons, in particular because of the grave consequences of the act.
Timing is generous where the substance is narrow. Subsection (4) provides that joinder is permissible at any stage of the proceedings, and may occur after judgment for the purpose of lodging an appeal.
Participation once granted carries practical entitlements, and one of them shows how the mechanisms interlock. Section 187(4) of the Courts Constitution Act applies the interpreter and translator provision — including the entitlement to free engagement of an interpreter for the whole proceedings — correspondingly to persons entitled to join the public prosecution as a Nebenkläger. A route into the case brings the means of following it.
Other systems address victims by directing that the subject be legislated for rather than by creating a mechanism in the constitution itself. Kenya’s Article 50(9) provides that Parliament shall enact legislation providing for the protection, rights and welfare of victims of offences. Kenya’s Article 50(7) also lets a court allow an intermediary to assist a complainant — as well as an accused person — to communicate with the court.
Common misconceptions
Widely held beliefs that do not match how the system actually operates.
Common belief: The prosecutor is the victim’s lawyer.
In practice: A public prosecution is brought in the public interest, not on the victim’s behalf. The interests frequently coincide; the prosecutor’s duty is not defined by them, and the victim is not the prosecutor’s client.
Common belief: The victim decides whether a case goes ahead.
In practice: That is what public prosecution was designed to avoid, so that a case does not depend on the victim’s resources or persistence and so that pressure does not fall on them. Systems vary in how much weight a victim’s wishes carry, but the decision is not theirs.
Common belief: Victims have no standing in a criminal case anywhere.
In practice: German law lets specified victims join a public prosecution as a Nebenkläger, at any stage of the proceedings and even after judgment for the purpose of appealing.
Common belief: Where victim participation exists, it is open to every complainant.
In practice: The German provision enumerates offence groups, adds bereaved close relatives and those who forced a prosecution, and keeps a discretionary category for grave consequences. It is a defined route rather than a general entitlement.
How this varies between jurisdictions
A required section on every guide. Arrangements differ between countries, and we say how.
Two techniques, at different levels of the legal order.
- A statutory route into the proceedings for defined categories of victim, available at any stage — Germany, StPO § 395.
- A constitutional direction to the legislature to provide for victims’ protection, rights and welfare — Kenya, Art. 50(9).
- A judicial discretion to allow an intermediary to assist a complainant to communicate with the court — Kenya, Art. 50(7).
Rights and accountability
AnalysisStanding determines what a person can do when the system does something they disagree with. A witness who thinks a prosecution has gone wrong has no procedural route; a party has one. That is the practical difference the German mechanism creates, and it is why the question of who counts as a participant is not merely descriptive.
AnalysisThe interaction with fair-trial rights is real and is not a reason to dismiss either side. Participation by a victim adds a voice to proceedings whose subject is another person’s liberty, which is exactly why the systems that allow it define who may join and on what basis rather than opening it generally.
What we could not establish
- One participation mechanism is described in detail from primary text, and one constitutional mandate. Victim-support services, compensation schemes, protection measures and the rights that follow from joining a prosecution were not researched and are not described.
- This page describes where victims stand structurally. It is not guidance for anyone affected by a crime, and it describes no procedure for participating anywhere.
Where to go next
Related: why public prosecution exists, access to justice, and effective remedy.
Related topics
- Why is the decision to bring a criminal case a public function?
Someone has to decide whether the state’s case should proceed, and the choice of who has consequences. Placing it in a public office separates it from the people who investigated, from the person harmed, and from the court that will decide.
- What good is a legal right if a person cannot actually use it?
Constitutions increasingly treat access as a right in itself rather than assuming it. Kenya guarantees it expressly and constrains court fees; South Africa gives everyone the right to have a dispute decided by a court; Brazil forbids the law from excluding a rights claim from the judiciary.
- When the state gets something wrong, what is a person actually entitled to?
A remedy is what a forum can give, and constitutions state it in concrete terms: release from unlawful detention, review of an official decision, written reasons, invalidity of inconsistent law — and, in Brazil, indemnity for a wrongful conviction.
Where this connects
Institutions: Prosecution service.
Sources
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) § 395 — Befugnis zum Anschluss als Nebenkläger (German original text)
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26
The authoritative German text, read directly. Supports § 395(1): a person injured by an unlawful act under an enumerated list of offence groups — among them offences against sexual self-determination, attempted murder and manslaughter, bodily-injury offences including ill-treatment in office, offences of trafficking, deprivation of liberty and coercion, and offences under the Violence Protection Act and named intellectual-property statutes — may join the public prosecution already brought, or the application in security proceedings, as a Nebenkläger. Supports § 395(2): the same power belongs to persons whose children, parents, siblings, spouses or life partners were killed by an unlawful act, and to persons who brought about the raising of the public charge by an application for judicial decision under § 172. Supports § 395(3): a person injured by another unlawful act — in particular insult offences, negligent bodily injury, specified aggravated theft, robbery and extortion offences and attack on a driver — may join where this appears necessary for the protection of their interests for special reasons, in particular because of the grave consequences of the act. Supports § 395(4): joinder is permissible at any stage of the proceedings, and may occur after judgment for the purpose of lodging an appeal. Cited for the existence and structure of accessory prosecution as a form of victim participation. It supports no claim about how often it is used, about outcomes, or about any other country, and it describes none of the rights that follow from joinder.
Bundesministerium der Justiz / Bundesamt für Justiz (Gesetze im Internet) · Legislation · link verified 2026-08-26
The authoritative German text of both provisions, each read directly at its own page on Gesetze im Internet (§ 187 at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gvg/__187.html). Supports § 184 in full: "Die Gerichtssprache ist deutsch. Das Recht der Sorben, in den Heimatkreisen der sorbischen Bevölkerung vor Gericht sorbisch zu sprechen, ist gewährleistet." — the language of the court is German, and the right of the Sorbs to speak Sorbian before a court in the home districts of the Sorbian population is guaranteed. Supports § 187(1): the court engages an interpreter or translator for an accused or convicted person not in command of the German language so far as this is necessary for the exercise of their rights in criminal procedure, and instructs the accused in a language they understand that they may claim the free ("unentgeltliche") engagement of an interpreter or translator for the whole of the criminal proceedings. Supports § 187(2): written translation of custodial orders, indictments, penal orders and non-final judgments is as a rule necessary; an extract suffices where that preserves the accused's procedural rights; the translation is to be provided without delay; and an oral translation or oral summary may take its place where that preserves those rights, which is as a rule to be assumed where the accused has defence counsel. Supports § 187(3): a waiver of written translation is effective only where the accused has first been instructed about the right and about the consequences of waiving it, and the instruction and the waiver must be documented. Supports § 187(4): subsection (1) applies correspondingly to persons entitled under § 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to join the public prosecution as a Nebenkläger. It supports nothing about any other country and nothing about the availability or quality of interpretation in practice.
National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), for the Republic of Kenya · Legislation · 2010 · link verified 2026-07-27
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (in force 27 August 2010), retrieved as the full official Kenya Law (National Council for Law Reporting) text and confirmed verbatim in two independent passes, including a direct read of the Fourth Schedule. Supports: Art. 1–2 (sovereignty of the people; the Constitution is supreme and any inconsistent law void); Art. 59 (the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, and 59(4) allowing legislation to restructure it into separate commissions — the hook for the KNCHR/NGEC/CAJ split, and 59(2)(h) the ombudsman-type function); Art. 156 (the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser, who does not conduct criminal prosecutions); Art. 157 (the Director of Public Prosecutions — 157(4) power to direct the Inspector-General to investigate; 157(5) a single non-renewable eight-year term; 157(10) not requiring any person's consent and not under the direction or control of any person or authority); Art. 160 (judicial independence — courts subject only to the Constitution and the law); Art. 162–163 (the superior courts and the Supreme Court as apex, bound-by rule 163(7)); Art. 165 (the High Court — 165(3)(a) unlimited original jurisdiction, 165(3)(d) jurisdiction to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution — diffuse constitutional review); Art. 170 (the Kadhis' courts, limited to Muslim personal-status matters where all parties profess Islam); Art. 171–172 (the Judicial Service Commission); Art. 243–246 (the National Police Service as one national service throughout Kenya, the two services, the Inspector-General's independent command under 245(2)(b), the direction firewall under 245(4), and the National Police Service Commission); and the Fourth Schedule Part 1 items 7 (police services, criminal law and correctional services) and 8 (courts), which place all four justice functions in the national government. Establishes constitutional supremacy and that, despite devolution to 47 counties, courts, prosecution, police and prisons are all national functions. WAVE 19 ADDITION, read from the same official Kenya Law text: Art. 50(4) in full — "Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." Note the conditional structure: exclusion follows from a judgment about the effect of admitting the evidence, not automatically from the fact of the violation. WAVE 20 ADDITION. Read from the same official Kenya Law text. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(1): “58. State of emergency (1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132 (4) (d) and only when— (a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is declared.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 132(4)(d)-(e): “132. Functions of the President ... (4) The President may— (a) perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation ...; (b) receive foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (c) confer honours in the name of the people and the Republic; (d) subject to Article 58, declare a state of emergency; and (e) with the approval of Parliament, declare war.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(2)-(3): “(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only— (a) prospectively; and (b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. (3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— ... (b) for not longer than two months at a time.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(3)-(4): “(3) The National Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) by resolution adopted— (i) following a public debate in the National Assembly; and (ii) by the majorities specified in clause (4); and (b) for not longer than two months at a time. (4) The first extension of the declaration of a state of emergency requires a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, and any subsequent extension requires a supporting vote of at least three-quarters of all the members of the National Assembly.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(5): “(5) The Supreme Court may decide on the validity of— (a) a declaration of a state of emergency; (b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; and (c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 58(6): “(6) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency— (a) may limit a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights only to the extent that— (i) the limitation is strictly required by the emergency; and (ii) the legislation is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergency; and (b) shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 25: “25. Fundamental Rights and freedoms that may not be limited Despite any other provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .”. Supports Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 241(3); cf. Article 240(8): “(3) The Kenya Defence Forces— (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.”. CORRECTION TO A COMMON MISSTATEMENT, verified against the text: the escalating extension thresholds in Article 58(3) are TWO-THIRDS and then THREE-QUARTERS of all the members of the National Assembly, not two-thirds and then sixty-five per cent. Note also that Article 58(6) speaks of LIMITING a right rather than derogating from one, and that Article 25 lists rights that “shall not be limited” at all. This record supports the declaration, extension, review and limitation architecture; it records no state of emergency and supports no claim about any other country.WAVE 21 ADDITION. Read from the same Kenya Law text, Chapter Four article by article. Supports Art. 24(1), the limitation clause: a right shall not be limited “except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including — (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” Supports Art. 24(2), which is the provision that distinguishes Kenya's clause from South Africa's: a limiting provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date “is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation” (24(2)(a)); shall not be construed as limiting unless clear and specific (24(2)(b)); and “shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content” (24(2)(c)). Supports Art. 24(3): “The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied.” Supports Art. 24(5), that legislation may limit the application of Arts. 31, 36, 37, 41, 43 and 49 to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the National Police Service. Supports Art. 27(1): “Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Supports Art. 31 verbatim: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have — (a) their person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” Supports Art. 49(1), rights of arrested persons, including (a) to be informed promptly, in a language the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent; (b) to remain silent; (c) to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary; (d) not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence; (f) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 24 hours after being arrested, or the end of the next court day where the 24 hours end outside ordinary court hours; and (h) to be released on bond or bail on reasonable conditions unless there are compelling reasons not to be. Supports Art. 50(1), the right of every person to have a dispute resolvable by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. Supports the RIGHTS-HOLDER observation that these provisions are worded “Every person” and “An arrested person”. Constitutional text only — no decision of the Kenyan courts, no statute, nothing about any other country.